Freddie aka Fraudie Mac / Market Sentiment

It´s always the reaction to the news that is important....And sending the stock higher almost 10 percent on the following news is a clear sign that the complacency has taken over again....A look at the VIX is confirming this view. On top of this Doug Kasshas observed this: "Investors Intelligence bulls are back up to 46, as bears drop to 29.9 -- at respective highs and lows since January". I think this headline via FT Alphaville sums it up nicely Not as bad as feared’ is the new code for ‘buy, buy, buy’ Here are More Reasuring Facts On Phony Mae aka Fannie Mae

Eine der wichtigsten Regeln für Anleger und Trader ist jeweils zu beachten wie der Markt auf bestimmte Nachrichten reagiert. Und wenn man nach den folgenden Neuigkeiten die Aktie fast 10 % nach oben katapultiert ist das für mich ein klares Zeichen das wir uns einem Level nähern der doch langsam wieder bedenklich wird.....Der sich rapide beruhigende VIX unterstreicht diesen Trend. Doug Kass hat diese Statistik die wunderbar zum Gesamtbild passt. "Investors Intelligence bulls are back up to 46, as bears drop to 29.9 -- at respective highs and lows since January" . Diese Schlagzeile via FT Alphaville fasst es ziemlich gut zusammen Not as bad as feared’ is the new code for ‘buy, buy, buy’ Hier gibt es mehr More Reasuring Facts On Phony Mae aka Fannie Mae

Parsing Freddie's Profit Report WSJ
Freddie Mac's earnings report more clearly than ever defined the battle lines between the company's shareholders and the government, which sees it as one of its main tools to bolster the housing market.

The report the mortgage giant issued Wednesday shows that the company's cushion for losses fell sharply in the quarter, giving it one of the weakest balance sheets in the financial sector and leaving it more vulnerable to future hits from the housing crunch.

This weakening in Freddie Mac's financial footing will unnerve politicians keen to see Freddie buy and guarantee even more mortgages to alleviate the credit crunch.

And investors sniffing around Freddie's shares may also want to pay heed to the enervated balance sheet. That is because the company likely will have to sell a large amount of new stock, diluting existing shareholders, to strengthen its balance sheet.

Freddie said Wednesday that it planned to sell $5.5 billion of common and preferred stock. "I think they'll continue to raise capital," said Paul Miller, an analyst at FBR Capital Markets.

The company's weakened state was lost on investors who rejoiced that the loss was smaller than expected and drove its shares up 9%. But the smaller-than-expected loss was primarily the result of accounting changes made in the quarter that allowed the company to book certain gains in earnings and exclude certain losses.

Freddie reclassified $90 billion in securities, boosting profit by about $1 billion compared with the fourth quarter.

Hat tip Calculated Risk

Analyst: There is a headline out there that you have level 3 assets of $157 billion. I was just wondering is that true and is that related at all to the markups of the 1.2 billion gain?

Freddie Mac: No, it is not Paul. We made a determination in the first quarter that given how widely the pricing we were getting on the abs portfolio [varied] that it no longer made sense to leave that into level two. So we essentially moved the entire abs portfolio into level three. We were still using the mean pricing that we were getting from the dealers. So we’re not using a model price. That is all that is. It has nothing to do with the trading portfolio

Another change -- related to its mortgage guarantees -- reduced a potential hit to profit by about $1 billion compared with the fourth quarter. A maneuver that delays taking credit losses also allowed the company to avoid losses in the quarter.

Excluding these and some other accounting changes, Freddie's modest $151 million loss would have been a more worrisome $2 billion.

More insights via Calculated Risk On Freddie Mac Accounting Change

One way to cut through the earnings noise is to go to the balance sheet and zero in on its leverage -- the amount of shareholders' equity Freddie has supporting its $803 billion of assets, which are the loans it has retained.

In the first quarter, Freddie's assets exceeded its $16 billion of shareholders' equity -- its leverage ratio -- by 50.2 times. Fannie's first-quarter leverage ratio was 21.7 times, while the first-quarter average for the 20 largest U.S. lenders was just under 12 times, according to data from SNL Financial.

A Freddie spokesman declined to comment on its leverage specifically. And to be fair to Freddie, some of the market losses that are driving down Freddie's equity may one day be recovered. For instance, equity plunged to $16 billion from $26.7 billion in the fourth quarter, in part because of unrealized losses on securities backed by subprime mortgages.

But if Freddie were a regular bank, its regulator wouldn't let leverage get anywhere close to 50 times. At a nosebleed level like that, the regulator would push Freddie to keep raising capital, even if some of its losses in equity might be fleeting.

Shareholders could sputter about the continued dilution, but the government won't be very sympathetic.

Condo Desperation.....Lehman Offers Money Back Guarantee

Thank god their balance sheet is strong...... :-) . For more insights on Lehman see what Mish has to say Questions Linger Over Lehman's Balance Sheet & April Fool's Offering At Lehman . I also recommend to take a view of the table Level 2 "mark to model" & Level 3 "mark to a hope & a prayer" .

Zum Glück ist deren Bilanz ja bekanntermaßen kerngesund........ :-) Wer mehr zu der "starken" Lehman Bilanz wissen möche wirft am besten einen Blick auf das was Mish zu sagen hat Questions Linger Over Lehman's Balance Sheet & April Fool's Offering At Lehman. Zudem empfehle ich einen kurzen Blick auf die Bilanzpositionen der großen US Banken Level 2 "markt to model" & Level 3 "mark to a hope & a prayer"

Condo Comfort / WSJ
In a move that speaks volumes about the glut in the condominium market, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. is promising some luxury-condo buyers their money back after three years of ownership.

The offer applies to some 200 condo units, priced between $480,000 and $2 million, in West Bay Club , a Lehman-owned resort community in Estero, Fla., near Naples on the Gulf of Mexico.

>Add the news via Calculated Risk and it is no wonder some are getting nervous....... Especially when you have a condo to sell in Miami

> Wenn man dann noch diese Daten via Calculated Risk hinzunimmt sollte es wenig verwundern das einige langsam aber sicher extrem nervös werden..... Das gilt besonders dann wenn man ein Condo in Miami verkaufen möchte

The new building comes on top of unprecedented supply....Lenders of all sizes have $42 billion of condominium debt on their books, according to Foresight Analytics. In just three months -- between the third and fourth quarters of last year -- the delinquency rate rose to 10% from 5.9%, says the Oakland, Calif., research firm.

In an effort to jump-start sales in a skittish market, Lehman says that for every buyer until June 1, it will guarantee that the resort will either sell or buy back the residence at the "full cost of the purchase price three years after closing."

> Charts & Stats via Inventory Tracker from my old friend Soldatthetop and his superb blog Paper Money

Naples, FL Condo Statistics

Current Count: 6863 Historical Low: 5547 Historical High: 7768 Average Range: $500,000.00 - $550,000.00 Median Range: $300,000.00 - $325,000.00 Listed Market Cap: $3,759,455,000.00

Statistics for Naples collected between 07-24-2006 and 04-23-2008

The gamble is that prices will recover during that time, and buyers will hold on to their condos.

A spokeswoman for Lehman said no one was available to discuss details of the guarantee program, which appears to exclude 10 penthouse units in two towers.

Jack McCabe, a real-estate consultant in Deerfield Beach, Fla., said other developers desperate to move unsold condo inventory might have to follow Lehman's lead in offering price guarantees as market values continue to slide and thousands more condo units in Florida come on line this year

> In the end it is probably still better to make this kind of creative offer to move inventory than to wait for things to get better........This will put lots of pressure on other players to match this kind of offer...Not good news for players like disaster stocks like WCI :-) It will be interesting to see how they will manage the accounting..... UPDATE: I also recommend to read this from Mish Condo Credit Squeeze

> Im Endeffekt ist diese Art des Marketings wohl immer noch eine der besseren Möglichkieten die Ladenhüter zu vertickern. Darauf zu warten das sich die Zeiten bessern dürfte extrem langwierig werden.... Das dürfte den Druck auf andere Speiler im Condomarkt erheblich verschärfen....Das dürfte dem übelsten Spieler WCI wohl demnächst den endgültigen Todesstoß versetzen. Man darf gespannt sein unter welchen Punkt solch geartete Geschäfte in der Bilanz auftauchen...... UPDATE: Zum Themenkomplex Condo´s sollte man zudem noch mal einen Blick auf Condo Credit Squeeze via Mish richten

What A Difference A Week Made....Credit Suisse Discovers Another $ 2.85 Bilion "Fair Value Reduction"

As one who has listened to the entire conference call from Credit Suisse just one week ago i can assure you that this will spook the markets. Credit Suisse was besides Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs viewed as one of the big winners during the turbulence. But there was always doubt that their numbers might be too good to be true...... Credit Suisse is proving that this might be the case..... Should be very bad news for the confidence in the marketplace overall...... I assume the "arrogance" from the Credit Suisse management won´t be as obvious as during the last call...... Stock tanking 7 percent......

Als einer der sich vor einigen Tagen die Telefonkonferenz angehört at bin ich mir sicher das diese Meldung hohe Wellen schlagen wird. Bisher galt die Credit Suisse zusammen mit der Deutsche Bank und Goldman Sachs als einer der Gewinner der Marktturbulenzen. In der Vergangenheit sind immer wieder Zweifel aufgekommen ob "die Zahlen nicht zu gut sind um wahr zu sein" ...... Credit Suisse liefert hier eine Steilvorlage für diese Vermutung......Ich bin mir zudem sicher das die "Arroganz" von Seiten des Managements während der nächsten Telefonkonferenz sicher nicht wieder so ausgeprägt sein wird wie letzte Woche .... Aktie zur Eröffnung 7% tiefer......

Thanks to Randy Galsbergen

Credit Suisse Further to its commitment to provide transparency, Credit Suisse today announced that in connection with the operation of ongoing control processes, it has undertaken an internal review that has resulted in the repricing of certain asset-backed positions in its Structured Credit Trading business within Investment Banking.

The current total fair value reductions of these positions, which reflect significant adverse first quarter 2008 market developments, are estimated at approximately USD 2.85 billion (having an estimated net income impact of approximately USD 1.0 billion).

In the first quarter to date, we estimate we remain profitable after giving effect to these reductions. The final determination of these reductions will depend on further results of our review and continuing market developments. We will also assess whether any portion of these reductions could affect 2007 results. Finally, our internal review, which has identified mismarkings and pricing errors by a small number of traders in certain positions in our Structured Credit Trading business, is continuing.

> Here the Full Year Results from Feb. 12th & Webcast

Qatar was maybe a little bit premature....

Sieht ganz so aus als wenn einige Investoren heute leicht erhöhte Temperatur haben werden.....

Qatar fund buys Credit Suisse stake

The QIA’s move comes after Credit Suisse posted robust fourth-quarter results underscoring its resilience during the credit crisis,......

What's a C.D.O.?

I second what FT Alphaville has to say. Maybe they should send the link to all the "smart money" guys that are holding all this stuff so that they finally understand what they are holding.....

Ich kann mich nur FT Alphaville anschließen. Man sollte diesen Link all denen schicken die Besitzer dieser Papiere sind damit Sie endlich begreifen was für eine halsbrecherische Konstruktion den Weg in die Bücher gefunden haben und warum es täglich vorkommen kann das aus AAA über Nacht Junk werden kann. Ich denke da ganz besonders an ein paar deutsche Landesbänker......

Far and away one of the best graphics we’ve seen. Kudos to Felix Salmon and the people at Portfolio

Make sure you click here to start the interactive beauty!

Laßt euch dieses Schmuckstück nicht entgehen und klickt hier um die interaktive Schönheit zu betrachten.

It remains to be seen if the write down from Royal Bank Of Scotland is enough.... Maybe the age of the CDO portfolio is an explanation why they still value the mezzanine tranche with 70 percent..... The same CDO in 07 would be definitley close to zero....

Bin gespannt ob die Abschreibung der Royal Bank Of Scotland genug sein wird.....Evtl. ist ads bereits fortgeschrittenen Alter des CDO Portfolios ja die Erklärung dafür das die Mezzanine Tranche immer noch mit 70% bewertet wird. Ein CDO mit Baujahr 2007 würde wohl eher bei null notieren......

At 30 November, GBM's exposure to these super senior tranches, net of hedges and write-downs, totalled £1.1 billion to high grade CDOs which include commercial loan collateral as well as prime and sub-prime mortgage collateral, and £1.3billion to mezzanine CDOs based predominantly on residential mortgage collateral. The CDOs are largely based on ABS issued between 2004 and the firsthalf of 2006

And with news like this Surge in Auto-Loan DelinquenciesIs Latest Trouble for the Economy via the WSJ it should be clear that the problem is spreading to all parts of securitisations.

Und mit Meldungen wie diesen Surge in Auto-Loan DelinquenciesIs Latest Trouble for the Economy dürfte auch bald der nächste Pfeiler der Verbriefungskredite mehr als nur leichte Schlgseite bekommen....

First came housing loans and the subprime-mortgage crisis.

Now, signs of stress are creeping into another key consumer area: auto loans.

Delinquencies in the auto-loan market are ticking up to their highest level in several years. Lenders are tightening terms in some cases, and interest rates have risen from the rock-bottom levels of a few years ago. About $575 billion in loans for new and used cars are made annually, according to the National Automotive Finance Association.

About 4.5% of auto loans made in 2006 to top-rated borrowers were at least 30 days delinquent as of the end of September, up from 2.9% the previous month,according to a Lehman Brothers survey of companies servicing these loans. That is the biggest one-month jump in at least eight years. Lehman says 12% of subprime borrowers, who have poorer credit records, were delinquent on their 2006 auto loans as of September. That is the highest level since 2002 and up from 11.1% the previous month.

"Liquidity Puts" / Enron Reloaded Part XXI.....

Floyd Norris from the NYT has some details on more ( some call it criminal ) "creativity" when it comes to financial alchemy. Nice to see that the regulators have also missed this kind of financial engineering.... Sooner or later the auditors will also face some serious questions

Floyd Norris von der NYT hat noch mehr Details zur (kriminillen) Kreativität der Finanzwirtschaft aufgedeckt um die Bilanzen und Gewinne in einem gänzlich anderen Licht erscheinen zu lassen. Ähnlich wie in Deutschland mit der Bafin sind die Aufsichtsbehörden anscheinend vollkommen überfordert. Wie zudem die Buchprüfer all diese Dinge ohne ganz besondere Hinweise durchwinken konnten ist ein Thema für ein seperates Post.

As Bank Profits Grew, Warning Signs Went Unheeded
We should have known something was strange. The banks were doing a lot better than they should have been doing.

When the history of the financial excesses of this decade is written, that will be a verdict of financial historians. There were signs that banks were either lying about their results or were taking large risks that were not fully disclosed, but investors were oblivious.

What were the signs? Consider how banks make money. They pay low rates on short-term deposits and charge higher rates on long-term loans. So they love what are known as positively sloped yield curves. And they like to see big credit spreads, where risky borrowers are charged much more than safe ones. Put them together, and banks should clean up.

By that light, nothing was going right in 2006 and early this year. The yield curve was inverted, or at best flat. And credit spreads were at historic lows. Risky loans, whether to subprime mortgage borrowers or junk-rated corporations, were readily available at rates that seemed to assume there was only the slightest risk of default.

And yet the bank stocks were buoyant, and so were reported profits.

Instead of being suspicious, many analysts believed that banks had found a new way to prosper. Making a loan and keeping it on the balance sheet until it was repaid was so old-fashioned. It was far better to collect fees for arranging transactions and passing on the risk to others. We did not ask why passing on risks should be so profitable to the risk-passers.

In reality, it was not.

In recent weeks, we have learned of many risks the banks kept. Not only did we not understand them, but there is every indication that senior managements did not either.

Consider “liquidity puts.” Don’t be embarrassed if you have no idea what I am talking about. In a fascinating article in Fortune, Carol Loomis quotes Robert E. Rubin, now the chairman of Citigroup, as saying he had never heard of them until this summer.

What were they? Banks put together collateralized debt obligations, or C.D.O.’s, many of which held subprime mortgage loans as assets. The C.D.O.’s were financed by issuing their own securities, and the risk of mortgage defaults seemed to pass to the people who bought the securities.

But we now learn that some banks also handed out liquidity puts, giving buyers of C.D.O. securities the right to sell them back to the bank if there was no other market for them.

> At least this would explain the AAA rating for these CDO´s from the rating agencies..... ;-)

> Das würde zumindest bei einigen CDO´s das AAA Rating erklären.... ;-)

That risk may have seemed slight when the securitization market was booming. But now the banks are being forced to buy back securities for more than they are worth.

With such a put in existence, I don’t understand how the banks could get the original loans off their balance sheets. How could they claim they had sold something if they could be forced to buy it back? It will be interesting to see if the Securities and Exchange Commission challenges the accounting.

But even if the accounting was completely proper, it was not very informative. It does not appear that any banks chose to mention the puts to investors before this month. Citigroup had billions of dollars of them, and in the new quarterly report from Bank of America, we learn that it had $2.1 billion of such puts on its books at the end of 2006, a figure that rose to $10 billion by the end of September.

In other words, as the subprime market was starting to falter early this year, the bank stepped up the issuance of such puts. Presumably, that was necessary to “sell” the paper. This week Bank of America announced a $3 billion write-off. A large part of it came from those puts.

There were many other funny ways to bolster profits, like specialized investment vehicles, or SIVs. These creatures bought those C.D.O. securities, paying for them with money borrowed in the commercial paper market.

Just like banks, the SIVs borrowed short and lent long. The spreads might be thin, but they could employ leverage to make narrow margins go a long way. The SIVs did not have much capital, but so long as everyone believed in C.D.O.’s, they did not need it. The banks that set up the vehicles swore they had no continuing interest in them, and so they also vanished from any balance sheet that investors could see. Now they are costing banks money to prop them up.

Jamie Dimon, the chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, told investors this week that “SIVs don’t have a business purpose” and “will go the way of the dinosaur.” Will they take the securitization system with them? The answer to that question may be crucial in determining how soon the financial system recovers.

The most important duty of the Federal Reserve is to preserve the health of the banking system. In the early 1990s, after the last big crisis, it engineered a steep yield curve for years, helping banks to recover. When the smoke clears, the Fed will try to do that again, even if it means significantly higher long-term interest rates.

Higher long-term rates are not what either debt-laden consumers or the depressed housing market really need, of course. But such trade-offs are what come when big risks are taken, and ignored, for too long.

UBS Write Down Estimates "Best Case $ 6 Billion, Worst Case....

They should have floated rumors/estimates of $ 20 billion and then surprise with a lower number like Barclays, Bear Stearns etc...... Sarcasm off..... :-) . UBS has just denied that they expect a big write down . I assume it depends on what is "big" . This comment doesn´t fit well with the comments from UBS at the beginning of the month.UBS: Further Writedowns Possible and this comment from the Wall Street Journal . The example Swiss Re doesn´t give much comfort either......

UBS hätte besser schon vorher Gerüchte über 20 Mrd $ streuen sollen um dann positiv zu überraschen ( siehe Barclays, Bear Stearns usw....... ;-). Gerade hat UBS einen größeren Abschreibungsbedarf dementiert. Ich denke es ist alles eine Frage was "groß" bedeutet. Was solche Dementies selbst aus der Schweiz heutzutage wert sind zeigt "eindrucksvoll" das Beispiel der Swiss Re ........ Auf jeden Fall harmoniert das Dementi nicht sonderlich mit dem Kommentar von Anfang November UBS: Further Writedowns Possible und diesem Kommentar aus dem Wall Street Journal .

Mr. Peace ( Lehman Brotehrs) said UBS may have to record an additional loss, because he compared UBS's and Merrill's exposure to a risky CDO slice known as the mezzanine piece. His analysis shows that UBS has triple the exposure to mezzanine CDO slices as Merrill Lynch yet so far has taken a quarter of the percentage write-down that Merrill took. UBS's holding does include some added protection against losses, Mr. Peace said.

Citi do a Whitney on UBS - “A major reversal of fortune” / FT
According to a note sent out to clients by Citi analysts today, we can “realistically” expect a further $12bn writedown from UBS in the next quarter.

UBS shareholders should also expect to see the dividend slashed, and the value of their equity diluted by a rights issue of up to $7bn. UBS, Citi’s Jeremy Sigee say dryly, will almost certainly need to recapitalise.

In other words, Citi are giving UBS the Meredith Whitney treatment. Is it true what they say - every bully was once bullied?

The difference, of course, is that Citi cut to the chase in disclosing its subprime losses - releasing details of its exposure and a breakdown of the figures. Not that it did Chuck Prince any good.

UBS, however, have been far more circumspect. Consider this table of banks’ disclosed exposure and writedowns on ABS CDOs:



While UBS have the second highest ABS CDO exposure, they have taken one of the lowest writedowns.

Clearly, UBS are not marking their assets at current market prices, and are still heavily relying on marked to model prices. Consider also the fact that many of the CDOs UBS arranged and sponsored have been some of the worst hit - like the appropriately named Vertical Capital, a CDO whose AAA debt was slashed 14 notches to junk in one fell swoop.

Consider this table from Citi, which neatly summarises the price declines on MBS and CDOs (measured respectively by declines in the ABX and TABX indices from Markit) It’s pretty clear that UBS’s average writedown so far is paltry

Citi outline three possible scenarios for UBS:
First we assume markdowns similar to Merrill Lynch. Under that scenario, UBS would need to take markdowns of SFr 6.7bn in 4Q07. Translating this revenue shortfall one-to-one to PBT (thereby assuming no clawback on the cost side), the group’s PBT would be -SFr 3.2bn for a net loss of SFr2.3bn. The Tier 1 ratio would be 9.5% under Basel I and 9% under Basel II. This is below the group’s target. However, cancelling the dividend (SFr4.2bn) would bring back the ratio to 10% under Basel II.

The second scenario takes conclusions from our Fixed Income credit strategists, assuming 30% writedowns on HG ABS CDOs and 60% on mezzanine ABS CDOs. UBS would report a loss of SFr 7.9bn in 4Q07, its Tier 1 ratio would drop to 8.1% (Basel I) and 7.6% under Basel II. The Tier 1 would remain below target even if the dividend were cut, raising the possibility of a capital shortfall.

The third scenario is a worst-case scenario. Under this scenario (50% writedowns on HG ABS CDOs and 100% on mezz ABS CDOs), UBS would end up with a substantial SFr22bn writedown. The group’s Tier 1 ratio would drop to 5.8% (Basel II). Even after cutting the dividend and accounting for a lower group Tier 1 ratio of 9% (Basel II), a capital shortfall of SFr 8.5bn would remain, raising the prospects of a large capital increase/rights issue.

Fundamentals, not liquidity conditions, are behind MBS crash

Good luck to all the banks and especially the monoline insurers that still think that the ABX Indices ( see also The AAA Trap via Sudden Debt ) are not reflecting the market price....... But as long as they can convince the auditors.......

Viel Glück all denen die die immer noch glauben das die ABX Indizes ( siehe auch The AAA Trap von Sudden Debt ) nicht den wahren Wert wiederspiegeln..... Aber solange die Buchprüfer diese Zahlen abnehemen......


Fundamentals, not liquidity conditions, are behind MBS crash / FT
Many banks, if not financial institutions in general, would have you believe that the current rout in mortgage-backed debt is largely being driven by irrational fear. A few bad subprime debts buried around the structured universe are scaring buyers out of markets.

But, said CreditSights, in a note to clients on Wednesday, current pricing levels reflect fundamentals, even for the most highly-rated debt. Mortgage securities across the board are overrated and overvalued:

The harsh truth about the outlook for the AAA tranches - necessary downgrades, if not defaults - should put the lie to the argument that current low prices in AAA RMBS tranches - let alone AAA tranches of mezzanine RMBS CDOs - are somehow the victim of poor liquidity conditions, and do not reflect the true fundamentals of the situation.

CreditSights publish the results of a survey they have conducted on “188 individual relatively large RMBS deals”. The outlook, by all accounts, is grim.

Hat tip to Barry Ritholtz who has also more on this topic Financials: Worse than they look?

Dank an Barry Ritholtz der zum Thema ebenfalls treffendes zu sagen hat Financials: Worse than they look?

At root, CreditSights calculate a severity loss ratio for lenders on individual defaulting subprime mortgages based on mortgage market data collected over the past few weeks. The survey results indicate that such loss severity rates on mortgages are “painfully high”. They range from 24 per cent to 55 per cent - with a weighted average at 35 per cent. And they’re expected to rise. For second-lien mortgages - that is, second mortgages on a property, the loss severity rates average 94 per cent.

> By the way MBIA is on the hook if the losses for their RMBS CDO´s are greater than 22-28 percent.........

> Ganz nebenbei bemerkt ist MBIA ab Verlusten von 22-28 % bei Ihren RMBS CDO´s in der Haftung.....

So how do those figures translate into the capital structure of structured mortgage-backed debt? Foreclosure rates are rising higher and higher - which means the number of occasions when the above loss severity ratios have to be applied are increasing.

And it doesn’t look like the blame can be pinned on any particular vintages of MBS. Here’s a graph of foreclosures on vintages since 2004:

According to CreditSights, that should “up-end the idea that the 2004 vintage was perhaps sufficiently seasoned and composed of loans that had enjoyed enough home price appreciation since 2000, to avoid any further erosion.”

As it is, foreclosure rates are hovering at around 13 per cent on 2005 and 2006 mortgage debt. But CreditSights say there is “no end in sight” when it comes to that figure rising.

Consider then the outlook for delinquancy rates - a measure of mortgage loans not yet in foreclosure, but in trouble:

Add the 7 per cent delinquency rate for the 2006 vintage to the 2006 foreclosure rate at 12.6 and it’s already close to 20 per cent.

How then does that translate into the world of structured finance, and those RMBS tranches?

To trigger a default on the most secure subprime RMBS debt - rated AAA, and structured with a typical 18 per cent attachment rate - foreclosure rates would have to reach the 30 per cent.

As can be seen from the results of CreditSights’ survey, that scenario is indeed becoming “less and less unthinkable”. Adding the foreclosure and delinquancy rates takes us close to 20 per cent. Both are set to increase. Then there’s those painfully low severity loss ratios. Add it all together and that AAA debt is far, far, far from safe.

And we haven’t even mentioned prime tranches lower down the structure.

Far from mispricing RMBS, CreditSights even go so far as to suggest that actually, the ABX indices (which list AAA RMBS debt at around 80 cents in the dollar) are throwing up some pretty appropriate figures.

Risk rises of asset fire sale; signs ‘superfund’ has stalled

Some might argue that these are market and not fire sale prices......... But as long as they can convince the rating agencies and the auditors that their "models" imply a higher price.......

Einige könnten argumentieren das diese Preise dann Marktpreise und keine Schleuderpreise sind.... Aber solange es möglich ist die Rating Agenturen und die Buchprüfer davon zu überzeigen das die hauseigenen Modelle einen höheren Wert ergeben.......

Risk rises of asset fire sale; signs ‘superfund’ has stalled / FT
The threat of fire sales of mortgage-backed securities is mounting as rating agency downgrades have pushed debt vehicles into technical default. The prospect of forced sales comes as a US Treasury-backed plan for a “superfund” to buy up distressed mortgage securities appears to have stalled. S&P and Moody’s have received default notices for $5bn worth of CDOs, giving investors in senior tranches the right to sell assets.

The $75bn superfund plan - designed to purchase assets from distressed investments linked to banks and so prevent fire sales - seems to be stalled following the upheaval at Citigroup.

IndyMac Increases Credit Reserves 47 Percent to $1.39 Billion

This number from the top Alt-A originator ( 14 percent) gives a hint how ugly the situation has become beyond subprime.

That might give a hint how bad the situation for several other players is that have bought back shares hand over fist during the past years and are more involed in subprime, havn´t sold their originations etc......

bigger / größer via Calculated Risk

Forecasted Home price depreciation ranging between 6% and 10% is factored into our loss expectations that drive valuation and reserves – average HPI declines expected to be around 9%

Diese Zahlen von dem Top Alt-A Kreditgeber ( 14 %) geben ein paar klare Indizien das neben Subrpime auch andere Segmente massiv an Qualität verlieren.

Das läßt erahnen wie übel es für andere Institute aussehen muß die im Gegensatz zu IndyMac in den letzten Jahren haufenweise Aktien zurückgekauft havben und sinnlose wertvernichtende Übernahmen getätigt haben aussehen mag. Ganz zu schweigen von denen die Ihre Riskiken nicht weiterreichen konnten und noch stärker im Subprime Sektor engagiert waren.....

We Hold Direct Credit Risk On $19.02 Billion Of Total Single Family Loans Serviced In Our Whole Loans And In Non-Investment Grade And Residual Securities

> Watch the large percentage of homebuilder credit costs....

> Man beachte den gewaltigen Anteil der Rückstellungen für die Homebuilder.....

In the call they said that they had claer signs in 2005 that the market for builders has peaked, but they have ignored it. Now they are paying a high price. They have stopped making any loans to builders and have no intend to re-enter the market soon.

Im CC hat das Management zugegeben das bereits Ende 2005 ganz klare Anzeichen für Probpleme bei den Buildern zu erkennen waren. Dummerweise wurden diese ignoriert und es wirde munter weiter verliehen. Nun kommt die Rechnung. Immerhin haben Sie versprochen dieses Segment nicht weiter zu bedienen und bis auf weiteres keine neuen Kredite zu begeben.

IndyMac Bancorp Reports Third Quarter Loss of $202.7 Million, ($2.77) Per Share

• Total pre-tax credit costs were $407.7 million (versus $103.5 million in the second quarter of 2007), or a negative impact on earnings per share (“EPS”) of $3.40.
• Spread widening in the private-label (non-GSE) mortgage secondary market resulted in a loss of gain on sale and MBS securities revenue estimated at $167.2 million pre-tax for the third quarter, or a negative EPS impact of $1.39.
• After surviving the global liquidity crisis in 1998 as a REIT, we purchased a federally chartered thrift and put our entire business inside the thrift, with the result that we have no liquidity issues today, while many mortgage companies have gone bankrupt or recorded massive losses due to liquidity shortfalls.
• We protected and bolstered our capital by not repurchasing any shares since 2002 and, in fact, raised a substantial amount of capital in 2007.
• We held virtually no subprime, closed-end seconds or HELOCs for investment purposes ($112 million, or 0.3 percent of total assets at September 30, 2007).
• We were not a major subprime lender, ranking 32nd among subprime lenders (according to the National Mortgage News 2006 survey). Our subprime volume in 2006 was $2.7 billion, or 0.39 percent of the total subprime market.
• While we originated $43 billion of Option ARMs from 2005 through Q3-07, we sold all but $1.0 billion (held for investment) and $2.6 billion (held for sale), and we retained no non-investment grade or residual securities related to these loans.
• We laid off virtually all Alt-A 2005/2006 credit risk into the secondary market, retaining only $7.0 million in non-investment grade and residual securities from this production.
• We hold no investments in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) or structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and only hold mortgage backed securities (93.5 percent of the investment grade MBS are rated AAA and AA, none of which have been downgraded).
• We made one of the only successful acquisitions this decade in the mortgage business – Financial Freedom, the largest reverse mortgage lender in the nation – while virtually all other significant acquisitions have produced very poor results.

> Almost all of the new liquidity is coming from the Federal Home Loan Banks ......

> Fast die ganze zusätzliche Liquidität kommt von Seiten der Federal Home Loan Banks ......

Our operating liquidity is at an all time high of $6.3 billion at 9/30/07, up 54% from $4.1 billion at 6/30/07, and we have no reverse repurchase borrowings or extendable assetbacked commercial paper…95% of our borrowings are deposits, FHLB advances and long-term debt

> the next slide shows a nice Level 3 aka "Mark-to-Make-Believe Gains" etc gain. Wonder why they havn´t used an assumption that would have cover the entire loss from the credit costs.......... Maybe they are conservatice.......

> Nebenbei bemerkt zeigt die nächste Grafik das auch hier mal wieder ein nicht ganz unerheblicher Level 3 aka Mark-to-Make-Believe Gains etc Gewinnbestandteil. Schon erfreulich das Sie nicht gleich eine Berechnungsgrundlage berechnet haben die gleich die gesamten Verluste im Zusammenhang mit den Kreditkosten abdeckt...... Evtl. ist IndyMac ja betont konservativ......

I want to highlight the IndyMac Presentation / pdf that is full of details about every aspect of the mortgage market

Ich möchste Euch in diesem Zusammenhang die IndyMac Präsentation / pdf ans Herz legen die vollgepackt mit Details zur aktuellen Verfassung der Hypothekenmärkte ist.

As clear as alphabet soup: banks’ CDO exposures

I think the term "Black Box" is not an understatement....... Maybe some still think their exposue is hedged via MBIA & Co. Good luck...... I also suggest to read From level three to cloud nine from Roubini via the FT & the take from Mish. Keep this in mind when some "experts" are still hyping the high dividend yield and the strong balance sheets.......

Ich denke hier trifft der Begriff der Black Box ziemlich genau ins Schwarze....... Evtl. haben ja einige Ihre Bestände auch durch MBIA & Co abgesichert und sind daher der Meinung nicht tätig werden zu müssen. Viel Glück........ Zudem solltet Ihr Euch From level three to cloud nine von Roubini via der FT und die Beurteilung von Mish nicht entgehen lassen. Behaltet diese Zahlen im Hinterkopf und schaltet am besten die Glotze ab und überspringt den Artikel in denen immer noch auf die starken Bilanzen und die hohen Dividenden hingewiesen wird.....

As clear as alphabet soup: banks’ CDO exposures / FT

Forget the banks’ Q3s. By any account, they’re billions of dollars out of date. For banks holding CDOs - and that’s most of Wall Street - writedowns will have greatly increased in the past three weeks.

The trouble is, no one, not even the SEC, knows exactly what banks’ exposures are. But the losses are beginning to come out of the woodwork: for Citi, in the news Monday, a $8bn-$10bn loss on the value of some assets. For Merrill Lynch, last week, it worked out at $8bn. For UBS, reporting their Q3s last week, $3.4bn.

Citi have painted the most comprehensive picture to date. But rather than making things clearer, it simply casts doubt on the other banks’ disclosures. Citi, for example, are reporting $8-10bn writedowns on a portfolio containing $10bn of high-grade CDO paper - which has been the principal faller in the past two weeks. But UBS only report writedowns of $3.4bn. And they hold $20bn of high-grade CDO paper.

There are very few proxies which can be used to judge banks’ CDO holdings. Even a league table of CDO deals arranged is a pretty poor indicator:

An added complication is the fact that banks are using wildly different estimates on the pricing of CDO assets. Although indices such as the ABX and TABX are valuable proxies for the market’s prices as a whole, they don’t necessarily reflect where banks individually are pricing their debt.

As reported in today’s FT, for example, Merrill Lynch, has written down mid-quality ABX debt to 63 cents in the dollar, even though the bank’s own analysts say its worth only 40. UBS, meanwhile, assumes the same debt to be worth 90 cents in the dollar. “Simple math would imply that UBS needs an additional $8bn write-down [on its $15.4bn holdings] if the ABX pricing is correct,” Merrill themselves had the cheek to point out in a report on their rival.
Here’s a breakdown of the main CDO exposures:

Citi
$10bn senior rated CDO debt
$8bn mezzanine CDO debt
$2.7bn “warehoused” CDOs
£200m CDO squared


Merrill Lynch
$8.3bn senior rated CDO debt
$5.3bn mezzanine CDO debt
$1bn “warehoused” CDO debt
$600m CDO squared


UBS
$20.2bn senior rated CDO debt
$1.8bn warehoused CDO debt

Total exposure undisclosed:

Bank of America
Undisclosed

Barclays
Q3s due November 27

Deutsche
$1.6bn on “trading activities in relative value trading in both debt and equity, CDO correlation trading and residential mortgage-backed securities.”

JPMorgan
$339m (net of hedges) “on collateralized debt obligation (CDO) warehouses and unsold positions.”

Lehman Brothers
Undisclosed

Morgan Stanley
Undisclosed

Wachovia
$534m writedown on CDOs

"Enron-esque characteristics" / Deals With Hedge Funds May Be Helping Merrill Delay Mortgage Losses

Enron reloaded! I shouldn´t be surprised. This on top of Off Balance Sheet Vehicles, financing “Vulture Funds” to buy bank assets, UFOs (or Unidentified Financing Objects) & Level 2 and Level 3 accounting etc. makes me believe that this cartoon isn´t so far of the mark......... :-)

Enron lebt! Eigentlich sollte ich nach den letzten Meldungen über Off Balance Sheet Vehicles, die Finanzierung von “Vulture Funds” um Problemkredite aus der Bilanz zu bekommen, UFOs (or Unidentified Financing Objects) und Level 2 & Level 3 Buchführung usw nicht weiter überrascht sein. Evtl. ist der nachfolgende Cartoon doch nicht so übertrieben wie einst vermutet...... :-)

If the SEC, Auditors etc don´t act this should be viewed as another step in the bailout process..... Is still anybody wondering why gold is doing so well......

Sollten die Aufsichtsbehörden, Buchprüfer usw das auch noch durchgehen lassen darf man das wohl als weiteren Schritt in Richtung Bailout werten.....Gibt es immer noch welche die sich Fragen warum Gold so gut unterwegs ist......

Deals With Hedge FundsMay Be Helping MerrillDelay Mortgage Losses WSJ
Merrill Lynch & Co., in a bid to slash its exposure to risky mortgage-backed securities, has engaged in deals with hedge funds that may have been designed to delay the day of reckoning on losses, people close to the situation said.

The transactions are among the issues likely to be examined by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC is looking into how the Wall Street firm has been valuing, or "marking," its mortgage securities and how it has disclosed its positions to investors, a person familiar with the probe said. Regulators are scrutinizing whether Merrill knew its mortgage-related problem was bigger than what it indicated to investors throughout the summer.

In one deal, a hedge fund bought $1 billion in commercial paper issued by a Merrill-related entity containing mortgages, a person close to the situation said. In exchange, the hedge fund had the right to sell back the commercial paper to Merrill itself after one year for a guaranteed minimum return, this person said.

> I assume that they aslo provide the probably very cheap financing.....

> Ich gehe mal davon aus das Merrill zudem noch die wohl günstige Finanzierung sicherstellt.....

While the Merrill-related entity's assets and liabilities weren't on Merrill's own balance sheet, Merrill might have been required to take a write-down if the entity was unable to sell the commercial paper to other investors and suffered losses, the person said. The deal delayed that risk for a year, the person said.

At issue with any hedge-fund deals is whether there was an attempt by Merrill to sweep problems under the rug through private transactions kept out of view from investors. Some previous scandals, such as the collapse of Enron Corp. and the troubles of Japan's financial system in the 1990s, involved efforts to hide problems through off-balance-sheet transactions.

Ground Zero
Merrill has become ground zero of mortgage problems in the U.S. Last week, the firm announced a $7.9 billion write-down fueled by mortgage-related problems -- one of the largest known Wall Street losses in history -- after projecting just a few weeks earlier that the write-down would be $4.5 billion. Merrill also took a $463 million write-down, net of fees, for deal-related lending commitments, bringing the firm's total third-quarter write-down to $8.4 billion.

The rapid widening of Merrill's losses has led investors to wonder whether other banks and brokerages have a good grasp of their exposure to bad debt. Bank shares fell sharply yesterday, contributing to a 2.6% fall in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Merrill's shares fell $3.83, or 5.8%, to $62.19 in 4 p.m. trading on the New York Stock Exchange.

Making the Rounds
"Merrill has been making the rounds asking hedge funds to engage in one-year off-balance-sheet credit facilities," Janet Tavakoli, who consults for investors about derivatives, told clients in a recent note. "One fund claimed that Merrill was offering a floor return (set buy-back price)," she said in the note, "so this risk would return to Merrill." Ms. Tavakoli said such transactions would explain how Merrill's mortgage-related exposure dropped in the third quarter.

Thanks to Randy Glasbergen

In recent weeks, Merrill has been scrambling to line up hedge funds to take as much as $5 billion in mortgage-related securities, people close to the situation said, part of what Merrill executives refer to as a "mitigation strategy." Under the strategy, which started earlier this year, Merrill has tried several means of lowering the risk of its exposure to mortgage-backed securities, these people say.

In accounting for such transactions, "the general guiding principle is whether the benefits and risks of ownership were transferred," says Charles Niemeier, former chief accountant for the SEC's enforcement division and now a director of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Legal questions can arise if the seller retains some exposure to the risk of the assets losing value, and if the deal is designed to disguise the picture of a business's financial health.

Other big securities firms with mortgage-related losses have arranged similar deals with hedge funds. As disclosed in a recent page-one article in The Wall Street Journal, Bear Stearns Cos. sold $1 billion of risky mortgage loans to a hedge fund under a one-year pact known as a "mandatory auction call." Bear Stearns agreed to participate in an auction for the loans that provided the hedge fund with a guaranteed minimum return.

Three big U.S. banks are assembling a group of financial institutions to create an investment pool to buy some mortgage-related securities from "structured investment vehicles" that are being forced to sell. That effort, which is backed by the Treasury Department, has also led some investors to question whether the goal is to delay the point at which banks recognize losses on troubled assets. The banks say their aim is to forestall forced selling of the assets.

In mid-July, before the credit crunch worsened, Merrill reported better-than-expected earnings with little impact from exposure to mortgage-backed securities. Asked about the firm's mortgage position on a call with analysts, Merrill Chief Financial Officer Jeff Edwards said: "Proactive aggressive risk management has put us in an exceptionally good position." Two weeks later, Mr. O'Neal personally sent an email to Merrill employees assuring them the firm had such risks well in hand.

By the end of June 2007, Merrill had CDO exposure of $32.1 billion and a subprime-mortgage exposure of $8.8 billion, totaling $40.9 billion. Much of the CDO exposure was in triple-A rated "super senior" slices. These were supposed to enjoy strong protection against defaults, but they began to decline steeply in price in late July.

By the end of September, Merrill says it reduced such positions through sales, hedges and write-downs to $15.2 billion of CDOs and $5.7 billion of subprime mortgages, a total of $20.9 billion. The write-downs totaled $6.9 billion for CDOs and $1 billion for subprime mortgages.

> Nice to see that the call for transparancy is working so well.....

> Schön zu sehen wie die Forderung nach mehr Transparenz so konsequnet umgesetzt wird.....

Goldman:Aug level 3 asset value $72.05B, 7% of total

Add the level 2 component and you have well over 50% of assets that are "not transparent"..... If you want to read more on this issue read Level 3 " Mark-To-Make-Believe Gains" & Level 2 "Mark-To-Model" or surf the labels....

Wenn man jetzt noch die Level 2 Bestandteile addiert kommt man auf satte 50% plus X der Vermögenswerte die nicht transparent nachvollzogen werden können. Mehr zu diesem Thema Level 3 " Mark-To-Make-Believe Gains" & Level 2 "Mark-To-Model" sowie unter den Labeln

Thanks to Bespoke

via Marketwatch Goldman:Aug level 3 asset value $72.05B, 7% of total

...the size of its level 3 assets at the end of third quarter increased to $72.05 billion from $54 billion at the end of the second quarter.

Goldman Sachs said level 2 assets at the end of third quarter amounted to $494.6 billion. There may be some market activity for level 2 assets but the valuations often depend on internal models

Goldman Sachs disclosed that the net unrealized gain on level 3 derivative contracts amounted to $2.62 billion in the third quarter, saying the gains resulted from changes in level 2 reclassification as opposed to level 3 changes

In connection with its lending activities, the firm had outstanding commitments to extend credit of $135.53 billion as of August, compared with $100.48 billion at Nov. 30 fiscal yearend

> Goldman is up 45 per cent since its low on August 15th.......... I´ll stay with gold and the miners......

> Seit dem Tief vom 15.08. hat Goldman u.a. dank dieser Bilanzierung mal eben 45% zugelegt........ Ich für meinen Teil bleibe lieber beim Gold und den dazugehörigen Minen......

Fineprint Citigroup Warning

This story fits perfect with the latest news from the UBS (and more to come probably on a weekly basis...). Make sure you also read this from Minyanville A Look Inside Citigroup's Writedowns & No Kidding.... More Off Balance Sheet Vehicles For Citigroup . A must read!

Das ganze paßt hervorragend zu den heutigen Neuigkeiten die aus der Schweiz von der UBS (und zukünftig auf Wochenbasis von rund um den Globus) kommen. Zudem solltet Ihr Euch das A Look Inside Citigroup's Writedowns via Minyanville & No Kidding.... More Off Balance Sheet Vehicles For Citigroup nicht entgehen lassen.

Quote Prince CEO Citigroup just a few weeks ago The $1 Billion Break Up Fee & An Ignorant And Deaf CEO

Dieses Zitat vom CEO der Citigroup ist gerade einige Wochen alt.......

"When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing".

Not a good sign if the CEO of the world biggest bank need signs like this.......

Kein gutes Zeichen wenn der CEO der weltgrößten Bank anscheinend solch deutliche Hinweisschilder benötigt.....

FT Citi takes big hits across the board: 60 per cent drop in Q3 income That huge loss has been realised from two hits from LBO debt and subprime mortgages. throughout the credit crunch, banks have been quick to point out that they hold few, or no subprime assets. Most casualties so far have thus been victims of contagion. No such luck for Citi.

Instead, there’s just huge amount of LBO debt and subprime mortgage securities stuck on the bank’s balance sheet - making it the most direct casualty of the credit crunch to date. Citi lost $1.4bn on holdings of LBO debts:

Write-downs of approximately $1.4 billion pre-tax, net of underwriting fees, on funded and unfunded highly leveraged finance commitments. These commitments totalled $69 billion at the end of the second quarter, and $57 billion at the end of the third quarter. Write-downs were recorded on all highly leveraged finance commitments where there was value impairment, regardless of the expected funding date.

And Citi are still having difficulty syndicating. As FT Alphaville observed earlier Monday, bank’s are having to brook significant losses on sales where they can make them - so there could be more pain for Citi to come.

As for Citi’s subprime debt, it too is stuck on the bank’s books: “warehoused” for use in future securitizations. Here the bank reports $1.3bn in losses:

Losses of approximately $1.3 billion pre-tax, net of hedges, on the value of sub-prime mortgage-backed securities warehoused for future collateralized debt obligation (”CDO”) securitizations, CDO positions, and leveraged loans warehoused for future collateralized loan obligation (”CLO”) securitizations.

Note that Citi, a touch coy here, hasn’t disclosed the total amount of subprime securities they hold - only the $1.3bn loss on them they’ve realised so far.

But those losses aren’t just coming from toxic debt products. Citi has also lost $600m through their fixed income trading operations because of “market volatility”. And a massive $2.6bn hit has been taken because of an increase in global “credit costs”. The charge was:

Due to continued deterioration in the credit environment, organic portfolio growth, and acquisitions. Approximately one-fourth of the increase in credit costs was due to higher net credit losses and approximately three-fourths was due to higher charges to increase loan loss reserves.

While other banks have been nimble on their feet and hedged their way around big losses, Citi’s results look nothing short of an out and out embarrassment. UBS was quick to direct senior figures towards the job pages and announce changes and cost cutting. Surely heads will also roll at Citi?

We suspect that all that troubling talk of a Citigroup break up to unlock shareholder value could gain ground again - fast.

> Maybe that´s the reason why the stock is up. I have the feeling that there is almost no news bad enough out there to put a positive spin on it. At least i havn´t heard a "Buffet" rumor yet... ;-)

> Wird wohl auch der Grund sein warum die Aktie z.Zt. höher notiert.Es gibt wohl kaum eine Meldung die schlecht genug ist um nicht für einen Spinversuch herhalten zu müssen. Immerhin mußte das letzte Mittel "Buffet" bisher nicht herausgeholt werden..... ;-)

UBS latest victim of credit turmoil / FT

I assume that this kind of news is already "priced in"( update UBS down 4% after forecasting quarterly loss, now unchanged ). I think we will here similar news for quarters to come form almost every financial company . And i doubt that the future anouncement are also already priced in.....

Ich denke das die heutige Nachricht wohl schon "eingepreist" ist ( Update UBS down 4% after forecasting quarterly loss, inzwischen unverändert) . Diese Art Meldung wird und wohl noch diverse Quartale weiter begleiten. Ich kann mir schwerlich vorstellen das auch die zukünftigen Wertberichtigungen in Mrdbereich bereits in den Kursen enthalten sind......

UBS is expected to announce Monday the departure of its investment bank head as it warns it will write down billions of dollars of fixed-income assets, making the Swiss banking group one of the year’s biggest casualties of financial market turmoil. The bank is expected to say it has written down its fixed-income portfolio by more than SFr3bn ($2.6bn), triggering a Q3 loss of at least SFr600m ($516m), say people close to the matter.

Lex notes that new UBS chief Marcel Rohner has been thrown head first into the current credit crunch, and concludes that while trading activity has boomed for UBS over the past five years, as for all banks, it is also likely that risk is not being properly measured, or even that it is disappearing “off balance sheet”.

Bloomberg UBS Has Loss, to Cut Jobs, After Subprime Writedowns

Hat tip to New York City Housing Bubble

> Fascinating to see that often the same "experts" that praised the financials and the investmentbanks in particular have siwtched now after the earnings are "gone" already switched to the "book value" argument. They probably havn´t read some dirty secrects about the not very conservative accounting as shown in Earnings Quality Part XXIII........ & via Mish Bank Balance Sheets and Earnings.

> Erstaunlich das etliche die bis vor kurzem das niedrige KGV als Kaufgrund angeführt haben, nun da oft überhaupt keine Gewinne mehr ausgewiesen werden , inzwischen nahtlos auf das Argument "günstig im Vergleich zum Buchwert" umgeschwenkt sind. Denen sei nochmals gesagt das gerade die Bilanzierung nicht immer sehr "konservativ" ausfällt. Nachzulesen in