First Data Loans Delayed as KKR, Banks Keep Talking, People Say

It looks like the banks and investors have realised that they have gone too far. We can now take this cover "The trouble with private equity" and the men one step further...... Please click at the label to read more about the private equity mess.

Es sieht ganz so aus als wenn Banken und Investoren endlich realisiert haben das Sie heftigst überzogen haben. Ich denken wie können das Cover von "The trouble with private equity" erweitern und davon ausgehen das er sich jetzt auf dem "Abstieg" befindet.... Wenn Ihr mehr "schmutzige" Details zum Thema Private Equity lesen mächtet klickt bitte auf die Labels am Ende des Posts.

Sept. 12 (Bloomberg) -- Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. may delay the sale of loans to fund its $26 billion buyout of First Data Corp. until at least next week after failing to agree on terms with its bankers, people with knowledge of the talks said.

KKR, the New York-based private-equity firm run by Henry Kravis, and banks led by Credit Suisse Group couldn't agree today on pricing or how much of the debt lenders will try to sell, said the people, who asked not to be identified because the negotiations are private.

As recently as April, buyout legend Henry Kravis proclaimed a "golden age" of private equity

The First Data sale is the biggest to be attempted since rising U.S. mortgage defaults triggered the highest leveraged buyout borrowing costs in four years. It's being watched by bankers and buyout firms as a gauge for how $320 billion in debt committed for pending LBOs may fare. The banks would have to hold the loans and bonds if they can't be sold to investors.

``The pricing environment in the credit markets reflects illiquidity and fear,'' said Peter Plaut, an analyst with Sanno Point Capital Management LLC, a New York-based hedge-fund manager. ``If First Data gets done, it will show a significant vote of confidence.''

KKR has other deals to finance after Greenwood Village, Colorado-based First Data, the largest processor of credit-card payments. The firm and TPG Inc. agreed in February to buy Dallas-based power producer TXU for $32 billion in the largest U.S. buyout. The acquisition, which has been approved by shareholders and regulators, is set to close by the end of December.

> If you read the details from the TXU deal it is no wonder that the banks are having trouble to unload this junk.

> Wenn man sich die Details des TXU Deals durchliest ist es nicht weiter verwunderlich das keiner diese waghalsigen Kredite aufnehmen möchte.

Investors Balk
Demand for LBO debt has evaporated. After buying a record $754 billion of leveraged loans this year, investors are balking at debt without covenants, or restrictions, that give them greater power over a company's finances. More than 50 deals have been abandoned or reworked.

KKR has yet to agree to terms that would give its banks confidence they can sell the loans to investors without making the acquisition potentially less profitable, the people said.

The two sides have discussed various structures, including adding a provision that dictates how much debt First Data can assume relative to earnings, people with knowledge of the negotiations said Sept. 10.

Marketwatch reports First Data LBO may be costly for banks involved
Even if the banks manage to sell all the loans, they will probably have to offer them at a discount to entice investors.

If the First Data loans are sold at 94 cents on the dollar, that would leave the banks with a loss of between three and four cents on the dollar. On a $14 billion loan deal, that translates to a loss of $420 million to $560 million.

Citigroup is particularly exposed to such problems, according to analysts.

Quote Prince CEO Citigroup just a few weeks ago The $1 Billion Break Up Fee & An Ignorant And Deaf CEO

“When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing".

The bank is a lead underwriter on five of the six largest leveraged loan pending, including debt to support the LBOs of BCE Inc. , TXU Corp. and Alltel Corp. according to Banc of America Securities. That's more than $70 billion worth of loans

> But they are not alone.....See this excellent table The Banks Behind The Biggest Buyouts

> Immerhin sind Sie nicht alleine...Hier eine erstklassige Übersicht The Banks Behind The Biggest Buyouts

Citigroup is also lead underwriter on three of the five largest pending high-yield bond deals, worth more than $20 billion, Banc of America Securities noted.

First Data is one of the last so-called covenant-lite deals. These types of loans, which give companies more leeway and creditors less power, have fallen out of favor in recent months.

Over the weekend, KKR agreed to add one covenant to the First Data debt, the Wall Street Journal reported on Tuesday. The company must now maintain a certain ratio of earnings, before interest, depreciation, tax and amortization (EBITDA) to senior debt, the newspaper explained.

However, that's not much of a concession, especially considering the LBO is already highly leveraged, KDP's Lee said.

This is just in from the FT Talks to start on TXU $45bn financing
Negotiations over the terms of the financing package for the $45bn buy-out of TXU, the Texas-based energy group, are set to begin after the purchase by US private equity groups KKR and TPG received final regulatory approval earlier than expected.

The banks funding the TXU takeover - Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley - are expected to push for the inclusion of covenants in $37bn of loan financing and higher interest payments to make the debt more palatable to investors. But the buy-out groups will be reluctant to make any concessions that could hurt returns. The bond portion, worth about $8bn, would be sold after the loans.

Not So Smart "In an era of easy money, the pros forgot that the party can't last forever "

What a difference 6 month made..... It was in early February when Business Week ran this cover story It's A Low, Low, Low, Low-Rate World .

Looks like the "Cover Story Indicator" has worked once more.....

Was doch 6 Monate für einen Unterschied ausmachen.....Anfang Februar hat Business Week noch die folgende Titelgeschichte It's A Low, Low, Low, Low-Rate World gebracht.

Es sieht so aus als wenn der "Cover Story Indicator" mal wieder ganze Arbeit geleistet hat.
Not So Smart / In an era of easy money, the pros forgot that the party can't last forever

The boasting and bluster that marked the just-ended era of easy money varied depending on the speaker and his stake in the boom. But the underlying message was consistent: This time it's different. When it came to the hazards associated with borrowing, the old rules no longer applied.

The titans of home loans announced they had perfected software that could spit out interest rates and fee structures for even the least reliable of borrowers. The algorithms, they claimed, couldn't fail. With similar bravado, buyout firms bid up private equity deals, arguing that investors had an insatiable appetite for the increasingly risky and mammoth loans used to fund them. "I don't think it's a bubble," David M. Rubenstein of Carlyle Group told the Financial Times in an interview last December. "I think really what's happening now is that people are beginning to use a different investment technique, and this investment technique, private equity, adds real value."

> This chart from Bespoke shows how well timed the "Low, Low......Rate World" cover was.....

> Dieser Chart von Bespoke zeigt wie gut die Titelgeschichte "Low, Low, ..Rate World" abgepaßt war.

Hedge funds were all too happy to enable the leverage arms race. They, too, borrowed to the max so they could gorge on the debt that financed the housing and buyout booms. "The consumer has to be an idiot to take on those loans," John Devaney, chief executive of United Capital Asset Management, said in May, referring to dicey adjustable-rate mortgages. But since there were plenty of "idiots" out there, and legions of lenders eager to serve them, Devaney and other hedge fund managers eagerly devoured the securities confected by investment banks from batches of dubious home loans. This securitization, the argument went, would spread the risk far beyond banks and mortgage companies. In March, Devaney bragged that mortgage-backed securities were one of his "best-performing investments.

"It didn't work out that way. In June, Devaney's Horizon funds booked a loss of more than 30%, according to Hedge Fund Alert. Shortly after, United Capital suspended redemption requests by investors trying to pull out. Devaney did not return calls for comment.

> maybe he is the guy on the cover.......:-)

> ist wahrscheinlich der Typ auf dem Cover :-)

Making sense of this mess is daunting. One good place to start: the ways various financial players indulged in layer upon layer of leverage, much of it far from transparent. Mortgage lenders threw out common sense underwriting standards. Wall Street sliced and diced the loans, creating the illusion that risk somehow disappeared in the process. Hedge funds then multiplied the leverage by borrowing copiously to buy securities based on the rearranged mortgages. In their version of the game, private equity firms used loads of debt to launch unprecedented buyouts.

bigger / größer

> Looks "contained"´to me....

> Sieht für mich ziemlich "contained" aus......

What some of the smartest guys in each of these fields seemed to forget is that new paradigms can crumble suddenly. Many miscalculated how long the period of easy credit would persist.

Mortgage companies argued their algorithms provided near-perfect precision. "We have a wealth of information we didn't have before," Joe Anderson, then a senior Countrywide executive, said in a 2005 interview with BusinessWeek. "We understand the data and can price that risk."

PRIVATE EQUITY: `A GOLDEN AGE'
As recently as April, buyout legend Henry Kravis proclaimed a "golden age" of private equity. Perhaps he should have called it a golden age of CLOs—collataralized loan obligations.

Like mortgage lenders, the giants of private equity have relied on complicated investment pools to fund their binge. CLOs are cousins of collateralized debt obligations. Managers of the investment pools buy groups of risky, junk-rated loans from banks that have financed buyouts by Kravis and his competitors. The CLOs package the loans, then divide them into risk levels. While the individual loans carry low credit ratings, three-fourths of the securities marketed by CLOs magically boast AAA marks. (That's because some investors give up extra yield in exchange for better protection against losses.)

The financial alchemy has allowed private equity firms to attract a whole new base of investors, including pension funds and insurance companies that never would have bought those risky loans outright. U.S. CLOs raised $100 billion in 2006, quadruple the amount two years earlier.

Buyout firms have generally fronted 30% of the equity in recent deals, vs. just 15% two decades ago. But that doesn't mean firms have been more cautious. Steeled by the seemingly insatiable demand for CLOs, they became bolder and bolder in the deals they pursued. After Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and Texas Pacific Group's $44 billion bid for Texas energy giantTXU in February, analysts began putting odds on imagined future megabillion-dollar targets like Home Depot Inc. (HD )

As private equity firms bid up the prices for ever-larger LBOs, the transactions began getting riskier. A key measure of leverage, a company's total debt divided by operating earnings, skyrocketed from 4.7 in 2004 to 7.0 in the second quarter of 2007, according to Standard & Poor's (MHP ) LCD. Meanwhile, the ability of companies to cover the interest payments of that debt dropped sharply; the ratio of profits to interest fell from 3.4 to 1.8 in that period.

> It is getting worse if you consider that profit margins are close to record highs and the economy is now tanking.... So there is almost no room for error.....

> Das ganze wird noch dramtischer wenn man berücksichtigt das die Firmen momentan noch Gewinnmargen nahe der historischen Hochs haben und die Wirtscahft sich gleichzeitig abschwächt bzw. wie in den USA sogar abschmiert.... Nicht viel Raum für Fehler......

At the same time, loan terms got looser. For example, in the buyouts of Freescale Semiconductor and retailer Claire's Stores (CLE ), LBO firms peddled bonds that allowed the companies to postpone interest payments until the bonds matured—a previously unheard of feature. Such stipulations applied to 10% of all junk bonds sold in 2007, vs. virtually none 18 months earlier, according to Lehman.

The red-hot demand for even the junkiest of loans allowed many firms to delude themselves into thinking they could endlessly pursue deals. In the three months through July 31, firms announced $254 billion in buyouts, as much as in 2004 and 2005 combined, according to Thomson Financial (TOC ). One credit crunch later, the market for LBO financing has evaporated. Investors won't buy the loans at current prices, leaving banks on the hook for $300 billion in loans to buyout artists.

So far, no big deals have collapsed. The hope is that the credit environment will improve in the fall, and stalled deals will move through the LBO pipeline. But there may be more pain ahead.

HEDGE FUNDS: STEALTH DEBT
Hedge funds helped power the mortgage and buyout booms by hungrily consuming securitized subprime debt and loans used to fund buyouts. By borrowing much of the money they invest, in some transactions up to 90%, hedge funds add another potentially dangerous layer of indebtedness to already highly leveraged markets. Because hedge fund disclosure is limited, huge pockets of leverage are barely visible. This stealth debt helped cause the problems in the subprime market to spread far beyond the housing sector.

One example: the hundreds of billions of dollars in so-called repurchase lines of credit, or repo loans, that Wall Street banks have lent to hedge funds. Disclosure of these esoteric agreements is murky at best, so their precise value can't be quantified. Another tool that pumps up leverage by untold billions is the total return swap. These arrangements allow a hedge fund to capture the gains of a security without having to buy it outright and with only limited collateral.

For some funds, extreme leverage became an acute problem when the mortgage crunch caused banks to doubt the value of the subprime bonds and CDOs the funds held. Banks pulled their lines of credit, forcing funds to come up with the full value of those assets. That caused dire consequences because, in some instances, the funds paid as little as 10 cents on the dollar and now had to come up with the remaining 90 cents. Many funds, including ones from Goldman, Sachs & Co. (GS ) and Renaissance Technologies, were forced to sell better-performing bonds, stocks, and commodities to pay back nervous bankers. ....

Related links from Business Week to the cover story

Main Street Is Fed Up

Bruce Wasserstein: "Expect Lots More Embarrassment"

It's Out Of Bernanke's Reach

The $1 Billion Break Up Fee & An Ignorant And Deaf CEO

If you read the details from the deal it is no wonder that the banks are having trouble to unload this junk. But you have to feel lots of Schadenfreude when you read comments taken from Mish´s Top Call ( almost perfect call Mish!) from the Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince just a month ago like this

Wenn man sich die Details des TXU Deals durchliest ist es nicht weiter verwunderlich das keiner diese waghalsigen Kredite aufnehmen möchte. Man kann aber gerade nichts anderes als die pure Schadenfreude empfinden wenn man sich den Kommentar des CEO der Citigroup Chuck Prince vom 10. Juli vor Augen führt

“When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing".

Thanks to Minyanville

Billion Dollar Breakup
Banks led by Citigroup (C) are considering whether they should pay a $1 billion break-up fee in order to get out of a deal to buy Texas Utilities (TXU) Thomson Financial is reporting.

• Why the cold feet?


• According to Thomson the lenders want to avoid being stuck with $37.2 billion in
  debt to fund the purchase of TXU by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and TPG.
  
• Goldman Sachs (GS), JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Lehman (LEH) and Morgan Stanley (MS) had also committed to provide the debt financing for the acquisition.
  
• Yikes! But $1 billion just to get out of a financing arrangement? Pretty steep, no?
  
• Yes, it is pretty steep. But, according to Thomson, apparently not as steep as the current losses of upwards of 10% on traded loans and bonds of recent buyouts.
  
• According to First Data (FDC), there's an estimated $300 billion of total debt for buyouts that still need to be funded.
  
• Among the deals still pending, Blackstone's (BX) leveraged buyout of Hilton Hotels (HLT).
  A separate article by Bloomberg this morning said banks led by Bank of America (BAC) have agreed to provide as much as $21 billion of debt financing to fund the buyout... at least for now.

Goldman, JPMorgan Stuck With Debt They Can't Sell to Investors

Schadenfreude! Almost on a daily basis news are coming out that the "golden era" that Henry Kravis has described just a few month ago is not so golden anymore......

Kann meine Schadenfreude nicht wirklich unterdrücken. Es kommen momentan fast täglich Meldungen das das sog. "goldene Zeitalter" (Zitat Henry Kravis) für Private Equity bereits einige Monate später weniger golden ist.....

July 17 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and the rest of Wall Street are stuck with at least $11 billion of loans and bonds they can't readily sell.

The banks have had to dig into their own pockets to finance parts of at least five leveraged buyouts over the past month because of the worst bear market in high-yield debt in more than two years, data compiled by Bloomberg show.

Bankers, who just a few months ago boasted that demand for high-yield assets was so great that they would have no problem raising debt for a $100 billion LBO, are now paying for their overconfidence. The cost of tying up their own capital may curb earnings and stem the flood of LBOs, which generated a record $8.4 billion in fees during the first half of 2007, according to Brad Hintz, the former chief financial officer at New York-based Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.
``The private equity firms, being very tough negotiators, are unlikely to let the banks off the hook,'' said Martin Fridson, chief executive officer of high-yield research firm FridsonVision LLC in New York. ``They'll say that's your problem and that's why we're paying you: To take risk.''

As the market began to turn sour last month, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup Inc., Lehman and Wachovia Corp. had to buy $725 million of bonds that Goodlettsville, Tennessee-based Dollar General Corp. was selling to finance Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. purchase of the company for $6.9 billion.

Bonds Tumble
Those bonds are probably worth 94 cents on the dollar, or $43.5 million less than when they were sold on June 28,

Bear Stearns Cos. strategists estimate that about $290 billion of deals still need to get funded, including those of Greenwood Village, Colorado-based credit-card processor First Data Corp. and energy company TXU Corp. of Dallas. ...

>Here are the details from the TXU Deal and i have the feeling that the pricing of the debt could be lots of fun.....

Record Sales
Acquisitions by private equity firms such as New York's KKR and Blackstone Group LP helped push sales of high-yield bonds and loans worldwide up more than 70 percent during the first half of the year to a record $708 billion,

The investment banking fees generated by LBOs in the first half amounted to almost two-thirds of the $12.8 billion paid by LBO firms to Wall Street in 2006, data compiled by Freeman & Co. and Thomson Financial show. In the race to win deals, the five largest U.S. investment banks more than tripled their lending commitments to non-investment grade borrowers during the past year to $174 billion, according to their regulatory filings.

KKR co-founder Henry Kravis in May called it the ``golden era'' of buyouts at a conference in Halifax, Nova Scotia. The extra yield investors demanded to own junk bonds rather than Treasuries shrank to a record low of 2.41 percentage points in June from the peak of more than 10 percentage points in 2002, according to index data from New York-based Merrill Lynch & Co.

No Escape
For loans rated four or five levels below investment grade, the spread over the London interbank offered rate shrank to 2.12 percentage points in February from more than 4 percentage points in 2003. It has since widened to 2.72 percentage points.

Some bankers even speculated that $100 billion LBO was possible, a scenario that is now ``definitely'' off the table,

Just three of the 40 biggest pending LBOs have an escape clause that lets the buyer back out if funding can't be arranged, . A couple of years ago, a majority of deals included a financing contingency, Belin said, based on his research.

Market Cracks
The market for high-yield bonds and junk-rated, or leveraged loans began to crack in June as concerns that LBOs were becoming too risky coincided with a slump in the market for subprime mortgages that caused the near-collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds.

Junk bonds lost 1.61 percent last month, the most since March 2005 when General Motors Corp. forecast its biggest quarterly loss since 1992 and the debt lost 2.73 percent, according to Merrill Lynch.

In most deals, investment banks promise to provide loans to the buyer. They then seek other lenders to take pieces of the loans and find buyers for bonds. When buyers vanish, the banks must either buy the bonds themselves or provide a bridge loan to the borrower, tying up capital that would otherwise be used to finance more deals. The banks typically parcel out portions of bridge loans to reduce their risk.

Lending Commitments
Citigroup, the biggest U.S. bank, reported that its securities and banking division recorded an expense of $286 million in the first quarter to increase loan-loss reserves to account for higher commitments to leveraged transactions and an increase in the average length of loans.

Lehman reported on July 10 that its commitments for ``contingent acquisition facilities'' more than doubled in the quarter ended May 31 to $43.9 billion, exceeding its stock market capitalization of $39.1 billion. Lehman said its commitments contain ``flexible pricing features'' that allow it to charge more if market conditions deteriorate.

Goldman Sachs more than doubled its lending commitments to non-investment grade borrowers to $71.5 billion in the year ended May 31.

The biggest concern is ``hung deals,'' where a lender is left holding a large loan to a single borrower, said Azarchs. ``Those traditionally in all the prior credit cycles have caused the greatest amount of grief for the large syndicating banks,'' Azarchs said.

For firms such as KKR or Blackstone, both based in New York, the tighter credit environment may make their acquisitions less profitable and even change the way they go after future targets. Mark Semer, a spokesman for KKR, declined to comment.

``The underwriters are going to be forced to provide bridge loans and it's getting pretty ugly, but Wall Street deserves to get smacked around a little,'' said William Featherston, managing director in high-yield at J. Giordano Securities LLC in Stamford, Connecticut. ``It's been easy for so long.''

Disclosure: short GS, long UBS

Where Was The "Merger Monday"........?

This could be a coincidence but i think that we really have seen the peak in merger activity. When i talk about the peak i mean in terms of the cash component. It could well be that some gigantic stock deals will pump up the total amount. But this should have not such a big impact on equities overall. The key point is that with a lower cash component fewer fresh money is flowing from credit markets back in the equity markets. And i think one should remember that the actual deals that are and will be announced soon were done when credit conditions were almost perfect. Even when this "call" is premature the buyout premiums should shrink.

Das ganze könnte natürlich auf reiner Zufall sein, aber ich denke das wir in der Tat den Höhepunkt der Fusionsaktivitäten gesehen haben. Damit meine ich den Teil der Fusionen die mit Cash abgewickelt werden. Es kann sehr gut sein das noch weitaus gigantischere Aktiendeals durchgehen und die Gesamtzahl nach oben hieven. Entscheidend aber wird sein das hier zukünftig deutlich weniger frisches Geld vom Kreditmarkt and den Aktienmarkt zurückfließt, es also mehr oder minder ein Nullsummenspiel ist. Zudem sollte man bedenken das die ganzen Deals die jetzt oder in den nächsten Wochen bekanntgegeben werden noch zu Zeiten angeleiert worden sind als das Kreditmarktumfeld perfekt gewesen ist. Selbst wenn sich die these als voreilig erweisen wollte so dürften doch in jedem Fall die Aufschläge bei den (Cash)Übernahmen deutlich leiden.

The buyout boom may be about to hit a bump.

After years of supersize private equity deals, investors in the debt that supports these transactions — the lifeblood of the industry — have begun to not so quietly push back at several prominent transactions.

Rising interest rates and tougher terms from investors may signal that private equity players will soon be struggling to continue reaping the outsize returns that have made the buyout business so lucrative.

Already a raft of bond offerings for recently announced deals, including the $7.75 billion buyout of Thomson Learning and the $7.1 billion deal for U.S. Foodservice, have been scaled back after facing resistance from investors.

This week, two other buyouts, the $4.7 billion deal for ServiceMaster and the $6.9 billion sale of Dollar General, are expected to price their bonds, and they may serve as an important barometer for a series of even larger deals to sell bonds to investors this summer.....
These setbacks come as Cerberus Capital Management begins a road show this week to sell bonds for its $7.4 billion buyout of Chrysler; it plans to raise up to $62 billion. First Data, which was acquired by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts for $29 billion, plans to price its bonds next month. And later this year, bonds for the buyout of TXU, the largest in history, will go on sale. TXU is likely to seek about $24 billion.

The resistance from bondholders may already be cooling the buyout market. The proverbial Merger Monday has not been so merger-filled lately. Yesterday, only seven deals were announced, compared with 43 a week ago and 84 on June 4, according to data from Thomson Financial.
“In the last couple of days, we’ve seen some cracks,” said Kingman Penniman, president of KDP Investment Advisors, a bond research firm. “Private equity people have for a long time now gotten funding at very low rates and very liberal terms. The market has known for a long time that this was ridiculous.”

Not only bondholders but banks themselves appear to be thinking twice before they agree to lenient financing of these huge deals.

A small correction appeared to have taken place Friday when Thomson Learning scaled back the debt offering it hoped to sell to finance its buyout by two private equity firms, Apax Partners of Britain and the buyout arm of the Ontario employees’ pension fund. Originally, Thomson, a former division of the media publisher Thomson, sought $2.14 billion; it is now seeking $1.6 billion.

“There’s not a lot of room for error in these transactions, so investors have become very cautious,” said Chris Donnelly, who tracks leveraged finance at Standard & Poor’s Leveraged Commentary and Data. “Investors have been pushed to the wall on structure. At this point, we can’t go any further.”
> European data q1 2007

Among the changes Thomson made was to eliminate a $540 million provision for a pay-in-kind toggle, a type of debt that allows interest to be paid in cash or with the issuing of more bonds. The entire offering must now be paid back in cash, and Thomson Learning agreed to add more covenants to both the loan and the bond portion of the sale.

U.S. Foodservice, a division of Royal Ahold of the Netherlands, has now twice scaled back its own debt offering to help finance its buyout by Kohlberg Kravis and Clayton Dubilier & Rice. Scheduled to go on sale today, U.S. Foodservice’s offering will now also be paid back in cash, not with the issuing of more bonds.

thanks to http://bespokeinvest.typepad.com/bespoke/

Pay-in-kind debt, in particular, has fueled the buyout boom, largely because of the flexibility it affords private equity firms to pile on debt. Those instruments, proponents argue, allow companies to avoid bankruptcy.

But, according to Mr. Penniman, that debt has also loaded up many companies with potentially more debt than they can pay off.

Companies just cannot keep issuing debt, he said. “That assumes the market is pretty stupid.”

> As seen in subprime.........

kkr/goldman spinning the txu deal as a "green deal"

read here more details on the deal/biggest buyout ever / hier mehr zum deal
http://immobilienblasen.blogspot.com/2007/02/next-biggest-buyout-everkkr-may-buy-txu.html

mhhhh, i´m having trouble giving goldman and kkr the "benefit of the doubt" that they have mutated to environmentalists. i look at this as an attempt to avoid the massive investments involved with the plan to build the coal power plants

irgendwie habe ich leichte probleme im zweifel für kkr und gs zu sein. mir scheint der gedanke das die beiden plötzlich zu umweltaktivisten mutiert sind zu abwegig. ich sehe es eher als versuch sich um die nötigen investitionen für die kohlekraftwerke zu drücken (über 10 mrd$)

"In 2006, TXU expects to invest $2.6 billion in capital expenditures, roughly 100 percent of expected net income, in order to improve reliability and customer service and meet the urgent and growing electricity needs of Texas. For 2006 through 2010, TXU plans to invest more than $17 billion in capital expenditures, more than 135 percent of expected net income"

it should be clear that when this investment plan stays in tact there would be almost no room for kkr to load up more debt to finance the usual "special dividend"..... and make the numbers/deal work

es sollte ziemlich klar sein das sich der deal nur rechnet wenn schnell hohe schulden aufgenommen werden können und die übliche "sonderdividende" ausgezahlt werden kann.

looks like the spin doctors have made a comeback......

die spin doctors feiern ein comeback......

but when the consequence of the takeover would be that more "green" power would be used and emissions could be avoided....i´m in danger of becoming a "private equity fan" :-)

but to be honest i think with this number in mind

"In 2000, North America had coal reserves of around 286 billion short tons, about 96 percent of which were located in the United States. North American coal reserves account for around 26 percent of total world coal reserves"

it is very hard to believe that the us would not tap into this massive resource. but there is always hope.....

wenn dieser übernahmewahn letztendlich dazu führt das mehr "grüne" energie und weniger emissionen produziert werden laufe ich am ende noch gefahr ein "private equity fan" zu werden... :-)

wenn man sich nüchtern betrachtet die riseigen kohlereserven der der usa und auch in texas ansieht beschleichen mich doch zwiefel ob dieses tatsächlich eintreffen wird. aber die hoffnung stirbt bekanntlich zuletzt......

In Big Buyout, Utility to Limit New Coal Plants / NYT

Under a proposed $45 billion buyout by a team of private equity firms, the TXU Corporation, a Texas utility that has long been the bane of environmental groups, will abandon plans to build 8 of 11 coal plants and commit to a broad menu of environmental measures....


The roster of commitments came through an unusual process in which the equity firms asked two prominent environmental groups what measures could be taken to win their support. The result is an about-face from the company’s earlier approach to climate-change issues, and includes a goal of returning the carbon-dioxide emissions by TXU to 1990 levels by 2020.




Environmental groups said yesterday that they had never known of a financial deal with such an ambitious built-in environmental component.

Two private equity firms, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company and the Texas Pacific Group, have proposed to buy TXU in what would become the largest leveraged buyout ever.


The transaction will be put to the TXU board for a vote on Sunday.

People involved in the negotiations said that
Goldman Sachs, an adviser and lender to the buyers, helped broker peace with environmental groups and sought their support for the transaction. Goldman Sachs has been one of the most aggressive firms on Wall Street about taking action on climate change; the company sends its bankers home at night in hybrid limousines. ( i think we can expand this cartoon to other sectors as well / real estate, investmentbanks, pe etc / denke diesen cartoon kann man locker auf andere branchen wie die immobilienbranche, investmentbanken, pe etc.

For the investor groups, the effort was as much about making a sound business decision to ensure the deal’s completion as it was about any environmental concerns.

By bringing the environmental groups into the process, the buyers may have helped avert years of costly litigation over emissions from their plants. But they may also have raised new questions about how they will meet the energy needs that TXU intended to address by building all 11 plants; the company is said to be examining ways to expand in cleaner forms of energy......

“We have history’s largest purchase of a power company, with the new owners wanting to move the company in a direction that is consistent with a world that takes global warming seriously,” said David Hawkins of the Natural Resources Defense Council, ....

The commitments come at a time of uncertainty for utilities that are considering building coal-fired plants. They do not know if such plants will be grandfathered by Congress and excluded from future restrictions on carbon-dioxide emissions, or whether anything they build now will have to operate in a starkly different regulatory environment. (watch the deposits and i´ll bet that lobbyist are working overtime to exclude coal from the emisions.....bei den massiven vorkommen sind die lobbyisten sicher hart am arbeiten um für kohle ne sonderregelung zu finden)


TXU (or better kkr thats the 10q filing from txu in november http://biz.yahoo.com/e/061109/txu10-q.html / wohl eher kkr. lest das txu filing vom novmber) will discard plans to build eight of 11 proposed new coal plants, which would have been major new sources of emissions. Those plants — which would have added more than 9,000 megawatts of new capacity, the equivalent of 3.5 percent of the nation’s current coal-fired power — had been part of a planned $10 billion expansion of coal-fired electricity.

TXU, which is based in Dallas, also intends to expand the renewable energy portion of its portfolio and reduce or offset its emissions significantly, said people who were familiar with the plans. .......

.... Natural Resources Defense Council, said that the investment team was essentially asking “what would it take” to gain environmentalists’ support.

But people familiar with the investors’ thinking took pains to say that the investors brought the measures to the environmental groups, and were not acting out of any fear of the groups’ potential to wage a legal and public-relations campaign against them.

but lets hope that in the end "mother earth" can benefit ....

bleibt zu hoffen das die umwelt unterm strich davon profitieren kann