Food Prices Hit Record High......

One can only hope that the very critical price of Rice ( see Chart & Rice Market Monitor ) will stay well below the last "riot" highs from 2008..... UPDATE: Jim Rogers Rotates From Gold To Rice, Sets Foundation For Next Bubble ZH

Man kann nur hoffen das der alles entscheidende Preis für Reis ( siehe Chart & Rice Market Monitor ) weiterhin deutlich unter dem letzten (Unruhe)Hoch aus dem Jahr 2008 bleiben wird....UPDATE: Jim Rogers Rotates From Gold To Rice, Sets Foundation For Next Bubble ZH


WSJ

The index doesn't measure domestic retail prices, which can be affected by a wide range of factors, including government subsidies. Instead, the index tracks export prices and can still serve as a barometer of what consumers may pay.

FT

Food prices hit a record high last month, surpassing the levels seen during the 2007-08 crisis, the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organisation said on Wednesday.

The Rome-based organisation said the increase did not constitute a crisis. But Abdolreza Abbassian, senior economist at the FAO, acknowledged that the situation was “alarming”. He added: “It will be foolish to assume this is the peak.”

The jump will increase fears about the repetition of the crisis of 2007-2008. However, poor countries have not so far seen the wave of food riots that rocked countries such as Haiti and Bangladesh two years ago, when prices of agricultural commodities jumped.

The increase in food costs will also hit developed economies, with companies from McDonald's to Kraft raising retail prices.

Higher food prices are also boosting overall inflation, which is above the preferred targets of central banks in Europe.

Compare the food CPI problems of the ECB, BOE & FED with the rest of the world.....

Der Rest der Welt kann über die Nahrungsmittelpreisprobleme der EZB, BOE & Fed wohl nur gequält lächeln.....

Please note that the chart above covers only the first 6 Month in 2010....Looking at the monthy price table it should be clear that the real spike happenend since July.....

Der obige Chart wird noch weniger appetitlich wenn man bedenkt das lediglich der Zeitraum bis einschließlich Juni 2010 berücksichtigt ist....Ein Blick auf den Food Price Index zeigt leider das der Löwenanteil des Anstieges im 2. Halbjahr vollzogen worden ist....


H/T FT Alphaville

Probably not an understatement that at least a "small" part of the increase is related to the wisdom of the central banksters around the world..... I´m very sceptical that without "QE" & with "credible" central bankers ( and politicians ) we would face similar headlines.....UPDATE: Speaking of "credible" people Ben Bernanke and the Price of Oil.....Wouldn´t surprise me if way too many on Wall Street & in the numerous "ivory towers" around the world are calling develompents like this "collataral damage"....

Denke es ist keine Untertreibung zu sagen das zumindest ein "kleiner" Anteil des Preisanstieges der geballten Weisheit der weltweiten Notenbänker geschuldet ist..... Ich kann mir nur sehr schwer vorstellen das wir ohne "QE" und mit "glaubwürdigen und vertrauenserweckenden" handelnden Personen ähnliche Schlagzeilen zu verkraften hätten...UPDATE: Da wir gerade von Glaubwüdigkeit gesprochen haben Ben Bernanke and the Price of Oil...Würde mich ebenfalls stark wundern wenn an Wall Street & in den leider reichlich vorhandenen "Elfenbeintürmen" eine solche Entwicklung nicht als "Kollataralschaden" bezeichnet wird.....
UPDATE:

Just in time comes the follwoing chart via FT Germany showing the correleation from REAL US rates ( rhs inverted ) & the commodity complex...... And the FED is not alone.....

Passender hätte der folgende Chart der FT Deutschland nicht sein können.....Mit Ausnahme des fehlenden "QE" Hinweises hätte ich den dazugehörigen Bericht nicht besser formulieren können .... Zu allem übel muß man leider feststellen das die FED in Ihrer Politik nicht allein auf weiter Flur steht.....

Real rates in the Euro area & UK....

Realzinsen unter Aufsicht der EZB und der BOE.......

H/T FT Deutschland

H/T FT Deutschland

Back with then original Story..... Weiter mit dem Eröffnungslink.....

The FAO said its food price index, a basket tracking the wholesale cost of commodities such as wheat, corn, rice, oilseeds, dairy products, sugar and meats, jumped last month of 214.7 points – up almost 4.2 per cent from November.

The FAO is drawing comfort from relatively stable prices for rice, one of the two most important cereals for global food security, which remains far below its record high. Rice is the staple of 3bn people in Asia and Africa.

The FAO food index is at its highest since the measure was first calculated in 1990. During the 2007-08 food crisis, the index reached a peak of 213.5 in June 2008

However, the cost of the other critical staple, wheat, is now rising fast on the back of poor harvests.

“This is a high prices situation,” said Mr Abbassian, although he pointed to the fact the costs of cereals – and particularly rice – were below the peaks set in 2007-08.

“Rice and wheat are, from a global food security perspective, the critical agricultural commodities, not sugar, oilseeds or meat,” he said.

The increasing costs of sugar, whose price recently hit a 30-year high, oilseeds and meat are the main reason behind the rise in the FAO food index

.

The rise of commodity prices makes it likely that the global food import bill will hit a record high in 2011,after topping $1,000bn last year for only the second time. In November, the FAO raised its 2010 forecast to $1,026bn, up almost 15 per cent from 2009 and within a whisker of a record high of $1,031bn set in 2008 during the food crisis.

At least the "food import bill" will provide incentives to withstand or slow down the "competitive devaluation trend".....UPDATE: Asia Fights Inflation With Stronger Currencies
Wenn man überhaupt etwas positives an der Situation erkennen will dann vielleicht das die bedrohlich steigenden Nahrungsmittelpreise den bisher vorherrschenden "Währungskrieg" mit der klaren Tendenz die eigene Währung künstlich niedrig zu halten, wenn auch nicht aufhalten, so doch zumindest verlangsamen könnte.....UPDATE: Asia Fights Inflation With Stronger Currencies

Agricultural commodities prices have surged following a series of crop failures caused by bad weather. The situation was aggravated when top producers such as Russia and Ukraine imposed export restrictions, prompting importers in the Middle East and North Africa to hoard supplies.

I think it´s a safe bet that around the world subsidies & government involvement ( food stamps, price controls, ban on exports etc ) will not "deflate".....

One uselful "involvement" would be to start with the derivatives complex... ;-)

Sicherlich wird weltweit das Thema Subventionen & "Regierungseinmischungen" ( Essensmarken, Preiskontrollen, Exportbeschränkungen usw. ) in den nächsten Jahren häufiger die Schlageilen dominieren....

Eine der wenigen produktiven "Einmischungen" wäre, wenn man sich dem Thema "Derivate & Terminbörsen" mal etwas genauer widmen würde... ;-)UPDATE:

Food production is down, hunger is up and prices are rising / INFOGRAPHIC The Globe And Mail

U.N. Data Notes Sharp Rise in World Food Prices NYT

Needless to say that the NYT & GAM make no reference when it comes to the relation of prices & "sound money" .... ;-)

Überflüssig festzustellen, das es auch die NYT & GAM versäumen zumindest in einem Nebensatz die nicht unwesentliche Korrelation von Preisen und "verantwortungsvoller Geldpolitik" zu erwähnen.... ;-)

Immerhin wunderschön zu sehen das eine Firma wie Monsanto, die bei diesen Nahrungsmittelpreisen eigentlich durch die Decke gehen müßten, noch immer 50% vom Hoch notiert.....Um meine SCHADENFREUDE zu verstehen, muß man sich zwingend Monsanto - mit Gift und Genen ansehen.... Meiner Meinung nach die beste und wichtigste Doku der letzten Jahre über eine Firma die wahrscheinlich über noch bessere Lobbyisten verfügt(te) als alle Banken der Wall Street zusammen ..... ;-)

More UPDATES :

Youths riot in Algeria over high food prices Associated Press

Riots over rising food prices and chronic unemployment spiraled out from Algeria's capital on Thursday, with youths torching government buildings and shouting "Bring us Sugar

Wednesday's violence started after evening Muslim prayers. It came after price hikes for milk, sugar and flour in recent days, and amid simmering frustration that Algeria's abundant gas-and-oil resources have not translated into broader prosperity.

Food Riots Commence As The Fed's Loose Money Policy Leads To First Violence Of 2011 Zero Hedge

Mann bei Protest gegen teures Essen erschossen Die Welt

Big Picture Agriculture / Lester Brown via Reformed Broker

In the United States, which harvested 416 million tons of grain in 2009, 119 million tons went to ethanol distilleries to produce fuel for cars. That's enough to feed 350 million people for a year.... The combined effect of these three growing demands is stunning: a doubling in the annual growth in world grain consumption from an average of 21 million tons per year in 1990-2005 to 41 million tons per year in 2005-2010. Most of this huge jump is attributable to the orgy of investment in ethanol distilleries in the United States in 2006-2008.

Bond Vigilanties

The reasons behind the ugly scenes in Tunisia are down to a combination of political and economic factors, but at least part of the discontent stems from rising food and energy prices

The problem these countries face is that food and energy prices are a much bigger percentage of an emerging consumer's shopping basket than for a developed consumer's basket. Food and energy therefore carry a much higher weight in domestic consumer price indices within emerging markets, which is something I discussed last year when going over some of the risks to the emerging market story

To an extent, higher food and energy prices are a result of expansionary economic policy in the US combined with a reluctance of emerging market countries (particularly China) to allow their currencies to appreciate versus the US dollar. Would it not be ironic if the very policies that US authorities have pursued to return the US economy to growth then proceed to be the cause of global economic weakness?

Food Stamp Usage Hits New High Of 43.2 Million ZH



It´s safe to say that without similar programs in the G7 countries we would see similar "riots" like in Algeria etc.....

Man muß kein Prophet sein, um zu erkennen das in den G7 Ländern ohne ähnliche Programme längst "ziviler Ungehorsam" wie momentan in Algerien, und demnächst wohl noch deutlich mehr Ländern, zu sehen sein würden....

The food price vulnerability index Citi via FT Alphaville / Tilt

The index has been created by Citigroup and its based on the idea that a country’s central banks are more likely to have to respond to a food price shock if:

1) the consumer price index is sensitive to changes in good prices.

2) growth is strong — the chances of contagion from food prices to core CPI are strongest when demand pressures are in any case robust.

3) Relatively loose monetary policy– on the grounds
that a country already behind-the-curve might have some nasty catching-up to do if a food price shock leads to a surge in inflationary pressures overall.

And China ticks all those boxes.

Back with a vengeance Economist

Russia Imposes Inflation-Driven Price Controls: Will Use Price Caps On "Socially Important" Commodities

Russia has just announced it would proceed with price caps on a variety of foodstuffs, from buckwheat, to potatoes, assorted fruits and vegetables and all other commodities it deems "socially important" accoding to Russian newspaper gazeta.ru.

Interactive Map Of Recent Food Riots And Price Hikes ZH

The "Accumulator".......

Another "innovative" product that is backfiring & will be eliminated very soon..... Being forced to double down ( if you want to spin it you can call it "cost average effect.....couldn´t resist....) in this market on a regular basis is indeed brutal..... But no mery they deserve the losses...... According to the journal this was the cause of the $ 2 billion Loss at CITIC ( see "Cowboy Hedging" Leads To $ 2 Billion Trading Loss.... )

Einmal mehr eine "Produktinnovation" die furchtbar nach hinten los geht und die es zukünftig sicher nicht mehr geben wird..... In regelmäßigen Abständen gezwungenermaßen in eine verlierende Position zu verbilligen ist so ziemlich das Gegenteil von gewinnbringend ( zu meiner aktiven Bank/Sparkassenzeit nannte man das im Fondsbereich bei noch "Cost Average Effekt"..... Vielleicht sollten die in Asien einfach mal die Vermarktung ändern.....). Da auch hier wieder Gier das Hirn gefressen hat hält sich mein Mitleid auch für die Privatinvestoren doch reichlich in Grenzen...... Lt. dem WSJ war auch die Art des "akkumulierens" die Hauptursache für den 2 Mrd $ Verlust von Citic ( siehe "Cowboy Hedging" Leads To $ 2 Billion Trading Loss....)

WSJ HONG KONG -- Amid widespread losses investors have suffered in the global financial crisis, one financial product popular in Asia has surfaced as the culprit behind a painful destruction of wealth for individuals and businesses alike.

Called an "accumulator," it is essentially a contract that obliges investors to purchase a security, currency or commodity at a fixed price -- often set at a discount to prevailing market rates -- at regular intervals. When the market price is above the fixed purchase price, the investor makes money. When it falls below the fixed price, the investor loses, sometimes quite a lot. Contract terms typically last a year.

In Hong Kong, recent losses from stock accumulators have led to dozens of complaints to regulators and legislators from disgruntled investors. Chan Kam-lam, a Hong Kong legislator, says he has heard from 50 or so individual investors, many of whom say they didn't fully understand the risk or blame their private bankers for pushing them into the products. Some individuals he has talked to have lost as much as $25 million. ...

Accumulators are among a number of structured financial products and derivatives that were sold to investors during headier times, when their downside risk seemed remote, but which are now wreaking havoc on private portfolios and corporate balance sheets amid huge volatility in global financial markets.

A fairly new flavor of derivative, the accumulator has led to big losses in some unexpected places. Among them: the books of VeraSun Energy Corp., one of the top three ethanol producers in the U.S., which filed for bankruptcy protection Friday. VeraSun had entered into accumulator contracts linked to the price of corn -- ethanol's key ingredient -- that led to big losses when those prices plunged amid a broader downturn in the commodity markets.

Citic Pacific Ltd., a Chinese-backed conglomerate listed in Hong Kong, recently reported a possible loss of nearly $2 billion, or more, thanks to its investments in a currency accumulator linked to the Australian dollar, which has fallen sharply against the U.S. dollar in recent months. News of the expected loss has punished the stock and has forced the company's Chinese parent to offer a rescue loan package.

Among the hardest-hit victims have been wealthy individual, or "retail," investors who bought stock accumulators in Hong Kong, by far the biggest market for the product, according to bankers. Hong Kong's financial regulator, the Securities and Futures Commission, estimated earlier this year that about $23 billion in accumulators remained outstanding.

What made them so popular? For one, years of rising equity prices and a dearth of fixed-income alternatives in Asia stoked interest in a number of equity-linked derivatives, including accumulators. Many people also appeared attracted by what seemed at first glance to be a great deal: the ability to buy stocks at a discount to the prevailing market price. This enhanced the impression that a bank's private-wealth clients were getting an exclusive offer only available to a select group.

And during the bull run in stock prices, when accumulators were most popular, many investors consistently underestimated the risk of a major, long-lasting downturn in shares that could leave them dangerously exposed.

As investors once enticed by the "discount" on their shares saw their losses mounting, they developed a new nickname for the accumulator: "I kill you later."

"The fundamental flaw with nearly all structured products that were developed is something that I learned from my grandmother: You get nothing for free," says Kathryn Matthews, chief investment officer for Asia at Fidelity Investment Management Ltd., which doesn't operate a private bank or offer accumulators.

Some investors have settled quietly for undisclosed sums with their private banks, according to people familiar with those negotiations. Others have opted to cut losses and terminate the accumulators, by selling them back to private banks for far less than their original purchase prices. Still others are hanging on to those investments, hoping a market rebound will restore ailing account balances......

The accumulator got its start in Europe as a corporate product, designed primarily for companies looking to build stakes in one another without causing sudden spikes in the share price of the target company.

Later, when private bankers began marketing the product to retail investors, the Asian market proved a lucrative source of new business.

Here is how an accumulator might have worked for an investor interested in accumulating a large position in China Mobile, one of the country's biggest telecom stocks.

larger/vergößern

A year ago, China Mobile was trading around 142 Hong Kong dollars (US$18.32) a share. An accumulator might have offered investors the ability to buy 1,000 China Mobile shares every month for a price of HK$114, or 20% below market price. The contracts typically included a "knock-out" clause, which terminated the contract once the stock appreciated 5%, or in China Mobile's case reached HK$149. If the stock reached that level, the return on the investor's outlay was 31%.

But here's the rub: Investors were contractually obliged to keep purchasing the shares at HK$114 regardless of whether they rose or fell. There was another nasty twist: Many accumulators required investors to double down on purchases if shares dropped, buying 2,000 shares instead of 1,000 at a price that now put them in the red.

For the 12-month accumulator, set in November 2007, investors quickly found themselves in this situation, as China Mobile's stock bounced around in the market's volatility. On Wednesday, the company's shares closed at HK$71.60 -- down 37% from the HK$114 purchase price. And because the investor is locked into making more purchases over the life of the contract, he keeps adding to his losses with each purchase.

Counterparty Risk...... Lufthansa Edition

I assume we will hear similar stories for month to come...... We all know that the AIG rescue was mainly because they were a major cds unwriter ( see A Question for A.I.G.: Where Did the Cash Go? ).... After the Lehman collapse and the actions taken from the governments i assume the real danger will come from non bank counterparties ( hedge funds, companies ).......

Ich denke das wir ähnlich gelagerte Geschichten demnächst noch öfter zu hören bekommen.... Die starke Stellung von AIG gerade im Hinblick auf CDS im Zusammenhang mit Banken war der eigentlich Grund für die Rettungsaktion ( siehe A Question for A.I.G.: Where Did the Cash Go? ). Ansonsten hätten alleine europäische Banken zweistellige Mrdbeträge verloren. Nach Lehman haben ja alle politischen Vertreter klar gemacht das es keine Bankenpleiten (Versicherungspleiten ?) mehr geben wird und daher ist davon auszugehen das die nächste Welle der "Counterparty" Risiken sicher von Hedge Fonds und Firmen kommen wird die nicht mehr in der Lage sein werden Ihren Verpflichtungen nachzukommen.....


Bloomberg

Lufthansa's fuel-hedging for the remainder of 2008 fell to 72 percent of needs from 85 percent because the Sept. 15 collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. liminated some of the contracts, the airline said. The company, which forecasts fuel expenses will rise 38 percent to 5.4 billion euros this year, is 57 percent hedged for 2009 needs. Spending on fuel next year is targeted at 5.6 billion euros, Gemkow said.

The airline, which took a charge of 76 million euros because of Lehman's failure, doesn't plan to build up its hedging position.

"Cowboy Hedging" Leads To $ 2 Billion Trading Loss....But Compared To Jerome Kerviel.........

Peanuts for Societe Generale...... :-) This might gives us a hint what kind of blowups we can expect from hedge funds or trading desks from financials. The only difference is that this time the trade was "without proper authorisation" ( for an example of a "normal" hedge that went wrong see `KIKO' Hedges Slay Korean Exporters, Threaten Banks )...... Got Gold?

Societe Generale wäre für einen so geringen Verlust wohl dankbar gewesen...... :-) Denke das dieses Beispiel einen leichten Vorgeschmack auf das gibt was demnächst von Seiten der Hedge Fonds und den Tradingabteilungen der Finanzinstitute noch auf uns zurollen wird. Der einzige Unterschied wird dann sein das diese Trades nicht "unauthorisiert" gewesen sind ( hier ein Beispiel einer "normalen" Hedgingtransaktion `KIKO' Hedges Slay Korean Exporters, Threaten Banks )...... Got Gold?


Citic Pacific Slump on Possible $2 Billion Forex Loss
Oct. 21 (Bloomberg) -- Citic Pacific Ltd. tumbled the most in 18 years in Hong Kong trading after predicting HK$15.5 billion ($2 billion) in losses from unauthorized currency bets.

The unit of China's biggest state-owned investment company dropped as much as 47 percent to HK$7.70 at 11:14 a.m. local time. The company ousted Financial Director Leslie Chang and Financial Controller Chau Chi Yin and said yesterday in a filing its parent would help to arrange a $1.5 billion loan.

``The company may face bankruptcy if it doesn't secure the loan from its parent as banks probably won't dare to lend money to it under the current credit crunch,'' said Liu Yang, managing director at Atlantis Investment Management Ltd., which oversees about $2 billion in China assets. ``The incident shows the company has real problems in risk management.''

WSJ The hit to Citic Pacific's bottom line could reach 14.7 billion Hong Kong dollars ($1.89 billion), the company said. That is roughly a third more than the company earned in 2007. The size of the loss won't be known until Dec. 31, when Citic Pacific plans to mark to market its positions in currency-derivative contracts

Citic Pacific's bet that the Australian dollar would rise incurred losses as the currency tumbled about 30 percent against its U.S. counterpart from a 25-year high reached in July. This may be the biggest derivatives loss reported by a Chinese company, almost four times the 2004 sum incurred by China Aviation Oil (Singapore) Corp. betting on jet fuel.

The shares drop, the most since 1990, cut the company's market value to HK$17.3 billion and takes the year's loss to 82 percent.

Citic Pacific's potential loss would beat other wrong bets by Chinese companies. China Aviation Oil triggered Singapore's biggest derivatives scandal after revealing a $550 million trading loss. Liu Qibing, a Chinese government trader, made wrong copper bets resulting in an estimated $300 million in losses in 2005.

Citic Pacific bought currency contracts to fund an A$1.6 billion ($1.1 billion) iron ore mine in Australia, the company said yesterday. The hedging transactions weren't approved by the company's Chairman Larry Yung, the company said.

A loss of HK$808 million has been incurred from terminating some leveraged currency contracts, and an additional HK$14.7 billion in losses are possible, Citic Pacific said yesterday.

Strike Price
The possible losses are based on an exchange rate of 70 cents to the Australian dollar, $1.35 to the euro and 6.84 yuan to the dollar, it said. The outstanding Australian contracts, for monthly delivery until October 2010, have a weighted average strike price of 87 cents to the Australian dollar, it said.

The Australian dollar traded at 69.65 U.S. cents at 12:17 p.m. in Sydney.

``Citic had only A$1.6 billion in capex requirements, however, it is now interested in more than A$9 billion,'' Anil Daswani, a Hong Kong-based analyst at Citigroup, said in a report. The ``cowboy hedging policy sees Citic sitting on unlimited potential losses,'' Daswani said.

Citic Pacific on Aug. 28 said its first-half profit fell 12 percent to HK$4.38 billion as material costs rose and part-owned Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd. posted a loss. At the end of June, the company had net debt of HK$31.2 billion as well as HK$30.2 billion in cash and available committed loan facilities.

UPDATE: Big Currency Bets Backfire WSJ

Societe Generale reports $7.1 bln trading loss from "fraud"

ice internal risk management...... In the end this is probably good news. ( You know that times are really bad when an € 5.5 billion capital infusion at fire sale prices is been widely seen as good news.....) There were rumors crashing the stock and the entire sector that they would have a big write down. But this write down seems (at least that´s what i hope) to be company specific. And some still wonder why banks don´t trust each other.......Probably the most important part is that SocGen is starting to write down some insurance from monolines and from a total of € 550 mio and only € 50 mio is coming from ACA! ( watch page 10 on the presentation )

Nette Risikokontrolle..... Unterm Strich dürfte das aber trotzdem für eine große Erleichterung sorgen ( Der Umstand das eine massive Kaitalspritze von üver 5,5 Mrd € zu Ausverkaufspreisen als gute Nachricht angesehen wird sagt eigentlch schon alles aus...). Speziell in den letzten beiden Tagen hat das Gerücht um eine riesige Abschreibung den ganzen Sektor zerlegt. Das die Abschreibung jetzt größtenteils nur auf einen "Betrug" und damit hoffentlich nur isoliert zu betrachten ist sollte beruhigen. Relativ gesehen natürlich....Kein Wunder das die Banken sich gegenseitig nicht über den Weg trauen..... Ein interessanterter Aspekt ist das auch SocGen damit angefangen ist wertlose Versicherung der Monolines abzuschreiben ( von den 550 Mio stammen lediglich 50 Mio von ACA / Details auf Seite 10 der Präsentation) . Passend zum Thema hier ein Ranking vom Spiegel über die größten Fehlspekulanten Börsenschwindler, Seiltänzer, Hochstapler

You cannot make this up. FT Alphaville is reporting that Societe General has won the award for the " Best Equity Derivatives House" .....

Das ist wirklich kaum zu toppen. FT Alphaville berichtet das ausgerechnet Societe General den Preis fpr das "Beste Derivatehaus für Aktien" gewonnen hat.

“We managed the existing book very well because we decided some time before the crisis to be long volatility and be less sensitive to correlation, so the losses were minimal. We suffered on our statistical arbitrage trading activity, but that was just for one month, and minimal compared to some hedge funds or other banks. Overall, our trading activities will be approximately flat compared to last year, which is a good performance,”

Qutote: Christophe Mianne, SG CIB’s head of market activities, covering equity, derivatives, fixed income, currency and commodities in Paris

Make sure you read the Societe General Presentation for some more interesting details !

Empfehle die Societe General Präsentation für die mehr als interessanten Details zu lesen !

Live blogging the SocGen conference call via FT Alphaville

Marketwatch
French bank Societe Generale loss after an "exceptional fraud" committed by someone who usually trades plain-vanilla and European stock index futures.

It also said it was taking a 2.05 billion euro write-down, with 1.1 billion euros coming from U.S. residential property, 550 million euros coming from the U.S. bond insurers and 400 million euros in additional subprime-related risks. It will earn between 600 million and 800 million euros for the year.

The board rejected the resignation of CEO Daniel Bouton. It's going to issue 5.5 billion euros in preferred securities to J.P. Morgan and Morgan Stanley to boost its capital

The story is reminding of Nick Leeson & Barings

Erinnert mich irgendwie stark an Nick Leeson & Barings

Here is a good take from Barry Ritholtz Fed's Folly: Fooled by Flawed Futures? suggesting ( i think correctly ) that this poor trader has lead to the emergency cut

Hier eine wie ich finde zutrefende Einschätzung von Barry Ritholtz Fed's Folly: Fooled by Flawed Futures? der unterstellt das dieser durchgeknallte Trader es geschafft hat Bernanke zum größten Notzinsschritt seit Jahrzehnten zu bewegengrößten Notzinsschritt

This is not merely a subprime crisis / Münchau on Credit Default Swaps

I´m back from my 3 week vacation and it looks like i missed a lot of fun..... Thanks for all the mails during the past weeks. I´ll answer them this week.

It looks like more and more dominoes are falling at an accelerating pace. No wonder more and more people are waking up an are finally discovering Gold ..... Wolfgang Münchau from the FT has some good thoughts on one of the next shoes to drop

Melde mich nach einem dreiwöchigen Urlaub zurück und muß feststellen das ich wohl eine Menge Spaß verpaßt habe...... Dank an alle die gemailt haben. Ich werde diese im Laufe der Woche beantworten.

Es sieht so aus als wenn unübersehbar immer mehr Dominosteine kippen. So verwundert es wenig das endlich immer mehr Leute Gold für sich entdecken.....Wolfgang Münchau from The FT hat sich Gedanken zum nächsten drohenden "Unheil" gemacht.

This is not merely a subprime crisis

If this had been a mere subprime crisis, it would now be over. But it is not, and nor will it be over soon. The reason is that several other pockets of the credit market are also vulnerable. Credit cards are one such segment, similar in size to the subprime market. Another is credit default swaps, relatively modern financial instruments that allow bondholders to insure against default. Those who such sell such protection receive a quarterly premium, based on a percentage of the amount insured.

The CDS market is worth about $45,000bn (€30,500bn, £23,000bn). This is not an easy figure to imagine. It is more than three times the annual gross domestic product of the US. Economically, credit default swaps are insurance. But legally, they are not, which is why this market is largely unregulated.

Technically, they are swaps: two parties swap payments streams – one pays a regular premium for protection, the other pays up in case of default. At a time of low insolvency rates, many investors used to consider the selling of protection as a fairly risk-free way of generating a steady stream of income. But as insolvency rates go up, so will be the payment obligations under the CDS contracts. If insolvencies reach a certain level, one would expect some protection sellers to default on their obligations.

So the general health of this market crucially depends on the rate of insolvencies. This in turn depends on the economy. The US and Europe are the two largest CDS markets in the world. It is now widely recognised, including by the Federal Reserve, that the US economy is heading for a sharp downturn, possibly a recession. The eurozone, too, is heading for a downturn, but possibly not quite as sharp. ....

Today, the really important question is not whether the US can avoid a sharp downturn. It probably cannot. Far more important is the question of how long such a downturn or recession will last. An optimistic scenario would be a short and shallow downturn. A second-best scenario would be for a sharp, but still short, recession. .....

So what then would be the effects of these scenarios on the CDS market? Bill Gross of Pimco*, who runs the world’s largest bond fund, last week produced an interesting back-of-the-envelope calculation that received widespread publicity. He projected ( see his latest Investment Outlook ) that the losses from credit default swaps caused by a rise in bankruptcies could be $250bn or more – which would be similar to the expected total loss as a result of subprime.

This is how he arrived at this estimate. His calculation assumes that the corporate insolvency rate would return to a normal level of 1.25 per cent (measured as the default rate of all investment grade and junk debt outstanding). As the entire CDS market is worth about $45,000bn, $500bn in CDS insurance would be triggered under this assumption. The protection sellers would probably be able to recover some of this, so the net loss would come to about half of that. This estimate is very rough, of course. Most important, it is based on the assumption that the hypothetical US recession would not turn into a prolonged slump. In that case, one would expect corporate default rates not merely to return to trend, but to overshoot in the other direction.

So one could take that calculation as a starting point. A downturn lasting two years could easily trigger payments streams of a multiple of $250bn.

At this point we might be tempted to conclude that this all is irrelevant, since this is only insurance, which is a zero-sum financial game. The money is still there, only somebody else has got it. But in the light of the current liquidity conditions in financial markets, that would be a complacent view to take.

If protection sellers were to default en masse, so too could some protection buyers who erroneously assume that they are protected. Given that the CDS market is largely unregulated there is no guarantee of sufficient liquidity behind each contract.

It is not difficult at all to see how the CDS market has the potential to cause serious financial contagion. The subprime crisis came fairly close to destabilising the global financial system. A CDS crisis, under a pessimistic scenario, could produce a global financial meltdown.

This is not a prediction of what will happen, merely a contingent scenario. But it is contingent on an event – a nasty and long recession – that is not entirely improbable.

Where is Debt Being Stuffed? Minyanville

Thanks Mr. Practical. On top of this i suggest to read the latest from Hussman An Irrelevant Fed: Thimbles of Water in a Forest Fire .

Besten Dank Mr. Practical. Ergänzend empfiehlt sich das letzte "Werk" von Hussman An Irrelevant Fed: Thimbles of Water in a Forest Fire

Thanks to Jim Borgman

Where is Debt Being Stuffed? Mr. Practical / Minyanville

As the markets seem to want to be relieved that global central banks have the “liquidity” problem under control, let us Minyans remind ourselves of the magnitude of the problem.

I have described just how central banks inject “liquidity” into the markets when they need it. Essentially central banks encourage debt creation, for people to borrow money, so that they buy things (consumption) to spur the economy. But due to too much debt, financial engineering has had to create new and better places to stuff more and more debt.

You may have seen this chart before. It shows the results of that financial engineering. Central banks can only affect the bottom two parts of the chart, high powered money and M3. M3 the Federal Reserve is growing as fast as it can in order to indirectly support the much larger problem of securitized debt and derivatives.

These two phenomenal pockets of debt are supported by asset prices: when asset prices (which act as collateral) decline, liquidity gets sucked out of the system. So the purpose of pumping new debt into the system is to keep nominal asset prices up to protect collateral values of the real problem of leverage in the system that the Fed cannot directly control. It takes more and more debt to do this because people are having huge problems servicing the debt they already have.

So we have two huge forces fighting each other right now: central banks desperately attempting to re-flate (create more debt) and the market grudgingly but purposefully attempting to deflate by paying back (which the bureaucrats are trying to help with) or more likely destroying (write-offs) that debt. We have extremely high volatility as these two forces fight it out.

Looking at the chart, which do you think will win?

>If you are still not convinced i urge you to read Straight Talk on the Mortgage Mess from an Insider via Herb Greenberg. One of the best i´ve seen in months. It looks like the "Hope Now Alliance" will become a running gag during the coming years.....

>Solltet Ihr immer noch Hoffnung haben das alles gut werden wird empfehle ich dringend Straight Talk on the Mortgage Mess from an Insider via Herb Greenberg zu lesen. Mit das Beste was ich in den letzten Monaten zu lesen bekommen habe. Es sieht so aus als wenn die "Hope Now Alliance" zum Running Gag in den nächsten Jahren werden dürfte......

UBS Write Down Estimates "Best Case $ 6 Billion, Worst Case....

They should have floated rumors/estimates of $ 20 billion and then surprise with a lower number like Barclays, Bear Stearns etc...... Sarcasm off..... :-) . UBS has just denied that they expect a big write down . I assume it depends on what is "big" . This comment doesn´t fit well with the comments from UBS at the beginning of the month.UBS: Further Writedowns Possible and this comment from the Wall Street Journal . The example Swiss Re doesn´t give much comfort either......

UBS hätte besser schon vorher Gerüchte über 20 Mrd $ streuen sollen um dann positiv zu überraschen ( siehe Barclays, Bear Stearns usw....... ;-). Gerade hat UBS einen größeren Abschreibungsbedarf dementiert. Ich denke es ist alles eine Frage was "groß" bedeutet. Was solche Dementies selbst aus der Schweiz heutzutage wert sind zeigt "eindrucksvoll" das Beispiel der Swiss Re ........ Auf jeden Fall harmoniert das Dementi nicht sonderlich mit dem Kommentar von Anfang November UBS: Further Writedowns Possible und diesem Kommentar aus dem Wall Street Journal .

Mr. Peace ( Lehman Brotehrs) said UBS may have to record an additional loss, because he compared UBS's and Merrill's exposure to a risky CDO slice known as the mezzanine piece. His analysis shows that UBS has triple the exposure to mezzanine CDO slices as Merrill Lynch yet so far has taken a quarter of the percentage write-down that Merrill took. UBS's holding does include some added protection against losses, Mr. Peace said.

Citi do a Whitney on UBS - “A major reversal of fortune” / FT
According to a note sent out to clients by Citi analysts today, we can “realistically” expect a further $12bn writedown from UBS in the next quarter.

UBS shareholders should also expect to see the dividend slashed, and the value of their equity diluted by a rights issue of up to $7bn. UBS, Citi’s Jeremy Sigee say dryly, will almost certainly need to recapitalise.

In other words, Citi are giving UBS the Meredith Whitney treatment. Is it true what they say - every bully was once bullied?

The difference, of course, is that Citi cut to the chase in disclosing its subprime losses - releasing details of its exposure and a breakdown of the figures. Not that it did Chuck Prince any good.

UBS, however, have been far more circumspect. Consider this table of banks’ disclosed exposure and writedowns on ABS CDOs:



While UBS have the second highest ABS CDO exposure, they have taken one of the lowest writedowns.

Clearly, UBS are not marking their assets at current market prices, and are still heavily relying on marked to model prices. Consider also the fact that many of the CDOs UBS arranged and sponsored have been some of the worst hit - like the appropriately named Vertical Capital, a CDO whose AAA debt was slashed 14 notches to junk in one fell swoop.

Consider this table from Citi, which neatly summarises the price declines on MBS and CDOs (measured respectively by declines in the ABX and TABX indices from Markit) It’s pretty clear that UBS’s average writedown so far is paltry

Citi outline three possible scenarios for UBS:
First we assume markdowns similar to Merrill Lynch. Under that scenario, UBS would need to take markdowns of SFr 6.7bn in 4Q07. Translating this revenue shortfall one-to-one to PBT (thereby assuming no clawback on the cost side), the group’s PBT would be -SFr 3.2bn for a net loss of SFr2.3bn. The Tier 1 ratio would be 9.5% under Basel I and 9% under Basel II. This is below the group’s target. However, cancelling the dividend (SFr4.2bn) would bring back the ratio to 10% under Basel II.

The second scenario takes conclusions from our Fixed Income credit strategists, assuming 30% writedowns on HG ABS CDOs and 60% on mezzanine ABS CDOs. UBS would report a loss of SFr 7.9bn in 4Q07, its Tier 1 ratio would drop to 8.1% (Basel I) and 7.6% under Basel II. The Tier 1 would remain below target even if the dividend were cut, raising the possibility of a capital shortfall.

The third scenario is a worst-case scenario. Under this scenario (50% writedowns on HG ABS CDOs and 100% on mezz ABS CDOs), UBS would end up with a substantial SFr22bn writedown. The group’s Tier 1 ratio would drop to 5.8% (Basel II). Even after cutting the dividend and accounting for a lower group Tier 1 ratio of 9% (Basel II), a capital shortfall of SFr 8.5bn would remain, raising the prospects of a large capital increase/rights issue.

Investors Should Spank Banks for Betraying Trust: Mark Gilbert

Mark Gilbert from Bloomberg rocks!

Thanks to Randy Glasbergen

Investors Should Spank Banks for Betraying Trust: Mark Gilbert Nov. 15 (Bloomberg) -- Exactly a year ago, I was summoned to ABN Amro Holding NV's London headquarters for a dressing-down. I had sinned by comparing the bank's glossy new derivatives, dubbed constant proportion debt obligations, to a Nigerian banking scam.

The newfangled securities made bets on credit-default swaps, which are themselves a gamble on company creditworthiness. Steve Lobb, ABN's global head of structured credit, tried to convince me of the error of my skeptical ways with the help of a whiteboard and one of those wonderful diagrams of boxes and arrows showing money flowing from here to there.

This week, Moody's Investors Service said it may cut the Aaa ratings on two of ABN's CPDOs, along with five CPDOs and one swap contract initiated by UBS AG and rated between Aaa and Aa3. Moody's cited ``the continued spread widening and spread volatility on the financial names underlying these CPDOs.''

One of the ABN CPDOs, called Chess III, went on sale in July priced at 100 percent of face value with that golden Aaa rating. This week, it was worth about 41.5 percent of face value, according to ABN prices.

Put another way, the investors who bought the 100 million euros ($147 million) of notes lost 58.5 million euros in just four months. That beats any Nigerian scam.

It turns out that anyone who trusted the CPDO creators -- and even the most sophisticated derivatives buyer has to place some faith in what the stress-testing models of the seller suggest about future valuations -- misplaced their faith.

Expecting A Recession / Hussman

This is only a smal snippet from Hussman´s latest work Expecting A Recession . Havn´t heard the word "contained" for a long long time.....

Dieses ist nur ein kleiner Ausschnitt von Hussman´s letzten Werk Expecting A Recession . Nebenbei bemerkt habe ich das wort "contained" schon lange nicht mehr gehört.......

Industry groups: rotating disappointments
It's interesting that investors have not yet put the rotating disappointments among various industry groups into a “gestalt.” Rather, investors seem to be looking at various industries as if their problems are each somehow unique and unrelated. Investors recognized early that the housing sector is profoundly vulnerable. More recently, they have recognized that financials face growing loan loss risk. With Caterpillar's disappointing guidance, they suddenly realized that cyclicals and machinery face significant challenges. With Exxon's refining difficulties, they realize that profit growth in the oil sector is unlikely to produce major upside surprises. And last week, technology stocks were clipped when Cisco produced strong earnings but didn't raise guidance. Yet somehow, investors haven't put all of these together to see the larger picture, which is that the market has lost leadership from every important group. This isn't a stock-selection or an industry-selection issue. It is a pervasive indication of oncoming economic risk.

With regard to financials in particular, investors continue to look for a bottom. Aside from periodic short squeezes and spectacular but short-lived rebounds, I don't think it is coming anytime soon. The recent concern about higher loan losses is no surprise (see The Problem with Financials), and this is likely to continue. This is not simply a problem that will go away if various financial companies “come clean” with what their CDOs and so forth are worth. The real problem is that the companies don't know what they're worth because the foreclosures that will determine their value haven't happened yet. The defaults are just starting. The heaviest round of mortgage resets only started in October, so it will probably be months before we observe mass delinquencies, and several more months until we observe significant foreclosures, loan losses, and writeoffs. This is a multi-year problem, not a multi-week problem that can be resolved by “just coming clean” with what's on the balance sheet

According to the latest FDIC banking profile, FDIC insured institutions currently hold a notional value of $153.8 trillion in credit derivatives. That's not a typo – though GDP itself is only about $13 trillion, the high notional value emerges because for each derivative that connects two true “end users” (one long, one short), there is a whole chain of intermediaries who are long with one intermediary and short with another, hoping to earn a tiny profit on the spread. For example, I buy a derivative from Andy, who goes short to me, so he buys one from Barry who is short to Andy, hopefully for a tiny spread, and covers the risk by buying a derivative from Charlene, and so on, until someone finds a true “end user” who actually wants to carry a pure short position in that derivative. Unfortunately, this also exposes banks to as-yet-unknown “counterparty” risk. If one link in the chain snaps, the links surrounding that chain have to bridge the gap. This is not a material risk in exchange traded derivatives, but can be a problem in “over-the-counter” derivatives traded between banks, where “know thy counterparty” currently ought to be chiseled into every marble surface.

Not So Smart "In an era of easy money, the pros forgot that the party can't last forever "

What a difference 6 month made..... It was in early February when Business Week ran this cover story It's A Low, Low, Low, Low-Rate World .

Looks like the "Cover Story Indicator" has worked once more.....

Was doch 6 Monate für einen Unterschied ausmachen.....Anfang Februar hat Business Week noch die folgende Titelgeschichte It's A Low, Low, Low, Low-Rate World gebracht.

Es sieht so aus als wenn der "Cover Story Indicator" mal wieder ganze Arbeit geleistet hat.
Not So Smart / In an era of easy money, the pros forgot that the party can't last forever

The boasting and bluster that marked the just-ended era of easy money varied depending on the speaker and his stake in the boom. But the underlying message was consistent: This time it's different. When it came to the hazards associated with borrowing, the old rules no longer applied.

The titans of home loans announced they had perfected software that could spit out interest rates and fee structures for even the least reliable of borrowers. The algorithms, they claimed, couldn't fail. With similar bravado, buyout firms bid up private equity deals, arguing that investors had an insatiable appetite for the increasingly risky and mammoth loans used to fund them. "I don't think it's a bubble," David M. Rubenstein of Carlyle Group told the Financial Times in an interview last December. "I think really what's happening now is that people are beginning to use a different investment technique, and this investment technique, private equity, adds real value."

> This chart from Bespoke shows how well timed the "Low, Low......Rate World" cover was.....

> Dieser Chart von Bespoke zeigt wie gut die Titelgeschichte "Low, Low, ..Rate World" abgepaßt war.

Hedge funds were all too happy to enable the leverage arms race. They, too, borrowed to the max so they could gorge on the debt that financed the housing and buyout booms. "The consumer has to be an idiot to take on those loans," John Devaney, chief executive of United Capital Asset Management, said in May, referring to dicey adjustable-rate mortgages. But since there were plenty of "idiots" out there, and legions of lenders eager to serve them, Devaney and other hedge fund managers eagerly devoured the securities confected by investment banks from batches of dubious home loans. This securitization, the argument went, would spread the risk far beyond banks and mortgage companies. In March, Devaney bragged that mortgage-backed securities were one of his "best-performing investments.

"It didn't work out that way. In June, Devaney's Horizon funds booked a loss of more than 30%, according to Hedge Fund Alert. Shortly after, United Capital suspended redemption requests by investors trying to pull out. Devaney did not return calls for comment.

> maybe he is the guy on the cover.......:-)

> ist wahrscheinlich der Typ auf dem Cover :-)

Making sense of this mess is daunting. One good place to start: the ways various financial players indulged in layer upon layer of leverage, much of it far from transparent. Mortgage lenders threw out common sense underwriting standards. Wall Street sliced and diced the loans, creating the illusion that risk somehow disappeared in the process. Hedge funds then multiplied the leverage by borrowing copiously to buy securities based on the rearranged mortgages. In their version of the game, private equity firms used loads of debt to launch unprecedented buyouts.

bigger / größer

> Looks "contained"´to me....

> Sieht für mich ziemlich "contained" aus......

What some of the smartest guys in each of these fields seemed to forget is that new paradigms can crumble suddenly. Many miscalculated how long the period of easy credit would persist.

Mortgage companies argued their algorithms provided near-perfect precision. "We have a wealth of information we didn't have before," Joe Anderson, then a senior Countrywide executive, said in a 2005 interview with BusinessWeek. "We understand the data and can price that risk."

PRIVATE EQUITY: `A GOLDEN AGE'
As recently as April, buyout legend Henry Kravis proclaimed a "golden age" of private equity. Perhaps he should have called it a golden age of CLOs—collataralized loan obligations.

Like mortgage lenders, the giants of private equity have relied on complicated investment pools to fund their binge. CLOs are cousins of collateralized debt obligations. Managers of the investment pools buy groups of risky, junk-rated loans from banks that have financed buyouts by Kravis and his competitors. The CLOs package the loans, then divide them into risk levels. While the individual loans carry low credit ratings, three-fourths of the securities marketed by CLOs magically boast AAA marks. (That's because some investors give up extra yield in exchange for better protection against losses.)

The financial alchemy has allowed private equity firms to attract a whole new base of investors, including pension funds and insurance companies that never would have bought those risky loans outright. U.S. CLOs raised $100 billion in 2006, quadruple the amount two years earlier.

Buyout firms have generally fronted 30% of the equity in recent deals, vs. just 15% two decades ago. But that doesn't mean firms have been more cautious. Steeled by the seemingly insatiable demand for CLOs, they became bolder and bolder in the deals they pursued. After Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and Texas Pacific Group's $44 billion bid for Texas energy giantTXU in February, analysts began putting odds on imagined future megabillion-dollar targets like Home Depot Inc. (HD )

As private equity firms bid up the prices for ever-larger LBOs, the transactions began getting riskier. A key measure of leverage, a company's total debt divided by operating earnings, skyrocketed from 4.7 in 2004 to 7.0 in the second quarter of 2007, according to Standard & Poor's (MHP ) LCD. Meanwhile, the ability of companies to cover the interest payments of that debt dropped sharply; the ratio of profits to interest fell from 3.4 to 1.8 in that period.

> It is getting worse if you consider that profit margins are close to record highs and the economy is now tanking.... So there is almost no room for error.....

> Das ganze wird noch dramtischer wenn man berücksichtigt das die Firmen momentan noch Gewinnmargen nahe der historischen Hochs haben und die Wirtscahft sich gleichzeitig abschwächt bzw. wie in den USA sogar abschmiert.... Nicht viel Raum für Fehler......

At the same time, loan terms got looser. For example, in the buyouts of Freescale Semiconductor and retailer Claire's Stores (CLE ), LBO firms peddled bonds that allowed the companies to postpone interest payments until the bonds matured—a previously unheard of feature. Such stipulations applied to 10% of all junk bonds sold in 2007, vs. virtually none 18 months earlier, according to Lehman.

The red-hot demand for even the junkiest of loans allowed many firms to delude themselves into thinking they could endlessly pursue deals. In the three months through July 31, firms announced $254 billion in buyouts, as much as in 2004 and 2005 combined, according to Thomson Financial (TOC ). One credit crunch later, the market for LBO financing has evaporated. Investors won't buy the loans at current prices, leaving banks on the hook for $300 billion in loans to buyout artists.

So far, no big deals have collapsed. The hope is that the credit environment will improve in the fall, and stalled deals will move through the LBO pipeline. But there may be more pain ahead.

HEDGE FUNDS: STEALTH DEBT
Hedge funds helped power the mortgage and buyout booms by hungrily consuming securitized subprime debt and loans used to fund buyouts. By borrowing much of the money they invest, in some transactions up to 90%, hedge funds add another potentially dangerous layer of indebtedness to already highly leveraged markets. Because hedge fund disclosure is limited, huge pockets of leverage are barely visible. This stealth debt helped cause the problems in the subprime market to spread far beyond the housing sector.

One example: the hundreds of billions of dollars in so-called repurchase lines of credit, or repo loans, that Wall Street banks have lent to hedge funds. Disclosure of these esoteric agreements is murky at best, so their precise value can't be quantified. Another tool that pumps up leverage by untold billions is the total return swap. These arrangements allow a hedge fund to capture the gains of a security without having to buy it outright and with only limited collateral.

For some funds, extreme leverage became an acute problem when the mortgage crunch caused banks to doubt the value of the subprime bonds and CDOs the funds held. Banks pulled their lines of credit, forcing funds to come up with the full value of those assets. That caused dire consequences because, in some instances, the funds paid as little as 10 cents on the dollar and now had to come up with the remaining 90 cents. Many funds, including ones from Goldman, Sachs & Co. (GS ) and Renaissance Technologies, were forced to sell better-performing bonds, stocks, and commodities to pay back nervous bankers. ....

Related links from Business Week to the cover story

Main Street Is Fed Up

Bruce Wasserstein: "Expect Lots More Embarrassment"

It's Out Of Bernanke's Reach

About "Conduits" And "Off Balance Sheet" Vehicles.....

Whenever i hear the phrase "off balance sheet" vehicles "Enron" and other accounting scandals are coming to my mind. It is often only a matter of time until the ticking time bomb is taking its toll. In the case of the German IKB and probably the Sachsen LB i think the board that has the oversight is just too incompetent to realize what is and was going on. On top of this it is clear that the Bafin ( banking oversight ) has done a lousy job and didn´t know anything about the immense risk that small German banks were taking. Maybe they should order this excellent artwork from the NYT to understand what kind of junk they have often as AAA in their books..... ( hat tip to Pancho Villa and Calculated Risk

Immer wenn ich den Begriff "Off Balance Sheet" höre ziehen vor meinem geistigen Auge immer wieder "Enron" und andere Skandale vorbei. Es ist fast immer nur eine Frage der Zeit bevor diese Konstruktionen große Probleme bereiten. Im Fall der IKB und wahrscheinlich auch der Landesbank Sachsen wird zudem deutlich das der Aufsichtsrat vollkommen inkompetent gewesen ist. Zudem sollte ernsthaft mal hinterfragt werden was die Bafin eigentlich so den ganzen Tag macht....... Evtl. sollten sie die Verantwortlichen mal diese diese gelungene Übersicht ansehen um zu versthen was die überhaupt als AAA in Ihren Büchern haben

Big hat tip to the reader who sent me this link!

Structured investment vehicles’ role in crisis

Policymakers and investors have been obsessed in recent years about the potential for a hedge fund collapse to spread financial panic. But it seems one of the biggest threats to stability is coming from the age-old risk of short-term borrowing to fund investments in illiquid long-term products.

In a corner of the market few people knew existed, regulators are scrambling to understand what is happening in structured investment vehicles (SIVs), a breed of often huge, mainly bank-run, programmes de­signed to profit from the difference between short-term borrowing rates and longer-term returns from structured product investments.

These have proliferated in recent years and control assets worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Depending on whether they are fully rated by credit rating agencies and on how strictly they have to conform to certain rules, they are known as SIVs, SIV-lites, or conduits.

> Here the German conduits / Übersicht der deutschen Conduits

They are typically quite opaque, invest in complex securities and often do not need to be displayed on a bank’s balance sheet.

It seems they have played a key role in last week’s liquidity crunch.

“We are in the middle of a mini-crisis in the commercial paper market, at least half of which is related to the SIV conduits,” says Robert McAdie, global head of credit strategy at Barclays.

These programmes typically invest in credit market instruments, such as US subprime mortgage-backed bonds and collateralised debt obligations. These assets tend to be the highly rated, supposedly safe versions of such debt, but in the recent fear-driven turmoil have shown just how illiquid and hard to value theycan be.

The profit for those who run such programmes comes from the fact that the assets pay fairly high yields, while the conduits and SIVs fund their purchases with short-term borrowings in which interest and principal payments are backed by financial assets that are deemed to have stable cash flow. Collectively this so-called “asset-backed commercial paper” – or ABCP – lasts for anything between a few days and a few months before needing to be refunded.

The problem could be thrown into relief when billions of dollars of ABCP mature today and on Wednesday, with great un­certainty as to whether this can be refinanced.

Everything in this market depends on investors in the ABCP market maintaining their faith in the programmes and the assets they hold. With the current rush for the exits in many structured credit markets, this faith has been evaporating wholesale. No investors are sure exactly what assets SIVs and conduits are holding, or how damaged those holdings might be.

Thanks to the fantastic Randy Glasbergen

While many non-SIV funds – such as those run by BNP, Axa and others that have hit trouble recently – were able to stop investors pulling their cash out, SIVs and conduits who see their funding expire on a regular basis have no such luxury.

In the case of a blip in the market, SIVs and conduits are supported by liquidity facilities from highly rated, mainstream banks. This means banks must step in to provide finance if the SIV cannot raise commercial paper in the normal way, unless the SIVs’ assets suffer significant ratings downgrades. Typically, the credit line provided by the sponsoring bank and a group of others in a syndicate must cover 100 per cent of outstanding commercial paper.

These funding lines have rarely been drawn in recent years, because liquidity has been abundant in the ABCP market as almost everywhere else in the financial world. As recently as mid-June, the European commercial paper market was seeing records levels of issuance.

However, what sparked last week’s turmoil – and the dramatic intervention by central banks – was a pernicious chain of events. As it became apparent this summer that the US subprime problems were worsening and infecting a broader range of structured products, some investors in the ABCP market started to worry about whether SIVs were also sitting on losses.

The rush to sell structured products by hedge funds facing redemptions and other investors meant those market values that could be ascertained were being marked down heavily. As a result, by mid-July some investors decided to stop buying ABCP paper from SIVs suspected of subprime exposure.

The German bank IKB was an early victim. Another victim could be the Landesbank Sachsen. Like many local peers, it had a conduit – called Rhineland Funding – which had ex­panded rapidly and had almost €20bn ($27.3bn, £13.5bn) worth of outstanding commercial paper in the markets in July. In mid-July, ABCP investors refused to roll over some of these notes.

Rhineland asked IKB to provide a credit line, as the rules of SIVs require. But it appears the German bank did not have enough cash to meet this request and was unable to liquidate enough assets to plug the gap. This threatened to trigger IKB’s collapse, until KFW, the state-owned German bank, stepped in and offeredan €8bn credit facility.

German officials hoped this action would stop growing panic in the sector. But it may have had the reverse effect: investors started to shun almost all commercial paper issued by SIVs.

“This is an environment where there has been a big loss in confidence and nobody is distinguishing between apples and oranges,” notes Mr McAdie.

By early August, the problems in the ABCP market had become so serious that some European banks were preparing for additional calls on credit lines to SIVs. But the banks are also grappling with a backlog of unsold leveraged loans, which is placing additional pressure on their balance sheets.

So early this month some European banks – and a few US institutions as well – quietly started trying to raise new credit lines themselves. That, however, triggered additional alarm, as rumours spread about the potential losses at SIVs – on top of problems in other corners of the financial world.

Consequently, by the middle of last week, some banks started shutting credit lines to a sweeping list of institutions. “Commercial paper is now being funded on an overnight basis. The banks will not roll paper for three months,” says Dominic Konstam, head of interest rate strategy for Credit Suisse. ....

Policymakers hope that some of this panic will dissipate this week following the massive emergency injections of liquidity by the ECB and US Federal Reserve. And indeed, by the end of last week, borrowing rates were stabilising. There were signs vulture funds were circling, ready to pick up ABCP paper at bargain prices.

“What some people are hoping is that the bottom fishers will appear and help the market self-correct,” says one big ABCP issuer.

However, nobody close to this sector expects to see a quick solution soon. Commercial paper interest rates have not yet fallen, irrespective of central banks’ actions. In New York on Friday, they closed at their highest level for six years.

There is deep uncertain­ty about what the central banks will do next – making ABCP players even more reluc­tant to start issuing and trading again. “Nobody is going to handle commercial paper if they think the Fed could be about to cut rates or do some­thing else completely unexpected overnight,” explains one. 

However, the third, most pernicious problem is that it is becoming clear central banks cannot resolve the biggest problem – a lack of clarity about valuations in structured credit markets and the almost complete loss of confidence that is infecting even the biggest and most diversified of conduit-type programmes.