William Poole : "The Fed Wants To Create Inflation"

Isn´t is amazing that just a few days after leaving the Fed Bill Poole is speaking out what the real agenda of the Fed is...... The interview in the FAZ ( one of the most respected German newspapers ) covers lots of others topics like the $, China, commodities, real estate etc but the following quote stands out. The quote is even more true when you agree with my definition of inflation ( see this piece from Mish Inflation: What the heck is it? ) .

Denke hier hat die FAZ in Ihrem Interview einen echten Coup gelandet. Keinen Monat nachdem Poole aus der Fed ausgeschieden ist wird hier endlich mal Klartext über die eigentliche Agenda der Fed ( und leider auch anderen Notenbanken ) gesprochen. Empfehle zudem den restlichen Teil des Interviews zu lesen ( $, China, Rohstoffe, Immobilienmarkt usw. ). Das nachfolgende Zitat fast im Prinzip alles zusammen was man über die Arbeit der Notenbanken und ganz besonders der Fed wissen muß. Das gilt umso mehr wenn man die gleiche Definition von Inflation wie ich habe ( siehe Inflation: What the heck is it? von Mish ).

"Historically inflation is one tool to take pressure away from borrowers. The Fed´s policy is to create inflation to relieve the stress. The Fed was and will be "easy" as long as the economic situation and the health of the financial institutions have stabilized/improved "

"Historisch betrachtet ist Inflation ein Mittel, um den Stress zu erleichtern, den Schuldner fühlen. Die Politik der amerikanischen Zentralbank ist darauf angelegt, Inflation zu kreieren, um diesen Stress zu lindern. Sie war, ist und wird so lange geldpolitisch „locker“ bleiben, bis sich die wirtschaftliche und die der Finanzunternehmen verbessert hat"

> "Easy as long...." LOL! They are trying always to be easy and keep the ponzi game going. I urge you to read How The Bubble Bursts from Mr. Practical via Minyanville for a nice summary how this will end and why Bernanke & Co will fail this time.

> "So lange geldpolitisch locker bleiben wie nötig...." Das ich nicht lache..... Die geldpolitische Ausrichtung wird immer darauf ausgerichtet sein die Inflation zu erhöhen. Für eine wirklich gelungene Zusammenfassung des gängigen Zyklus empfehle ich How The Bubble Bursts von Mr. Practical via Minyanville zu lesen um zu verstehen warum Bernanke & Co diesesmal erhebliche Schwierigkeiten haben werden Ihr Schneeballsystem weiter am laufen zu halten.

On top of this i have found one of the better rants i´ve seen during the past quarter. This comes from Aaron Krowne and fits perfectly to the topic. Debate Over: It's Hyperinflation (and US Economic Collapse) .It´s also gives a different viewpoint on the inflation/deflation debate.

Habe zudem noch eine nette "Tirade" von Aaaron Krowne passend zu dem Postingthema gefunden.Debate Over: It's Hyperinflation (and US Economic Collapse). Gerade weil ich nicht mit allem übereinstimme kann ein Blick nicht schaden. Genau die richtige "Unterhaltung" für ein verregnetes Wochenende.....

GOT GOLD....? ( Within five tonnes of a new record at the GLD gold ETF )

Bernanke vs Greenspan

Amazing that everybody wants to believe that Ben "Core" Bernanke has become an inflation hawk over night..... The only reason this guy is talking tough is that the $ is crashing further and the ECB is forcing him to act. But so far the Fed din´t act and i refuse to believe it until i see it confirmed from at least three sources.... :-) Especially in the face of the ongoing recession....... Disclosure : I´m with Mish´s definition on Inflation ( see Inflation: What the heck is it? ) . It seems i´m not the only one who is sceptical... Make sure you read the rant from Tim / The Mess That Greenspan Made Fisher: Silly interest rate talk

Überraschend das irgendeiner zumindest auf dieser Welt die Aussagen von Ben "Core" Bernanke in Sachen Inflationsbekämpfung für bare Münze nimmt..... Der einzige Grund warum praktisch über Nacht der Falke in Ihm erwacht zu sein scheint ist wohl der EZB zu verdanken die die Fed zum Handeln zwingen wird um einen totalen Kollaps des $ zu verhindern. Ich glaube aus Erfahrung keinerlei Rethorik die aus den Mündern von US Notenbänkern kommt und bin gespannt ob den hohlen Phrasen ausnahmsweise auch mal Taten folgen werden. Glaube das erst wenn ich das von mindestens drei unabhängigen Quellen bestätigt bekomme..... :-) Besonders dann nicht wenn die Erhöhungen im Angesicht einer üblen Rezession erfolgen. Hinweis : Bekanntermaßen sehe ich die Definition von Inflation wie Mish ( siehe Inflation: What the heck is it? ) . Sieht ganz so aus als wenn nicht nur ich der einzige ist der eine gewisse Skepsis an den Tag legt..... Empfehle hier den Rundumschlag von Tim / The Mess That Greenspan Made Fisher: Silly interest rate talk

via Calculated Risk Tim Duy: Fed Between a Rock and ...

Bottom Line: The Fed has no one to blame for their predicament but themselves. Bernanke & Co. cut rates too deeply, fighting a battle against deflation that never was. Now they are backed into a corner; either raise rates and risk upsetting a very fragile economy, or stay the path and risk the inflationary consequences.

AMEN!

Pimco´s Bill Gross Must Read Piece On CPI

The following post from Bill Gross is worth reading every single sentence. While i´m with Mish on what Inflation is ( see Inflation: What the heck is it? ) it is very telling how the US is able in depressing the symptoms of inflation. But as long as foreigners are willing to destroy money in buying US treasuries and agency paper one has to congratulate the US for their excellent PR ( no sarcasm! )........ I´m staying with gold......

Ich empfehle dringend das komplette Posting von Bill Gross zu lesen. Bekanntermaßen sehe ich die Definition von Inflation wie Mish ( siehe Inflation: What the heck is it? ). Es ist schon bemerkenswert wie die USA es schaffen die Symptome der Inflation auf äußert vielfältige Weise zu manipulieren. Der Irakfeldzug ist verglichen damit ein Lacher. Solange Sie es trotzdem schaffen genügend ausländische Investoren zu finden die Gelder besonders in Staatsanleihen und Papieren von Fannie & Freddie zu versenken kann man es den USA nicht einmal übel nehmen die kreative Berechnung jenseits von Enron & Co zu heben. Man muß hier ausdrücklich das herausragende PR loben ( das meine ich ehrlich ). Ich für meinen Teil bleibe da lieber beim Gold......

Thanks to Wall Street Follies

Hmmmmm? Gross / Pimco - What this country needs is either a good 5¢ cigar or the reincarnation of an Illinois “rail-splitter” willing to tell the American people “what up” – “what really up.” We have for so long now been willing to be entertained rather than informed, that we more or less accept majority opinion, perpetually shaped by ratings obsessed media, at face value. After 12 months of an endless primary campaign barrage, for instance, most of us believe that a candidate’s preacher – Democrat or Republican – should be a significant factor in how we vote. We care more about who’s going to be eliminated from this week’s American Idol than the deteriorating quality of our healthcare system. Alternative energy discussion takes a bleacher’s seat to the latest foibles of Lindsay Lohan or Britney Spears and then we wonder why gas is four bucks a gallon. We care as much as we always have – we just care about the wrong things: entertainment, as opposed to informed choices; trivia vs. hardcore ideological debate.

It’s Sunday afternoon at the Coliseum folks, and all good fun, but the hordes are crossing the Alps and headed for modern day Rome – better educated, harder working, and willing to sacrifice today for a better tomorrow. Can it be any wonder that an estimated 1% of America’s wealth migrates into foreign hands every year? We, as a people, are overweight, poorly educated, overindulged, and imbued with such a sense of self importance on a geopolitical scale, that our allies are dropping like flies. “Yes we can?” Well, if so, then the “we” is the critical element, not the leader that will be chosen in November. Let’s get off the couch and shape up – physically, intellectually, and institutionally – and begin to make some informed choices about our future. Lincoln didn’t say it, but might have agreed, that the worst part about being fooled is fooling yourself, and as a nation, we’ve been doing a pretty good job of that for a long time now.

I’ll tell you another area where we’ve been foolin’ ourselves and that’s the belief that inflation is under control. I laid out the case three years ago in an Investment Outlook titled, “Haute Con Job.” I wasn’t an inflationary Paul Revere or anything, but I joined others in arguing that our CPI numbers were not reflecting reality at the checkout counter. In the ensuing four years, the debate has been joined by the press and astute authors such as Kevin Phillips whose recent Bad Money is as good a summer read detailing the state of the economy and how we got here as an “informed” American could make.

Let me reacquaint you with the debate about the authenticity of U.S. inflation calculations by presenting two ten-year graphs – one showing the ups and downs of year-over-year price changes for 24 representative foreign countries, and the other, the same time period for the U.S. An observer’s immediate take is that there are glaring differences, first in terms of trend and second in the actual mean or average of the 2 calculations. These representative countries, chosen and graphed by Ed Hyman and ISI, have averaged nearly 7% inflation for the past decade, while the U.S. has measured 2.6%. The most recent 12 months produces that same 7% number for the world but a closer 4% in the U.S.

This, dear reader, looks a mite suspicious. Sure, inflation was legitimately much higher in selected hot spots such as Brazil and Vietnam in the late 90s and the U.S. productivity “miracle” may have helped reduce ours a touch compared to some of the rest, but the U.S. dollar over the same period has declined by 30% against a currency basket of its major competitors which should have had an opposite effect, everything else being equal. I ask you: does it make sense that we have a 3% – 4% lower rate of inflation than the rest of the world? Can economists really explain this with their contorted Phillips curve, output gap, multifactor productivity theorizing in an increasingly globalized “one price fits all” commodity driven global economy? I suspect not. Somebody’s been foolin’, perhaps foolin’ themselves – I don’t know. This isn’t a conspiracy blog and there are too many statisticians and analysts at the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and Treasury with rapid turnover to even think of it. I’m just concerned that some of the people are being fooled all of the time and that as an investor, an accurate measure of inflation makes a huge difference.
The U.S. seems to differ from the rest of the world in how it computes its inflation rate in three primary ways: 1) hedonic quality adjustments, 2) calculations of housing costs via owners’ equivalent rent, and 3) geometric weighting/product substitution. The changes in all three areas have favored lower U.S. inflation and have taken place over the past 25 years, the first occurring in 1983 with the BLS decision to modify the cost of housing. It was claimed that a measure based on what an owner might get for renting his house would more accurately reflect the real world – a dubious assumption belied by the experience of the past 10 years during which the average cost of homes has appreciated at 3x the annual pace of the substituted owners’ equivalent rent (OER), and which would have raised the total CPI by approximately 1% annually if the switch had not been made.

In the 1990s the U.S. CPI was subjected to three additional changes that have not been adopted to the same degree (or at all) by other countries, each of which resulted in downward adjustments to our annual inflation rate. Product substitution and geometric weighting both presumed that more expensive goods and services would be used less and substituted with their less costly alternatives: more hamburger/less filet mignon when beef prices were rising, for example. In turn, hedonic quality adjustments accelerated in the late 1990s paving the way for huge price declines in the cost of computers and other durables. As your new model MAC or PC was going up in price by a hundred bucks or so, it was actually going down according to CPI calculations because it was twice as powerful. Hmmmmm? Bet your wallet didn’t really feel as good as the BLS did.

In 2004, I claimed that these revised methodologies were understating CPI by perhaps 1% annually and therefore overstating real GDP growth by close to the same amount. Others have actually tracked the CPI that “would have been” based on the good old fashioned way of calculation. The results are not pretty, but are undisclosed here because I cannot verify them. Still, the differences in my 10-year history of global CPI charts are startling, aren’t they? This in spite of a decade of financed-based, securitized, reflationary policies in the U.S. led by the public and private sector and a declining dollar. Hmmmmm?

In addition, Fed policy has for years focused on “core” as opposed to “headline” inflation, a concept actually initiated during the Nixon Administration to offset the sudden impact of OPEC and $12 a barrel oil prices! For a few decades the logic of inflation’s mean reversion drew a fairly tight fit between the two measures, but now in a chart shared frequently with PIMCO’s Investment Committee by Mohamed El-Erian, the divergence is beginning to raise questions as to whether “headline” will ever drop below “core” for a sufficiently long period of time to rebalance the two. Global commodity depletion and a tightening of excess labor as argued in El-Erian’s recent Secular Outlook summary suggest otherwise.

The correct measure of inflation matters in a number of areas, not the least of which are social security payments and wage bargaining adjustments. There is no doubt that an artificially low number favors government and corporations as opposed to ordinary citizens. But the number is also critical in any estimation of bond yields, stock prices, and commercial real estate cap rates. If core inflation were really 3% instead of 2%, then nominal bond yields might logically be 1% higher than they are today, because bond investors would require more compensation. And although the Gordon model for the valuation of stocks and real estate would stress “real” as opposed to nominal inflation additive yields, today’s acceptance of an artificially low CPI in the calculation of nominal bond yields in effect means that real yields – including TIPS – are 1% lower than believed. If real yields move higher to compensate, with a constant equity risk premium, then U.S. P/E ratios would move lower. A readjustment of investor mentality in the valuation of all three of these investment categories – bonds, stocks, and real estate – would mean a downward adjustment of price of maybe 5% in bonds and perhaps 10% or more in U.S. stocks and commercial real estate.

A skeptic would wonder whether the U.S. asset-based economy can afford an appropriate repricing or the BLS was ever willing to entertain serious argument on the validity of CPI changes that differed from the rest of the world during the heyday of market-based capitalism beginning in the early 1980s. It perhaps was better to be “entertained” with the notion of artificially low inflation than to be seriously “informed.” But just as many in the global economy are refusing to mimic the American-style fixation with superficialities in favor of hard work and legitimate disclosure, investors might suddenly awake to the notion that U.S. inflation should be and in fact is closer to worldwide levels than previously thought. Foreign holders of trillions of dollars of U.S. assets are increasingly becoming price makers not price takers and in this case the price may not be right. Hmmmmm?

What are the investment ramifications? With global headline inflation now at 7% there is a need for new global investment solutions, a role that PIMCO is more than willing (and able) to provide. In this role we would suggest: 1) Treasury bonds are obviously not to be favored because of their negative (unreal) real yields. 2) U.S. TIPS, while affording headline CPI protection, risk the delusion of an artificially low inflation number as well. 3) On the other hand, commodity-based assets as well as foreign equities whose P/Es are better grounded with local CPI and nominal bond yield comparisons should be excellent candidates. 4) These assets should in turn be denominated in currencies that demonstrate authentic real growth and inflation rates, that while high, at least are credible. 5) Developing, BRIC-like economies are obvious choices for investment dollars.

Investment success depends on an ability to anticipate the herd, ride with it for a substantial period of time, and then begin to reorient portfolios for a changing world. Today’s world, including its inflation rate, is changing. Being fooled some of the time is no sin, but being fooled all of the time is intolerable. Join me in lobbying for change in U.S. leadership, the attitude of its citizenry, and (to the point of this Outlook) the market’s assumption of low relative U.S. inflation in comparison to our global competitors.

The Flexible Friend.....Some Credit Card Data

Thank god the credit crisis and the recession that never started are already over.....But i assume it´s hard even for a bull trying to explain the already sky high delinquency rate.... Nice to see that the Fed ( just a few weeks ago ) and other central banks are willing to take the securitized credit card debt as collateral. Lets hope the haircut will be big enough and the way too often toxic waste won´t be rolled over indefintely.......... This post ECB Concerned Over Swap-O-Rama Exit Strategy from Mish is showing that there are already schemes in place to "design" securities to limit the haircut & to make them available as collateral . One more reason to be bullish on gold.... Especially when you take a look at this graph Federal Reserve Balance Sheet

Gottseidank ist die Kreditkrise und die nicht eingetroffenen Rezession bereits vorbei....... Dann aber sollten die bereits jetzt astronomischen Rückstandsraten bei den Kreditkarten selbst für die Daueroptimisten aber für noch mehr Beunruhigung sorgen. Immerhin ist es gut zu wissen das zur Not die Fed ( erst seit einigen Wochen ) und andere Zentralbanken auch die verbrieften Kreditkartenforderungen als Sicherheit akzeptieren. Bleibt nur zu hoffen das die angenommenen Risikoabschläge ausreichend sein werden und das diese oft fragwürdigen Papiere nicht auf alle Ewigkeit prolongiert werden ..... Wie dieses Posting ECB Concerned Over Swap-O-Rama Exit Strategy von Mish zeigt hat es nicht lange gedauert bis die Marktteilnehmer Strategien entwickelt haben um dieses System zu Ihren Gunsten zu nutzen. Wenn man das mit einem Blick auf die grafische Darstellung der FED Bilanz kombiniert hat man leicht einen gewichtigen Grund mehr langfristig eine bullishe Meinung zum Gold zu haben....UPDATE: Das paßt wie die Faust auf Auge.....Zentralbanken können auch bankrottgehen FAZ & Sind Verbraucherkredite der nächste Krisenherd? FT Deutschland
Credit-Card Firms May Look Alluring, But Threats Loom WSJ
The quickest way to pay top dollar for something you don't need is to make an impulse buy on your credit card. Investors eyeing shares in credit-card companies as a quick way to profit from an economic recovery should also resist the temptation to buy right now.

A growing feeling that stand-alone credit-card lenders will weather the economic slowdown has started to lift shares in firms like American Express Co., Discover Financial Services and Capital One Financial Corp.

But recent credit-card data indicate that none of the big card companies -- including the large card units at banks like Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc. and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. -- are in the clear. Rising defaults could weigh on earnings for longer than expected.

Since the credit crisis began, investors have expected rising charge-offs -- the term given for losses caused by defaults -- at credit-card companies. Two big negatives were identified: Job losses and, for many borrowers, a sharply reduced ability to use home-equity loans to pay off more expensive card balances.

Credit did deteriorate. Moody's Investors Service reports that, for the card lenders it tracks, the annualized charge-off rate -- which measures defaults as a percentage of loans outstanding -- rose to 6.05% in March from 4.64% a year earlier. The charge-off rate peaked at just over 7% during the 1991 and 2001 recessions, according to Moody's.

Credit-card bulls -- believing that a recession may be avoided -- think charge-offs won't go to recession highs. If so, firms like Capital One could look forward to sharply higher earnings as lower defaults would allow lenders to ease off on the expense of building their loan-loss reserves.

But two key data points indicate defaults climbing higher, not falling fast.

First, card borrowers are starting to pay back less of their outstanding balances each month. Analysts at Oppenheimer & Co. say that a sustained decline in the amount borrowers repay each month, compared with a year-earlier, can be a leading indicator that borrowers will start to fall behind on payments.

Oppenheimer calculates that, for the companies it covers, borrowers paid back 19% of their balance on average in April, down from 19.7% in the year-earlier period. American Express's borrowers paid down 23.8% of their balances in April, down from 25% a year ago, according to Oppenheimer. Conversely, Capital One borrowers paid down 18.5% of their balances last month, up from 17.6% a year earlier.

Also worrisome are data from Moody's suggesting that borrowers are finding it harder to become current on credit-card loans once they fall behind. The ratings firm notes that the amount of loans on which borrowers have skipped three or more payments has started to rise more quickly than loans that have missed one or two. Once borrowers are three payments behind, fewer of them ever catch up.

Federal Reserve data say revolving credit outstanding -- which tracks credit-card balances -- increased 6.7% in the first quarter, compared with the year-earlier period. Borrowers are taking on more debt to support spending through the slowdown.
It's a gamble for card companies to lend more to people who are turning to relatively expensive debt because they're cash strapped.

And it's a bad bet for investors to load up on the card companies taking that gamble.

Fed, ECB, Central Banks Coordinate to Add Liquidity

Another attempt to unwind the liquidity issue. They will have a problem if this won´t work......When i look at the collateral that they are accepting i can smell a rat......

Ein neuer und koordinierter Ansatz um die Liquiditätskrise zu lösen. Sicherlich die bisher mit Abstand vielversprechenste Idee. Sollte selbst diese Herangehensweise nicht helfen haben die Zentralbanken wohl ein Problem.......Wenn ich mir die neuen Kriterien für die zu hinterlegenden Papiere angucke kann man schon auf den Gedanken kommen das hier alle guten Vorsätze über Bord geworfen worden sind.......

Fear at the Fed from Floyd Norris NYT (hat tip to Calculated Risk)
...The Fed will lend money to banks based on almost any asset they own, even ones that are not liquid at all. That will include some of the more exotic loans and securities out there.

How much will the Fed lend against illiquid assets? It has a public list, already in use in discount window lending. You will note that it allows the lending of up to 85 percent of the face value of AAA-rated collateralized mortgage obligations, if there is no observable market value. There are some C.M.O.’s out there that have not yet been downgraded but that might not bring that much in a sale.

I’d love to see which assets are pledged, and how much the Fed lends against them. But the Fed won’t disclose those facts. Nor will it let us know which banks borrow using the new facility.

The Fed's New Auction System Minyanville´s Mr. Practical via Mish

So the Fed is considering a “new auction system”. Essentially, what the Fed is doing is taking the stigma away from the discount window--the Fed will lend directly to banks and the banks don’t have to tell anybody. Theoretically, the Fed could make these quiet loans for indefinite periods, thus giving banks more permanent capital (it’s really credit, but banks call it capital).

Waldman

...this is a bailout,. Nearly all government bailouts take the form of subsidized loans, extending credit at low rates to counterparties or against collateral for which the market would have demanded a high premium. That is precisely what the TAF will do. The Fed's press release claims, of course, that loans will only be available to "sound" banks, and that they will be "fully collateralized". But no one who can get the same deal from private markets will use this facility. The need for the program arises because private markets are skeptical about the soundness of counterparties and the quality of the assets they have to offer as collateral. The Fed hints at this when it mentions the "wide variety of collateral" that can be used to secure loans. You can bet that whatever it is private lenders are eschewing will be pledged as collateral to the Fed under TAF. The Fed is going to bear private risk that the market refuses to. That is a bailout.

Felix Salmon

to give you an idea of what the Fed will lend, consider a AAA-rated subprime-backed CDO – the kind of thing which is causing billions of dollars in losses all over the financial system. If the CDO has a market price, the Fed will lend up to 98% of that price if it's a short-term CDO, up to 96% if it's medium-term, and up to 93% if it's long-term.

But what if the CDO is completely illiquid, and you can't find a price for it at all? No worries, the Fed will still accept it as collateral, and lend up to 85% of par value. (There's an interesting thought experiment here: what happens if a long-term CDO has a market value of, say, 90 cents on the dollar? In that case, an illiquid version of that CDO would actually be worth more to the Fed than the liquid version.)

Do keep on looking down that list, though: it turns out that banks can even put up as collateral subprime credit-card receivables – they don't even need a AAA rating.

Yves from Naked Capitalism Maybe the Real Reason for the Central Bank (Especially the Fed's) Actions Wednesday has also a very good summary

Yyes von Naked Capitalism hat mit Maybe the Real Reason for the Central Bank (Especially the Fed's) Actions Wednesday ein weitere erstklassige Zusammenfassung an den Start gebracht

Now the roundtrip to the official press releases.

Nun zu den offiziellen Presseerklärungen

BOE
The total size of reserves offered in the operations on 18 December and on 15 January will be raised from £2.85 billion to £11.35 billion, of which £10bn will be offered at the 3-month maturity.

The Bank will accept a wider range of high quality securities as collateral against funds advanced at the 3-month maturity. The additional categories of eligible collateral are:

• Bonds issued by sovereigns rated Aa3/AA- or above (in addition to those currently eligible), subject to settlement constraints.
  
• Bonds issued by G10 government agencies guaranteed by national governments, rated AAA.
  
• Conventional debt security issues of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, the Federal National Mortgage Corporation and the Federal Home Loan Banking system, rated AAA.
  
• AAA-rated tranches of UK, US and EEA asset-backed securities (ABS) backed by credit cards; and AAA-rated tranches of UK and EEA prime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).
  
• Covered bonds rated AAA.

BOC Part 1 & BOC
Expansion of List of Securities Eligible as Collateral for Use Under Bank of Canada Standing Liquidity Facility

Under its Standing Liquidity Facility (SLF), the Bank of Canada is prepared to provide liquidity on a daily basis to financial institutions that participate directly in the payments systems operated by the Canadian Payments Association. Loans made by the Bank of Canada must be fully collateralized.

In the context of the ongoing review of the Bank of Canada's collateral policy, begun in the spring of 2007, the Bank has decided to broaden the range of securities acceptable as collateral for use under the SLF to include (i) certain types of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) sponsored by banks and (ii) U.S. Treasuries.

By the end of March 2008, the Bank will expand the list of eligible securities to include certain types of Canadian dollar-denominated ABCP that meet the following general criteria: are bank-sponsored, are covered by a liquidity provision that meets global standards, and are backed by traditional assets of an acceptable credit quality. In addition, higher standards of disclosure and additional credit ratings will be required. Asset-backed commercial paper backed by collateralized debt obligations and other highly-structured assets will not be considered at this time.

Over the next two months, the Bank will consult with financial institutions and other interested parties on the terms and conditions that will apply to ABCP as collateral. By the end of March 2008, the Bank will announce the terms and conditions regarding the use of ABCP as collateral, including the margins that will be applied. The arrangements for accepting U.S. Treasuries as collateral are expected to be completed by mid-2008.

Fed

Under the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program, the Federal Reserve will auction term funds to depository institutions against the wide variety of collateral that can be used to secure loans at the discount window. All depository institutions that are judged to be in generally sound financial condition by their local Reserve Bank and that are eligible to borrow under the primary credit discount window program will be eligible to participate in TAF auctions. All advances must be fully collateralized. By allowing the Federal Reserve to inject term funds through a broader range of counterparties and against a broader range of collateral than open market operations, this facility could help promote the efficient dissemination of liquidity when the unsecured interbank markets are under stress.

Alternative Instruments for Open Marketand Discount Window Operations / Fed Page 43

Acceptable discount window collateral generally can best be described as any asset that can confidently be liquidated within a reasonable period of time at the value at which it is accepted.As a general rule, the greater the level of risk associated with a certain type of underlying collateral, the lower the (lendable) valuation assigned to the collateral. Accurately measured, the margins or haircuts used in the valuation process should reflect the true relative risks of the various asset types, and they should contribute to relative asset price neutrality across the broad spectrum of assets deemed eligible for collateral.

Each TAF auction will be for a fixed amount, with the rate determined by the auction process (subject to a minimum bid rate). The first TAF auction of $20 billion is scheduled for Monday, December 17, with settlement on Thursday, December 20; this auction will provide 28-day term funds, maturing Thursday, January 17, 2008. The second auction of up to $20 billion is scheduled for Thursday, December 20, with settlement on Thursday, December 27; this auction will provide 35-day funds, maturing Thursday, January 31, 2008. The third and fourth auctions will be held on January 14 and 28, with settlement on the following Thursdays. The amounts of those auctions will be determined in January. The Federal Reserve may conduct additional auctions in subsequent months, depending in part on evolving market conditions.

ECB

The Eurosystem shall conduct two US dollar liquidity-providing operations, in connection with the US dollar Term Auction Facility, against ECB-eligible collateral for a maturity of 28 and 35 days ECB Eligibility Criteria Collateral The submission of bids will take place on 17 and 20 December 2007 for settlement on 20 and 27 December 2007, respectively. The operational details can be obtained from the ECB’s website (www.ecb.europa.eu). The US dollars will be provided by the Federal Reserve to the ECB, up to $20 billion, by means of a temporary reciprocal currency arrangement (swap line).

SNB $ 4 billion

Overbought in an Unfavorable Market Climate / Hussman

On his mission to inform and try to provide his much needed "anti spin" Hussman must feel very lonely. It´s amazing what nonsense you hear and read hour by hour on a daily basis from wall street finest. Thanks from Germany

Hussman muß sich auf seiner Mission ungefilterte Wahrheiten unters Volk zu bringen ziemlich einsam vorkommen. Es gibt meiner Meinung nach kaum einen der so beharrlich & gebetsmühlenartig seinen "Anti Spin" mit Fakten untermauert. Das ganze wird immer dann besonders gruselig wenn man sich die Kommentare der sog. anderen Experten vor Augen führt und diese Hussman´s Ausführungen gegenüber stellt. Besten Dank dafür aus Deutschland



Overbought in an Unfavorable Market Climate
Also, as I've frequently emphasized, monetary policy is not, and cannot be independent of fiscal policy. All the Fed does is to determine whether government liabilities take the form of Treasury bonds sold to the public, or currency and reserves held by the public directly or indirectly through the banking system. Monetary policy determines the mix (and even then only at the margin). Fiscal policy determines the total quantity of those government liabilities, most which are absorbed these days not by the Fed but by foreigners (in an amount many, many times what the Fed absorbs). If you want to worry about some entity that could have enormous impact on U.S. economic activity, ignore the Fed and focus on the real “maestros:” foreign purchasers of U.S. Treasuries, particularly China and Japan. ....

Again, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has “injected” only about $16 billion of “liquidity” into the U.S. banking system since March – all via short-term repos that are continually rolled over. Meanwhile, foreign investors (particularly China's central bank) have provided about $2 billion in fresh “liquidity” per day, mostly by purchasing U.S. securities (primarily Treasuries).

Liquidity and real investment
What has happened to this dough? This is the money that the U.S. uses to finance its own gross domestic investment (“real” investment such as factories, equipment, housing, etc). Indeed, all of the growth in U.S. gross domestic investment over the past decade has been financed by foreign capital inflows, since our government appears incapable of existing without spending away the domestic savings that would otherwise allow America to self-finance its growth*.

In the coming year or so, we'll probably see a narrowing of the massive trade and current account deficits that have accumulated in recent years. As I've noted before, every dollar of “improvement” we observe in the U.S. current account deficit is typically matched by a dollar of deterioration in gross domestic investment. That regularly happens during recessions, and it's likely to happen in this one (nothing in recent reports or market action materially changes the prospects of an oncoming U.S. economic downturn).

Recessions are generally due to a growing mismatch between what the economy produces and what is demanded. During those recessions, overinvestment stops, losses are taken, adjustments are made, and resources are reallocated, all of which help to eventually turn the economy around. It is these adjustments that require a long and variable lag. They are not primarily the result of “Fed liquidity.”

In any event, the overinvestment and excess inventory during this economic cycle has clearly been in the areas of housing, finance, and debt origination, so those are the areas that will bear the primary burden of adjustment. ....


Fast, furious, and prone to failure
As I noted last week, “The market has now cleared the oversold condition that it established a week ago. Stocks aren't overbought here, but overbought conditions in unfavorable Market Climates tend to be rare. The steepest bear market losses tend to follow immediately on the heels of such overbought conditions.”

Presently, the market has established just that profile. This is one of the very few situations in which I ever have a pointed view about likely market direction. Although the likely Fed rate cut (no opinion on 25 vs. 50) on Tuesday adds some uncertainty, and the market would most likely celebrate a 50-basis point cut, there is currently not much evidence that suggests that even such a rally would be sustained for long. In my view, the probable risks are skewed to the downside. I don't believe there is such a thing as the Fed getting “ahead of the curve.” LIBOR continues to be “sticky” in the face of multiple cuts in the Federal Funds rate, credit spreads continue to push toward new highs, and there is no reason to believe that minuscule volumes of Fed repos will have any effect in ameliorating credit risks.

Meanwhile, the Treasury “plan” to bail out homeowners (without bailing them out) is likely to be both very little and very late. Think of it as the equivalent of the FEMA response after hurricane Katrina. Barring an almost immediate freeze on foreclosures and interest rate resets, we are likely to observe a rash of delinquencies and the need for soaring loan loss reserves even over the next few months. All of this talk of Federal help feels good, but it will be next to impossible to coordinate Federal assistance quickly and equitably. On the other hand, freezing lenders ability to collect on bad loans will simply allow balance sheets to deteriorate without any actual financial solution to the problem

The problem is simple: people bought houses during a boom, at bubble prices that they couldn't actually afford. The money that was lent has already been dissipated to the sellers – the owners of the houses don't have it, and neither do the lenders. The excess money that homeowners can't actually afford to pay back will have to be written off institution by institution, lender by lender. Major loan losses are inevitable. To believe they are something less than inevitable is to stay at the party even as flames engulf the building, in hopes that water is on the way. The U.S. financial system is going to have a bad time with this – there will be major losses and major adjustments. Eventually we will work through it, but it is delusional to look for a bottom when the real losses haven't even started to emerge.

Thanks to Jim Borgman

Again, with regard to the stock market, my having any view at all relating to short-term market direction is very unusual, but I am particularly concerned because we now have overbought conditions in a negative Market Climate. The Fed may very well give the market an extra psychological boost next week with a 50 basis point cut, but a disappointing move or statement could prompt an unusually steep decline. As for market action, despite the standard “fast, furious” rebound from oversold conditions, there is no indication from the quality of market action that investors have adopted a robust willingness to speculate.

On the subject of multiple Fed rate cuts being bullish for stocks, it may be helpful to note that in those events that multiple Fed cuts helped the market, stocks had generally already experienced a bear market decline of 20-40% prior to the second rate cut, and the average P/E on the S&P 500 was typically below 14 and (generally less than 11). Stocks were largely poised to perform well anyway, generally by virtue of being sold off to depressed valuations. Even in the 1998 instance (which occurred at much richer valuations than previously), the S&P 500 had plunged about 20% prior to recovering.

Investors let mottos like “don't fight the Fed” and “it's a new economy” do their thinking for them in 2000-2002, while the S&P 500 lost half its value and the Nasdaq lost three-quarters. There's good reason to expect “motto-based investing” to be disappointing again. Keynes may have been right in saying “the market can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent,” but provided you don't do things that endanger your solvency (like taking large net short positions), there's nothing wrong with avoiding risk in periods of market irrationality - particularly once market internals deteriorate measurably as they have now. Provably incorrect ideas are eventually proven incorrect. The beliefs that the Fed is “injecting massive liquidity” and that profit margins hold up despite economic softness are provably incorrect ideas.

What? Did Bernanke Really Say This ?

The piece from the WSJ is for real.... I´ve heard him say this during yesterday lousy performance before Congress' Joint Economic Committee. I think after this even the single person left that still took Bernanke seriously has now some doubts. Even i wouldn´t have thought that he is morphing into Greenspan at almost warp speed..... Cramer will be proud....And some still wonder why the $ in tanking.....

Ich kann die Geschichte des WSJ bestätigen.... Ich habe dieses Zitat während des erbärmlichen Auftrittes von Bernanke vor dem Congress' Joint Economic Committee selber gehört. Ich denke das spätestens jetzt die wenigen die noch immer eine hohe Meinung von Bernanke haben jetzt doch langsam Zweifel bekommen. Und selbst ich hätte es für unmöglich gehalten das Bernanke sich in Lichtgeschwindigkeit in Greenspan verwandelt.... Und einige Fragen sich immer noch warum das Vertrauen in den $ im freien Fall ist....

Thanks to Cox & Forkum

Idea of Jumbo-Loan Guarantee Is Floated
WASHINGTON -- Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke yesterday floated a new idea to fix the troubled market for mortgages too large for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy: Allow the companies to securitize jumbo-size mortgages but have the federal government guarantee them

Fannie and Freddie currently can buy mortgages only up to $417,000, and Congress -- so far -- hasn't acted to lift that limit despite distress in that market that has made jumbo mortgages at "somewhat tighter terms and higher prices," as Mr. Bernanke put it.

As an alternative to lifting that $417,000 cap, Mr. Bernanke offered a surprise answer to questions on Capitol Hill. He suggested that Congress could consider allowing the companies, known as "government sponsored enterprises," buy mortgages of as much as $1 million from lenders, pay the government a fee for guaranteeing them and then turn them into securities to be sold to investors.

"That would be, I think, of some assistance to the mortgage market," the Fed chairman said. "From the federal government's point of view, it would be taking on some credit risk, which you may or may not be willing to do." He added, "It would be a good idea to make the GSEs ultimately responsible for some, any excess losses, or some part of excess losses, relative to the premiums that are paid."

Mr. Bernanke's idea is significant because it could potentially extend the government's support and exposure to the mortgage market.... For years, the Fed and the Bush Treasury have complained that investors believe the companies have an implicit government guarantee of their debt. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase loans on the secondary market and either package them into securities or hold them in their portfolios, which now total $1.4 trillion.

> I can smell fear.......

Dollar Slumps to Record on China's Plans to Diversify Reserves

After Rogers, Faber, Gross, Buffet & Giselle now China. Don´t know what will get the most press in the US....... I assume that they will soon find a CPI formula to back out the increased costs that will come sooner or later from the weakening $ . Maybe Bernanke shouldn´t run the Fed via the applause meter ( Fleckenstein ) from Wall Street ........ It will be interesting to see how the "vilgilant" (LOL!) bond market will react to the news... And i expect at least one speech from Paulson & Co that the "strong $ policy is still in place" LOL!

Nach Rogers , Faber, Gross, Buffet & Giselle nun China. Bin mir nicht sicher was in den USA mehr Presse bekommen wird..... Höchste Zeit für die Verantwortichen eine CPI Formel zu finden die getsiegene Importpriese aus den Inflationszahlen herausrechnen...... Evtl. wäre es eine gute Idee wenn Bernanke sich mal nicht von Wall Street diktieren läßt was er zu tun hat...... Bin gespannt wie der angeblich so wachsame Bondmarkt (LOL) auf die Neuigkeiten reagiert. Ich erwarte mindestens eine Rede von Paulson & CO das die "Politik des starken $ " weiter bestand hat.... Slapstick pur!

This cover seems to be timeless..... Dieses Titelbild scheint Zeitlos zu sein........

Introducing the Xera:

Thanks to the suggestion put forth by a reader of my daily column, I have come up with the new name for our currency. Henceforth, it shall be called the xera. That's a combination of Xerox, for the piece of Xerox paper that it is; lira, which in the past was one of the world's chronically weak currencies; and, most importantly, the fact that it sounds like zero. That is ultimately where the xera is headed.

via Fleckenstein ( see Blogroll )

Dollar Slumps to Record on China's Plans to Diversify Reserves
Nov. 7 (Bloomberg) -- The dollar slumped to a record low against the euro after a Chinese official said the government will buy better-performing currencies as it diversifies $1.43 trillion of foreign-exchange reserves.

``We will favor stronger currencies over weaker ones, and will readjust accordingly,'' Cheng Siwei, vice chairman of China's National People's Congress, told a conference in Beijing. The dollar is losing its status among the world's currencies, Xu Jian, a central bank vice director, said at the same meeting.

The dollar fell against 14 of the 16 most-active currencies, declining to the weakest versus the Canadian dollar since the end of fixed exchange rates in 1950, a 26-year low against the pound and a 23-year low to the Australian dollar.

China's Reserves
Chinese investors have reduced their holdings of U.S. Treasuries by 5 percent to $400 billion in the five months to August. China Investment Corp., which manages the nation's $200 billion sovereign wealth fund, said last month it may get more of the nation's reserves to invest to improve returns.

``The world's currency structure has changed,'' Xu from the People's Bank of China said at the conference. ``The dollar has been depreciating.'' Cheng, speaking to reporters after his speech, said his comments don't mean China will buy more euros.

The dollar’s slide: 1/3 down and falling faster / FT

• The US dollar has now lost more than a third of its value (-35%) against a basket of major currencies since Feb 2002.
• The decline is accelerating. The USD has shed -12.5% of its value in the last year, -3.5% in the last month, and -1.5% in the last week alone.
  
  

``Cheng has a history of speaking out on a range of financial market and economic developments, and his comments are not always accurate,'' said Glenn Maguire, chief Asia economist at Societe Generale SA in Hong Kong.

Cheng's remarks on Jan. 30 that China's stock rally was a ``bubble'' caused the benchmark index to fall the most in almost two years on Jan. 31. The Shanghai and Shenzhen 300 Index, then over 2,500 points, has since climbed above 5,300.

The dollar's decline helped drive the price of crude oil to a record and gold to a 27-year high, encouraging investors to buy assets in commodity-producing nations. The dollar's 9.8 percent drop against the euro this year boosted the competitiveness of U.S. exports, helping shrink the nation's trade deficit to $57.6 billion in August, the smallest since January.

`Asset Story'
Against the pound, the dollar declined to $2.0955, the lowest since May 1981. It fell to $1.1010 per Canadian dollar. The currency slid against the Australian dollar to 93.89 U.S. cents, the lowest since April 1984 from 92.87 U.S. cents. The U.S. currency also fell to as low as 1.1347 against the Swiss franc, the lowest since December 2004.

``This is an asset story and shows sentiment for the dollar continues to be quite negative,'' said David Forrester, currency economist at Barclays Capital in Singapore.

The Australian dollar gained after the country's central bank raised its benchmark borrowing cost to 6.75 percent today. Governor Glenn Stevens, announcing today's quarter-point rate increase, said inflation will exceed his target.

> Gold is up over 15 bucks to 835$!

Janszen from iTulip on Gold

Thanks Eric!

Marc Faber & Greenspan Interviews

What a contrast to the screaming and hyping on CNBC. Excellent Interview covering every important topic

Was für ein Kontrast zu dem üblichen Hype der ansonsten spezeill auf Sendern wie CNBC läuft. Ein wirklich sehenswertes Interview das alle wichtigen Prolembereiche anspricht.

Marc
Faber Video

Thanks to iTulip here is the totally clueless "Easy Al" ...... This is a must see!

Dank iTulip gibt es hier als Kontrast den total ahnungslosen "Easy Al".... Unbedingt ansehen!

If you can stand more from Greenspan click here

Wenn Ihr noch mehr von Greenspan vertragen könnt klickt bitte hier.

Bad-News Bulls / Economist

This piece from the Economist sums it up. It´s always amazing to watch how quick sentiment can turn either way. It will be interesting to see what will be the trigger for the next "minor correction". I´ll bet that it has something to do with the coming CPI numbers....... One more chance for the bulls to "buy the dip"......

Dieser Bericht vom Economist faßt die Lage recht gut zusammen. Ich bin jedesmal wieder erstaunt und fasziniert wie schnell sich die Stimmung drehen kann. Ich bin gespannt welche Meldung der nächste Auslöser für eine erneute "kleine Korrektur" sein wird. Ich denke das es evtl. etwas mit den kommenden CPI Zahlen zu tun haben könnte.... Das wird den Bullen eine erneute Chance geben um nachzuladen. Evtl. mehr als Ihnen lieb sein wird..... ;-)

Bad-News Bulls / Economist
THE news seems to go from bad to worse. In late September figures showed that the American housing market was in free fall, with both sales and prices plunging. On October 1st Citigroup and UBS, two of the world's biggest banks, said they were writing down $9.3 billion of debt between them because of the credit crunch.

Global stockmarkets have reacted not with dismay but with euphoria. Wall Street marked the Citigroup write-downs by driving the Dow Jones Industrial Average to a record high (see chart). The MSCI emerging-markets index has soared to new highs. This summer's turmoil seems to have been completely forgotten.

What explains this apparent insouciance? It seems that investors reckon they cannot lose. “Take your pick,” says Gerard Minack, a strategist at Morgan Stanley: “Equity markets are either behaving as if the worst is over for credit and housing problems or they remain convinced that the [Federal Reserve] can offset whatever bad news may unfold.” In other words, bad economic news means the Fed will cut interest rates and good news means recession will be avoided.

There are some signs to support the idea that the worst might be over in the credit markets. After strenuous effort, banks have managed to find buyers for $9.4 billion of the $24 billion needed to finance the takeover of First Data, a payments processor, by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, a private-equity firm. According to JPMorgan, even the structured products that caused so much disquiet during the summer are moving again—$6.2 billion of collateralised-debt obligations were issued in the last week of September.

Risk appetite is resurfacing in currency markets, too. The “carry trade”, the borrowing of low-yielding currencies to buy higher-yielders, is back in full swing; the Australian and New Zealand dollars have been surging. Having reached a 27-year high on October 1st, gold (often seen as a safe haven for nervous investors) suddenly lost 2.5% of its value in a day.

The bullish case seems fairly simple. The American economy may be slowing but the rest of the world, particularly emerging markets, can make up for it. As a result, corporate profits can continue to be strong. Profits forecasts are being revised down, but not dramatically so. The dollar's decline has added impetus to the earnings of American exporters and multinationals with overseas subsidiaries.

In this light, the credit crunch seems like old news. Even bank write-downs can be spun in a good light. Much of the panic in August was caused by fear of what banks had on their books; now the bad news is out, investors can relax.

In addition, many investors are looking back to 1998 when the Fed cut rates in response to a previous crisis in the finance industry—the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund. The markets recovered quickly and the dotcom bubble reached its apogee. This time round, emerging markets (or even alternative energy stocks) might be the big winners.

> Here comes a slightly different view Emerging markets: an exhilarating, but potentially lethal, ride

> Hier eine leicht andere Einschätzung Emerging markets: an exhilarating, but potentially lethal, ride

And in the short term at least, money that was pouring into the credit markets is now being invested in shares.

But not everyone buys the bulls' arguments. Experienced observers of the debt market, such as Tom Jasper of Primus Guaranty, a credit insurer, think the crunch is far from over. According to Moody's, a rating agency, the spread (excess interest rate) of high-yield debt over Treasury bonds has fallen from the crisis peak but is far higher than it was in June.

In the quick-to-rollover money markets, there is still a much wider spread than normal between the rate governments must pay to borrow money and the rate which big banks have to pay. That indicates investors remain nervous about the extent to which banks are exposed to losses from subprime mortgages, or large private-equity borrowers.

Problems in the housing markets are far from over, too. The latest gloomy statistic to emerge was a 21.5% annual fall in pending American home sales, a figure that is a leading indicator for actual sales. House prices will surely fall further and defaults increase, as homeowners struggle to cope with higher mortgage rates from “teaser” loans taken out in 2006.

That may well have a depressing effect on consumer sentiment, something which the Fed's rate cut last month may do little to help. Normally, interest-rate moves take 12-18 months to work their way through the economy. In any case, mortgage rates are barely lower than they were a month ago. The American economy could yet slip into recession, an event on which Goldman Sachs now places a 40% probability.

Even the argument that corporate profits are still strong does not look completely convincing. American profits are close to a 40-year high relative to national output, according to Longview Economics, a financial consultancy. That suggests they should return to the mean, especially as the profit numbers taken from national-accounts data look a lot weaker than those reported by quoted companies. The last time such a gap appeared was in the late 1990s, an era of much creative accounting.

And while the weak dollar may be good news for American exporters, it is bad for European companies. Having been strong in the early part of this year, the latest data on European economies have weakened sharply; Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, is not the only one concerned by the euro's strength. There is the potential for turmoil in the currency markets, either because Europe takes a stand against the rising euro at the Group of Seven finance ministers' meeting on October 19th, or because international investors, who have to finance the American trade deficit, become alarmed by the weakness of the dollar. Stockmarkets might be able to rise above the problems of the credit markets. But whether they could gain ground in the face of foreign-exchange market turmoil as well seems a lot more doubtful.

Credit markets "Still gloomy" / Economist

Will be interesting to see how long the program "The Fed has saved us..." will continue to run in heavy rotation...... In the long run i think the Fed move was one of the worst decision and has undermined the little bit of credibility that was left .....

Es wird spannend zu sehen sein wiel lange die Phase "Die Fed hat den Markt gerettet..." noch anhält. Bisher wird sowohl das lange Ende der Zinskurve, der verfallende $, die haussierenden Rochstoffe, die gewohnt desaströsen Makrodaten und wie üblich auch die schlechten Unternehmenszahlen konsequent ignoriert...... Am schwerwiegensten ist aber wohl der endgültige Verlust der letzten Glaubwürdigkeit den besonders Bernanke noch bei einigen wenigen Naiven genossen hat.....

Credit markets "Still gloomy"
WAS that it then? From a shareholder's standpoint, it certainly looked as if the Federal Reserve had administered a miracle cure to stockmarkets with its spoonful of easy money on September 18th. Bankers began to talk of the worst being over and done with.

> Here is the perfect "Anti Spin" from Hussman Knowing What Ain't True that will be remembered after the "animal spirit" has run out of food....

> Hier sachliches von Hussman Knowing What Ain't True das wohl erst dann wieder Beachtung finden wird nachdem einige realisiert haben das die Gier mal wieder gesiegt hat.....

In the debt markets, however, a more jaundiced view prevails. Lingering pessimism—in overnight money markets right along the yield curve to long-term bonds—is likely to make the Fed's task harder as it seeks to revive the economy.

For one thing, the reaction of America's bond market to the interest-rate cut was different from previous rate-cutting cycles (see chart). Instead of falling, as they have in the recent past, ten-year bond yields rose, as investors fretted that the Fed's largesse would stoke inflation. In America and the euro zone yields came off their highs on September 25th, when weak economic data eased inflationary concerns. But economists polled by Bloomberg still expect ten-year yields in America to remain above their levels before the rate cut.

That does not bode well for American mortgage rates, which tend to rise along with long-term Treasury-bond yields. Indeed, the price of a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage has risen by seven basis points since last week, according to bankrate.com, a personal-finance website. That raises concerns about how little the Fed's rate cuts may help the housing market.
Elsewhere, banks continue to find it hard to get funding from other banks over short time-periods, because of their over-stretched balance sheets as a result of America's subprime mortgage crisis. The London Interbank-Offered Rate (LIBOR) in dollars, euros and sterling at overnight and three-month maturities remains higher than normal. Even future rates do not indicate much hope of improvement. Last week, LIBOR traders expected sterling rates to fall to 5.96% by the year-end from 6.35% today. Now traders still expect a drop, but only to around 6.16%.

Like the ten-year yields in America, higher LIBOR rates affect mortgage rates in Britain. Although mortgages are linked to the Bank of England's official rate, which has not changed since July, high-street banks partly fund their loans using LIBOR. If the rate moves up, or does not fall as much as expected, banks are likely to pass on the cost to mortgage borrowers.

Companies, too, are likely to be affected. Corporate-bond markets have re-opened since the Fed cut rates. But given the reluctance of banks to lend, those firms that need ready cash in short-term markets such as commercial paper are likely to feel the squeeze. “Those companies who last rolled over their short-term debt in July are likely to be in for a rude shock when they try to do so again in December,” says John Wraith of the Royal Bank of Scotland. Prepare for a long convalescence.

John Authers: Two views on the Fed Funds rate cut There are notes of caution - the main indices are not back to their highs, and defensive stocks have outperformed for the last week - but the cut has made stock investors a lot of money, he notes.

“Intriguingly, it has also made money for commodity investors,” he adds. The S&P GSCI non-energy commodity index is up a cool 16 per cent since the Fed cut the discount rate in August.

But the Fed was not acting for these people, Authers reminds us. “It wanted to relieve the crisis of confidence in money markets, where doubts about the quality of collateral had sent soaring the rates at which banks could raise funds.”

To look at it in two ways: First, the dollar Libor rate, at which banks lend to each other, fell by the full 50 basis points. Having touched 5.725 per cent, it is now 5.23 per cent. In asset-backed commercial paper 90-day paper rates reached 6.25 per cent and have come back down to 5.37 per cent.

So the rate cut reduced the cost of finance, bringing it back down to the levels before the crisis. This is important.

To look at it a second way, though: “Normally Libor and commercial paper are closely tied to fed funds. Both tend to be only slightly higher than fed funds, reflecting only slightly higher risks. When those spreads suddenly widened, it signalled a crisis of confidence.”

Those spreads are as wide as they were before the rate cut. In July, commercial paper traded at only 4bp above Fed Funds. That spread is now 62bp. Three-month Libor usually trades at 10 or 11bp above Fed Funds: that spread is now 45bp.

So the rate cut euphoria has not flushed the underlying lack of confidence out of the system. The money market shows banks are still fearful of ugly surprises in the next few months. Maybe that should temper the roaring equity and commodity markets.

> I don´t have heard "Don´t fight the Fed" during the last few years at times when the Fed was hiking rates ;-)

> Besonders der Spruch "Don´t fight the Fed" gefällt mir besonders gut. Komisch nur das man diesen Spruch nicht in Zeiten hört wenn die Notenbanken die Zinsen anheben ;-)

Fed, Greenspan & Bernanke Bashing Part XXII......

Enjoy! Viel Spaß!



Open Letter to Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke From: Eric Janszen / iTulip

Greenspan Cartoon

With the trouble just beginning and more and more people waking up i ´ll bet that the credibility of almost all central banks will take a significant hit. But when you have to fund big deficits like the US the problem is getting worse.....

Nachdem der Ärger gerade erst begonnen hat und immer mehr Leute aufwachen ist es nicht gewagt zu prognostizieren das das Vertrauen in die Zentralbanken ( auch ausserhalb der "Bloggerwelt" und den "Goldbugs") rund um den Globus erheblich leiden wird. Das ganze wird besonders für die Staaten zum Problem die hohe Defizite wie z.B. die USA finanzieren müssen....

Hat tip to New York City Housing Bubble & The Mess That Greenspan Made

Show Me The Money! / Hussman

On top of Hussman´s post i think it is good advice to read Turning a BB Gun Into a Machine Gun? from Russ Winter on the latest Fed and central bank action around the world. While i agree with Hussman on the data and facts i think Bernanke and the Fed have given the wrong message to the market. Too bad that the $index and the long end of the yield cirve didn´t play out like they have hoped .....

Zusätzlich zu den Ausfühtungen von Hussman ist es ratsam sich Turning a BB Gun Into a Machine Gun? von Russ Winter hinsichtlich der Notenbankaktionen in letzter Zeit durchzulesen. So sehr ich auch mit Hussman was die Faktenlage angeht übereinstimme so sehr muß man jedoch auch sagen das Bernanke und die Fed dem Markt praktisch eine Einladung gegeben haben die zwar kurzfristig gute Laune verspricht mittel bis langfristig aber kontraproduktiv sein wird. Dumm nur das sowohl der $Index als auch das lange Ende der Zinskurve die Partystimmung nicht teilen kann .....

These quotes sums it up ........Diese Zitate treffen es ziemlich gut

Scott Reamer / Minyanville

Bravo to Ron Paul for giving voice to the hundreds of millions or pensioners,savers, working stiffs, poor, fixed income beneficiaries, laborers, gasoline-, bread-, milk-, and egg-buyers who weren’t able to ask Mr. Bernanke why he – like every Fed chairman before him since 1913 – screwed them for the benefit of the top 5% of the population of this country.

Bernanke: The anti-Robin Hood / Fleckenstein

The Federal Bank of Guardian Angels roared down Wall Street last Tuesday. Its mission -- to bail out the stock market -- was a success (for now).

But the rate cut was no gift to Main Street, which lies outside the
loop of crony capitalism.

Bobble-head Fed Long ago, the Fed abdicated its responsibility under then-Chairman Alan Greenspan. But now chief Ben Bernanke and the boys at the Fed have taken irresponsibility to a new level, where they have clearly demonstrated that they work for Wall Street -- and when Wall Street says jump, the Fed asks, how high?

I don't quite have the database to research this, but I seriously doubt that we've ever experienced a 10% fed funds rate cut, or discount rate cuts of better than 15%, with the stock market a few percentage points off an all-time high.

Show Me The Money!
Investors were cheered last week when the Federal Reserve lowered its target for the Federal Funds Rate by 50 basis points, and lowered the Discount Rate (the interest rate it charges on loans to the banking system) by 50 basis points as well. It's important to emphasize that the impact of these changes is mainly psychological, and outside of a pool of a few billion dollars, won't have any effective bearing on the “liquidity” of the banking system, nor on the solvency of $3.4 trillion in real estate loans, and $6.3 trillion in total bank lending. ...

Much ado about nothing
....If you examine the data you'll find that the total level of “liquidity” that the FOMC deals with is minuscule in relation to a $13.8 trillion economy, and the variation is even smaller. The total reserves of the U.S. banking system are about $40-$45 billion, and are very stable. The Fed simply does not “inject” meaningful amounts of “liquidity” to the banking system.

Indeed, the latest cuts in Fed controlled interest rates were effected without any injection of “liquidity” into the banking system at all. Total borrowings by depository institutions from the Federal Reserve (i.e. borrowings at the Discount Rate) actually fell last week to $2.421 billion, from $3.158 billion the preceding week. That couple of billion dollars is the sum total of all outstanding borrowings at the Discount Rate. Though these figures are still higher than the typical level of discount window borrowing (a few hundred million), they are minuscule. Yet these are the figures that investors are revved up about as if this “liquidity” will save the mortgage market.

Meanwhile, there has been no material change in the “liquidity” provided by the Federal Reserve in the federal funds market either. It's kind of funny (and just a little pathetic) how the press and investors get all excited every time the FOMC does an open market operation, as if they represent fresh “injections” of liquidity into the banking system. They are generally nothing but rollovers of existing repurchase agreements.

Open market operations come in two flavors: permanent and temporary. As I've frequently noted, about 99% of the monetary base created by the Federal Reserve represents gradual and predictable increases in the amount of currency in circulation. Year-to-date, the Federal Reserve engaged in what it classifies as “permanent” open market purchases amounting to $1.9 billion in February, $6.1 billion in April, and $2.7 billion in May, for a year-to-date “permanent” increase of $10.7 billion in the monetary base. Not surprisingly, most of this has been drawn off as currency in circulation, which has increased by $9.1 billion since January. Simply put, “permanent” open market operations are simply the way the Fed increases currency in circulation. It is simply incorrect to believe that these open market operations add meaningfully to the “liquidity” from which banks are able to make loans.

Temporary open market operations generally take the form of “repurchase agreements” whereby the Fed takes collateral in the form of Treasury securities or U.S. government backed agency securities, and provides funds to banks for periods typically ranging from 1 day to 2 weeks. At the end of that period, the banks are obligated to repurchase the securities from the Fed at the sale price, plus interest.

Since reserves are only required on checking deposits, the total amount of reserves in the U.S. banking system is only about $40 to $45 billion. Banks don't hold stack a pile of idle cash in a corner of the vault to maintain these reserves. Instead, they hold securities like Treasury bills and U.S. government-backed agency notes, and if they find themselves in need of reserves, they just pledge these securities to the Federal Reserve as collateral.

Look at the last month of data. We know that total bank reserves during this period have ranged between about $40 to $45 billion. Using data on the last 25 FOMC operations reported by the New York Fed, we can tie out the amount of outstanding repurchase agreements on any given day. Recall that total reserves include those obtained through discount rate borrowing and Fed repos (though “nonborrowed reserves” exclude discount borrowings). Evidently, the majority of the reserves in the U.S. banking system are represented by a continuous rollover of outstanding “temporary” repurchase agreements. If one set of repurchase agreements for $10 billion matures 3 days from now, you can pretty well predict that the Fed will enter new repurchase agreements of nearly this amount when the existing agreements expire. As a result, the total amount of repos outstanding is fairly stable. On balance, the Fed injected nothing – repeat nothing – this week.
Importantly, investors are misled when they interpret eac