“Subprime Was The Tip Of The Iceberg”.... “Prime Will Be Far Bigger In Its Impact.”

Nothing really new but sometimes it is always good to get an update on the ongoing residential housing bust..... Scary that there are still some bottom callers out there..... I really hope that they have always put their money where their mouth was during their perma-bottom-calls.....

Das nachfolgende Posting liefert nicht wirklich bahnbrechend Neues und soll in erster Linie ein Update in Sachen US Wohnimmobilienmarkt geben. Denke hier werden all diejenigen die schon fast penetrant den Boden ausrufen als Phantasten entlarvt. Wenn man jetzt bedenkt das der Verfall im gewerblichen Sektor gerade erst Fahrt aufnimmt erscheinen einige bullische Kommentare in einem noch fragwürdigerem Licht...... Kein noch so großer Bailout kann die dringend notwendige Bereinigung verhindern.... Bin sogar der Meinung das je länger die Korrektur durch die "Eingriffe" verlängert wird desto größer wird der volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtschaden letztendlich sein. Da aber in der Realität immer irgendwelche Wahlen anstehen muß man wie die aktuellen Beispiele zeigen mit dem Schlimmsten rechnen.....

Housing Lenders Fear Bigger Wave of Loan Defaults NYT
The first wave of Americans to default on their home mortgages appears to be cresting, but a second, far larger one is quickly building

The percentage of mortgages in arrears in the category of loans one rung above subprime, so-called alternative-A mortgages, quadrupled to 12 percent in April from a year earlier. Delinquencies among prime loans, which account for most of the $12 trillion market, doubled to 2.7 percent in that time.

Delinquencies on mortgages tend to peak three to five years after loans are made....

Prime and alt-A borrowers typically had a five- or seven-year grace period before payments toward principal were required. By contrast, subprime loans had a two-to-three-year introductory period. That difference partly explains the lag in delinquencies between the two types of loans, said David Watts, an analyst with CreditSights

> You don´t need to be a genius to figure out will happen during the next few years..... The following quotes from Calculated Risk sums it up

> Denke hier braucht man nun wirklich kein Genie zu sein um zuerkennen das die nächsten Jahre brutal werden. Der nachfolgende Kommentar von Calculated Risk dürfte zutreffen.....

I think the second wave of foreclosures will be smaller in numbers, as compared to the largely subprime first wave, but the price of each home will be much higher. And the second wave will impact prices in the mid-to-high end areas, as opposed to the subprime foreclosures impacting prices in the low end areas.

Barry Ritholtz on "perma-bottom-callers"

Wishful thinking is never a substitute for reviewing the actual data;
thoughtful analysis is better than cheerleading

UPDATE: Click trough pages 61 & 62 from the HSBC Earnings Release to get an up to date picture of their US mortgages, consumer lending, credit card and vehicles credit book.... I also want to highlight page 12 & 13. They are showing the credit trends worldwide ( personal & commercial ) ...... Watch Latin America ( mainly related to Mexico ) ......

UPDATE: Passendweise hat gerade HSBC berichtet. In diesem Report findest man auf den Seiten 61 & 62 Daten nette Charts zu der US Kreditqualität quer durch alle Sektoren ( Kreditkarten , PKW Finanzierungen usw ). Darüberhinaus sollte man einen Blick auf die Seiten 12 & 13 werfen. Hier werden die weltweiten Rsikovorsorgen für den privaten und den gewerblichen Sektor aufgeschlüsselt. Hier sticht besonders und für mich etwas überracshend der starke Anstieg in Süd Amerika hervor ( Lt. Telefonkonferenz überwiegend Mexico )...... Die 200% Aufstockung der Risikovorsorge im gewerblichen US Bereich dürfte erst der Anfang sein.....

Which “inning” of the mortgage crisis are we in? / Hussman

Once again nice "Anti Spin" from Hussman. And don´t forget that after the mortgage crises we will see the commercial real estate crises, the credit card crises, the auto loan crises.......

Einmal mehr wohltuend sachliches von Hussman der einmal mehr die in den Raum geworfenen Behauptungen in ein rechtes Licht zu rücken versucht. Ist zwar bei dem ganzen Müll ein fast aussichtsloses Unterfangen aber bewahrt vielleicht den ein oder anderen den "Rattenfängern" oder Permabullen auf den Leim zu gehen. Und man sollte im Hinterkopf verankert haben das nach der Hypothekenkrise, die Krise der gewerblichen Immobilien, die der Kreditkarten, der Autofinanzierungen usw. kommt.

Which "Inning" of the Mortgage Crisis Are We In?

One of the fascinating aspects of Wall Street is the ability of analysts to provide opinions without the faintest backing from evidence. Among the latest topics of opinion is how far the mortgage crisis has to go. Evidently, the idea is that the recession that these analysts didn't forecast is already over, so it is time to “look across the valley” on the belief that most of the writedowns are behind us.

A good way to estimate where we are in the process of writedowns and foreclosures is to revisit the schedule of resets for adjustable rate mortgages.

The chart doesn't extend out to 2010 ( see extra chart Credit Suisse), where another spike in resets will occur in the third quarter of that year, but it is enough to recognize that resets are only now entering the heavy period.

To understand the implications of this schedule, it is important to recognize the foreclosure timeline. Once a reset occurs, it takes up to 30 days for the first payment to be missed. After 90 days of attempts to catch up on missed payments, the homeowner is served with a “Notice of Default.” It then takes another 90 days with the homeowner in default for a “Notice of Trustee Sale” to be delivered, shortly after which the property is sold in a foreclosure. In short, there is generally a span of about 6 months from reset to foreclosure, which means that we have to lag the data to get the profile of anticipated loan losses.

Fortunately, only a portion of the mortgages that reset will actually go into default, but we estimate which “inning” we are currently in by calculating the cumulative amount of mortgages that will have reset at each point in time (i.e. integrating the curve), and lagging it by 6 months (roughly the span between reset and foreclosure). That produces the following profile for the cumulative losses that can be expected. Again, these are not dollar amounts, since only a portion of even sub-prime mortgages will default. While we will also undoubtedly observe losses from credit cards, commerical real estate, and home equity loans, the point here is only about the general shape of the cumulative loss curve:


Clearly, as we enter April 2008, we appear to be quite early in the mortgage crisis, with only about a quarter of the cumulative resets having occurred. That places us near the start of the third inning, where we can expect each of the nine “innings” to be about three months in duration. Unfortunately, the next three innings (quarters) are when the heavy hitters on the opposing team will come up to the plate, as the cumulative amount of resets will surge. With that surge, loan losses and foreclosures will also predictably spike higher.

Moreover, because of the bundling, securitization*, and slicing and dicing of mortgage obligations, financial companies have little ability to take the required writedowns in advance, because they don't know yet which ones will go into default. To opine that we are in some late “inning” of the mortgage problem, without reference to the reset data, is just naïve. If anything, the probable rate of foreclosure on later resets will be higher, not lower, than the earlier resets, because those later resets represent the mortgages initiated at the peak of home prices and the trough of lending standards.

"Fools Day" With The Greatest Fool UBS

I have suspended my temporary time out. It took a little longer than initially planned. Due to time constraints my postings in the future will be lighter than before the break. Thanks for all the kind words and mails during the break.

I think it is a good start to kick off the "Fools Day" with news from the the greatest fool UBS. I suggest to read the Q4 details to understand all the drama in the specific positions.

With still close to $ 30 billion ( even if some positions are hedged ) exposure in Subprime and Alt A i expect further write downs and a break up of UBS during the coming 6 to 12 month....

Ich habe meine zwischenzeitliche Auszeit beendet. Sie hat ein wenig länger als ursrünglich geplant gedauert. Aufgrund von Zeitproblemen wird das Posting zukünftig wohl auch weniger häufig ausfallen. Auf diesem Wege möchte ich mich bei allen für die netten Mails und Kommentare bedanken.

Es gibt wohl kaum einen besseren Weg den 1. April mit Neuigkeiten von der UBS zu eröffnen. Bei den nachfolgenden Summen handelt es sich leider um keinen Aprilscherz. Ich empfehle um das ganze Ausmaß des Debakel zu erfassen sich die einzelnen Positionen aus Q4 "reinzuziehen".

Mit immer noch knapp 30 Mrd $ an Subprime und Alt A Positionen ( selbst wenn einiges gehedged sein sollte ) dürfte die nächste Abschreibung schon in Stein gemeißelt sein. Ich tippe weiterhin das die UBS binnen der nächsten 12 Monate aufgepalten wird.

UBS

For the first quarter 2008 UBS expects to report a net loss attributable to UBS shareholders of approximately CHF 12 billion after losses and writedowns of approximately USD 19 billion on US real estate and related structured credit positions. In the first quarter, UBS substantially reduced its real estate related positions through both valuation adjustments and significant disposals

Over the first quarter, UBS's exposure to US residential sub-prime mortgage related positions declined to approximately USD 15 billion from USD 27.6 billion on 31 December, and the exposure to Alt-A positions was reduced from USD 26.6 billion to approximately USD 16 billion. These developments are the result of asset disposals as well as the effects of further writedowns. Other risk positions were also reduced. Auction rate certificate positions increased from USD 5.9 billion on 31 December to approximately USD 11 billion

UBS

Für das 1. Quartal 2008 erwartet UBS einen den UBS-Aktionären zurechenbaren Reinverlust von ungefähr CHF 12 Milliarden nach Verlusten und Abschreibungen in Höhe von ungefähr USD 19 Milliarden auf Positionen US-Immobilienmarkt und damit zusammenhängenden strukturierten Krediten. Im 1. Quartal reduzierte UBS ihre Positionen im US-Immobilienmarkt in erheblichem Masse. Dies geschah einerseits durch Wertberichtigungen, anderseits durch Veräusserungen.

Im 1. Quartal 2008 hat sich das Engagement von UBS in US Subprime-Hypotheken auf ungefähr USD 15 Milliarden verringert (von USD 27,6 Milliarden am 31. Dezember 2007). Das Engagement in Alt-A-Positionen wurde von USD 26,6 Milliarden auf ungefähr USD 16 Milliarden reduziert. Weitere Risikopositionen konnten ebenfalls verringert werden. Die Positionen in Auction Rate Certificates erhöhten sich von USD 5,9 Milliarden am 31. Dezember 2007 auf ungefähr USD 11 Milliarden

UBS: The writedown and the (analysts') reaction FT Alphaville

The Q1 loss is approximately CHF 12 billion. That includes the CHF 18 billion write-down partly offset by CHF 2 billion of fair value accounting gain on your own debt and CHF 3.8 billion of fair value accounting for the option embedded in the mandatory convertible - or, said another way - the money GIC lost when it bought the UBS mandatory convertible. That last part was unexpected by us, and still seems a bit odd.

UBS’s 1Q08 net profit benefited from a CHF6bn positive accounting gain on revaluation of own debt and the mandatory convertible.

UPDATE: Deutsche Bank sees $3.9 billion mark-downs in Q1

Deutsche Bank said Tuesday that conditions have become significantly more challenging during the last few weeks and it expects first quarter mark-downs of around 2.5 billion euros ($3.9 billion). The mark downs are related to leveraged loans and loan commitments, commercial real estate, and residential mortgage-backed securities (principally Alt-A). Deutsche Bank said that it expects a BIS Tier 1 capital ratio at the end of the first quarter of between 8 and 9%, consistent with the bank's published targets

Compare this with the bragging just a few weeks ago......

Vergleicht das mit der Prahlerei von Ackermann von vor gerade einmal 8 Wochen.....

“In the fourth quarter, we again demonstrated the quality of our risk management. We had no net write-downs related to sub-prime, CDO or RMBS exposures. Those trading businesses in which we reported losses in the third quarter produced a positive result in the fourth quarter. In leveraged finance, where we had significant write-downs in the third quarter, net write-downs in the fourth quarter were less than EUR 50 million.”

SCHADENFREUDE!

IKB Bailout Now Topping € 8 Billion

Another day, another frustrating event in the German banking sector. One day after the € 5 billion West LB fiasco the IKB is hitting the news once again with another € 2 billion risk that needs to be stuffed mainly through the state owned KfW ( already on the hook for € 5 billion and with close to 40 percent the major shareholder ). There are talks to get more money from commercial German banks ( so far € 500 Mio ) but i doubt that they will step in and provide this kind of incompetence any further. The situation has gotten so worse that the KfW / Pdf is in danger to run out of money to provide the German Mittelstand with financing...... Here is more on the IKB saga....

Ein neuer Tag und natürlich eine neue Hiobsbotschaft aus dem Reich der Inkompetenz. Ein paar Tahe nach dem 5 € Mrd West LB fiasco schickt sich die IKB an erneut 2 Mrd. € an Steuergeldern zu vereinnahmen um den längst fälligen Niedergang aufzuhalten. Wie bei den bereits bisher zugesagten Summen ist auch hier die KfW / Pdf und damit der Steuerzahler wohl für fast die gesamte Summe verantwortlich. Inzwischen ist die Lage aber selbst bei der KfW so angespannt das hier Finanzierungslücken im ursprünglichen Geschäft der KfW drohen. Bleibt zu hoffen das zumindest der deutsche Mittelstand nicht noch mehr darunter zu leiden hat das ein paar unfähige Herren bei IKB ( im Zusammenhang mit Aufsichtsrat und Aufsichtsbehörden ) im großen Stile wahnwitzige US Hypothekenfinanzierungen ermöglicht haben.......Hier ein paar ältere Posts zur IKB.

Dank an Hartgeld

Handelsblatt FRANKFURT. Die angeschlagene Mittelstandsbank IKB braucht erneut eine milliardenschwere Kapitalspritze, um das Überleben der Bank zu sichern und die Kapitalbasis zu stärken. „Die Situation ist kritisch“, sagte ein Insider. Es gehe um ein drittes Rettungspaket in Höhe von bis zu 1,75 Mrd. Euro.

Noch gebe es aber keine Einigung der Beteiligten: "Alles ist im Fluss." Am Mittwoch tagt Finanzkreisen zufolge der 37-köpfige Verwaltungsrat der KfW, die mit rund 38 Prozent der größte Anteilseigner der IKB ist.

Das neue Rettungspaket ist Finanzkreisen zufolge aktuell Gegenstand von Verhandlungen zwischen KfW, der mit knapp zwölf Prozent beteiligten Stiftung Industrieforschung sowie den privaten Banken, die im Bundesverband deutscher Banken (BdB) organisiert sind. Unklar sei aber, ob nicht auch der Bund einspringen müsse. So spreche die KfW auch mit der Regierung über eine mögliche Unterstützung. Grundsätzlich reiche das Eigenkapital der KfW zwar aus, um entsprechend ihrem Anteil die IKB erneut zu retten, hieß es. Seit der letzten Unterstützungsaktion nähere sich der Kapitalbedarf aber der Grenze, ab der es nicht mehr hundertprozentig auszuschließen sei, dass die IKB -Krise den Eigenkapitalanteil, mit dem die ERP-Mittelstandsprogramme abgesichert sind, berühren könnte. Der Bund solle sicherstellen, dass dies nicht passieren könne.

Vorsitzender des Verwaltungsrats der KfW ist seit Jahresbeginn Bundeswirtschaftsminister Michael Glos (CSU). Das Wirtschaftsministerium wollte sich auf Anfrage nicht zur neuerlichen IKB -Krise äußern. Auch IKB, BdB und KfW lehnten eine Stellungnahme ab.

Die IKB war wegen milliardenschwerer Engagements im US-Subprime-Markt in die Krise geraten und konnte im Juli vergangenen Jahres nur durch das Eingreifen der deutschen Kreditwirtschaft vor dem Zusammenbruch gerettet werden. Seither wurden der Düsseldorfer Bank Garantien über sechs Mrd. Euro gewährt, rund fünf davon trägt die staatliche KfW. Der BdB kommt auf etwa eine halbe Mrd. Euro, auch Sparkassen und Genossenschaftsbanken sind beteiligt. Diese hatte aber bereits nach der letzten Rettungsaktion klar gemacht, für weitere Hilfen nicht zur Verfügung zu stehen. Als privates Institut wäre bei einem Zusammenbruch der BdB rein formal - neben den Eigentümern - ohnehin in der Hauptverantwortung.

Finanzkreisen zufloge wäre eine Pleite der IKB mittlerweile günstiger, als die langwierige und aufwändige Rettung des Institut. Aus politischen Gründen sei dies jedoch nicht akzeptabel. "Es wäre ein sehr schlechtes Zeichen für die Märkte, wenn eine deutsche Bank pleite geht", sagte ein Insider.

Chapeau! Deutsche Bank Has Manage To Avoid The Torpedoes

It is not often that i write something positive about banks. But you gotta give Deutsche credit for navigating through this tough environment. And reporting "only" write downs from $ 2.3 billion in 2007 is quite an achievement..... Especially when you look how their Peer Group have done so far......Lets hope that they are not "too good to be true"...... That their guidance is probably way too optimistic and the credit books is still loaded with tons of problems is subject to another post

Es geschieht wirklich nicht oft das ich etwas positives in Sachen Banken zu bloggen habe. Aber ich denke im Falle der Deutschen Bank ist das durchaus angebracht. Wenn man als eine der Top Investmentbanken für das gesamte Jahr 2007 lediglich 2,3 Mrd $ als Abschreibung zu verbuchen hat und das mit den Summen der Peer Group vergleicht erkennt man recht schnell wie gut Ackermann´s Bänker sich geschlagen haben..... Bleibt zu hoffen das die Zahlen nicht "Too Good To Be True" sind.......Das der Ausblick immer noch viel zu optimistisch und das Kreditbuch trotz allem mit Problemen beladen ist soll uns heute nicht weiter beschäftigen....Diese Thematik kommt sicher noch früh genug.....

Deutsche Bank reports net income of EUR 6.5 billion, up 7%, for the year 2007

“In the fourth quarter, we again demonstrated the quality of our risk management. We had no net write-downs related to sub-prime, CDO or RMBS exposures. Those trading businesses in which we reported losses in the third quarter produced a positive result in the fourth quarter. In leveraged finance, where we had significant write-downs in the third quarter, net write-downs in the fourth quarter were less than EUR 50 million.”

Unfortuantely both presentations from the analysts call fail to provide much further details on how they have to manage to avoid the losses.

Leider vermögen es auch die beiden Präsentationen von der Analystenkonferenz nicht mehr Lcht ins dunkel zu bringen wie genau die Deutsche Bank es geschafft hat so gut abzuschneiden.

Presentation CEO

Presentation CFO

$ 146 Billion - And Counting.......

Nice graph from the NYT. Í think the real number is much higher. Allianz / Dresdner has announced write offs over $ 1.5 billion during the past few weeks and hasn´t made it to the list. On top of this IKB & Sachsen LB would each have topped Bear Sterns in the ranking ...But with all the news hitting the wires on every hour it is almost impossible to catch every buck.

Die reale Nummer an Abschreibungen liegt sicher deutlich höher. Man bedenke nur das alleine die Allianz dank der Dresdner Bank Abschreibungen von einer knappen Mrd € avisiert hat und es nicht auf diese Liste geschafft hat. Man betrachte nur die besonders aus deutscher Sicht unsäglichen Vorfälle der IKB & Sachsen LB, die jeder für sich ausgereicht hätten um den Sprung vor z.B. Bear Stearns zu schaffen......Bei den ganzen Einschlägen die fast stündlich irgendwo vermeldet werden ist es aber auch unmöglich alle $ miteinzubeziehen.



Link

S&P Lowers or May Cut $534 Billion of Subprime Debt

Looks like the rating agencies have finally updated their model for subprime.... Next stop Monolines ( see MBIA: Another morning, another monoline crisis… or Open Letter On Bond Insurer Transparency From A Short Seller. )....

Es sieht so aus als wenn zumindest im Bereich Subprime die Schadensmodelle der Ratingagneturen endlich in der Realität angekommen sind.... Nächster Halt dürften dann wohl die Kreditversicherer sein ( siehe MBIA: Another morning, another monoline crisis… oder Open Letter On Bond Insurer Transparency From A Short Seller. )......

This comment from Calculated Risk sums it up

Dieser Kommentar von Calculated Risk faßt das Ausmaß wunderbar zusammen

According to the Fed Flow of Funds report, household have $10.4 rillion in mortgage debt. S&P's announcement today alone is for about 5% of that debt.

Jan. 30 (Bloomberg ) -- Standard & Poor's said it cut or may reduce ratings of $534 billion of subprime-mortgage securities and collateralized debt obligations, as home loan defaults rise.

The downgrades may extend losses at the world's banks to more than $265 billion and have a ``ripple impact'' on the broader financial markets, S&P said.

The securities represent $270.1 billion, or 47 percent, of subprime mortgage bonds rated between January 2006 and June 2007, S&P said today in a statement. The New York-based ratings company also said it may cut 572 CDOs valued at $263.9 billion.

The downgrades may increase losses at European, Asian and U.S. regional banks, credit unions and the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks, S&P said. Many of those institutions haven't written down their subprime holdings to reflect their market values and these downgrades may force their hands, S&P said.

``It is difficult to predict the magnitude of any such effect, but we believe it will have implications for trading revenues, general business activity, and liquidity for the banks,'' S&P said. The ratings company will start reviewing its rankings for some banks, especially those that ``are thinly capitalized.''

S&P downgraded $50.1 billion of subprime-mortgage securities, none rated higher than A+. More than 69 percent of the AAA rated subprime securities from 2006 and 46 percent from the first half of 2007 were placed on review.

Didn't See It
``This one, I didn't see coming,'' said Mark Adelson a consultant at Adelson & Jacob Consulting LLC in New York, and a former asset-backed bond analyst at Nomura Securities.

Some of the largest global banks have already taken ``significant'' losses and they aren't likely to have more writedowns, S&P said.

Under accounting rules, many smaller banks haven't been required to write down their holdings until the credit ratings fell, enabling them to avoid the losses that have crippled Citigroup Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co. and UBS AG. The world's largest banks have reported losses exceeding $133 billion related to mortgages, CDOs and leveraged loans.

``If you're holding a AAA piece and it's now downgraded to AA, you might have to write it down, even if you're holding it for an investment,'' Gary Gordon, a bank stock analyst at Portales Partners LLC in New York, said. ``The longer it goes on and the higher the credit rating of the instrument downgraded, the wider the pain.''

UBS: $14 Billion in Mortgage Write Downs

What a mess. Seems their 8 week old forecast was $ 4 billion too low. Lets hope the $ 12 billion capital injection from Singapour & the Middle East at fire sale prices will be still enough after the next forecast is hitting the tape..... I think the image as a rock solid Swiss banking giant is now gone and it will take a very long time to bring the once almost perfect reputation back. I assume that this debacle will also infect the much more important wealth management division. A break up is more than likely....

Was für ein Debakel. Sieht so aus als wenn die 8 Wochen alte Prognose mal eben um satte 40% oder $ 4 Mrd verfehlt worden ist. Bleibt die vage Hoffnung das die 12 Mrd $ Kapitalspritzen aus Singapur und dem mittleren Osten auch noch nach der nächsten Prognose immer noch ausreichend sind....... Der Ruf als solide schweizer Bankenadresse dürfte auf Jahre hinaus vernichtet worden sein. Ich kann mir kaum vorstellen das dieses Disaster ohne Auswirkungen auf die Vermögensverwaltung ( die mit abstand wichtigste Sparte ) bleiben wird. UBS wird wohl in der jetzigen Form die nächsten Jahre kaum überstehen.

FT Alphaville UBS, Europe’s largest bank by assets, reported a record loss after about $14bn of writedowns on assets infected by subprime mortgages in the US, reports Bloomberg on Wednesday.The fourth-quarter net loss of 12.5bn Swiss francs ($11.4bn) will result in a full-year loss of about CHF4.4bn, the Zurich-based bank said in a statement on Wednesday.

UBS posted its first annual loss since the company was created through a merger a decade ago, and the Q4 loss was bigger than the record declines reported earlier this month by Citigroup and Merrill Lynch. The collapse of the US subprime mortgage market has led to more than $130bn of losses and markdowns at securities firms and banks since June, notes Bloomberg.

UBS reported about $12bn of losses directly linked to the subprime market and an additional $2bn for positions related to the US residential market. The company said its Tier 1 capital ratio, a measure of financial strength, was 8.8 per cent as of December 31, reported Bloomberg.

60 Minutes Legitimizes Walking Away

I have borrowed the headline 60 Minutes Legitimizes Walking Away from Mish. He has also some more thoughts on this topic ( read also The Business of Walking Away ) . Also a hat tip to my friends from Housing Doom for digging the Youtube version. I hope this clip shows especially the European visitors how bleak the reality looks like and why we are still in the beginning of this painful process of the "correction". Lots of Germans ( including Landesbanker like West LB , Sachsen LB, IKB etc.) can´t understand that it is possible to just "walk away" from the house without facing consequences for the rest of their lifetime like here in Germany.

Dank geht an Mish für die "geborgte" Überschrift die eine ganz neue Dynamik in den "Anpassungsprozeß" der US Immobilienkrise bringen wird . Hier weitere Gedanken von Mish The Business of Walking Away . Zudem dank an Housing Doom für das aufstöbern der Youtube Version.

Nur zur Erläuterung muß erklärt werden das anders als in Deutschland die Haftungen in großen Teilen der USA und insbesondere in den Hochburgen wie Kalifornien bei einer Zwangsvollstreckung komplett anders als zum Beispiel in Deutschland gestaltet sind. Dort wird nur mit der Immobilie gehaftet. Das ist gleichbedeutend damit das selbst wenn die Immobile unter den Hammer kommt und die Bank wie momentan üblich gigantische Verluste macht der Schuldner nicht für diesen Verlust einzustehen hat.

Praktisch, oder?

Würde mal tippen, das auch dieses Neuland für die Manager der Landesbanken ist ( siehe Sachsen LB, West LB , IKB usw ) Sinnvollerweise haben die Verantwortlichen oftmals gleich die ganze Bank aufs Spiel gesetzt um auch ja genug US Hypothekenpapiere zu erwerben.....

So kommt es vor das zum Beispiel wenn ein Haus auf der gegenüberliegenden Straßenseite für 300.000 $ zum Verkauf steht und man für sein eigenes Objekt mit 400.000 $ in der Kreide steht ( Eigenkapital war ja zum Glück dank der wahnwitzigen Finanzierungen in den letzten Jahren aus der Mode gekommen ) es nur logisch ist das neue Objekt zu erwerben und das andere in die Zwangsvollstreckung gehen zu lassen. Der damit ruinierte Creditscore sollte bei dieser Ersparniss nicht weiter ins Gewicht fallen. Noch besser wird es wenn man es sogar geschafft hat während Zeiten steigender Immopreise die Refinanzierungskeule zu schwingen und siene Immobilien mit immer neuen Hypotheken zu belasten. Welch gigantische Ausmaße das ganze in der Verganheit angenommen hat zeigt eindrucksvoll dieser Chart.

Schweizer Ansichten von meinen geschätzen Bloggerkollegen gibt es auf Zeitenwende

Societe Generale reports $7.1 bln trading loss from "fraud"

ice internal risk management...... In the end this is probably good news. ( You know that times are really bad when an € 5.5 billion capital infusion at fire sale prices is been widely seen as good news.....) There were rumors crashing the stock and the entire sector that they would have a big write down. But this write down seems (at least that´s what i hope) to be company specific. And some still wonder why banks don´t trust each other.......Probably the most important part is that SocGen is starting to write down some insurance from monolines and from a total of € 550 mio and only € 50 mio is coming from ACA! ( watch page 10 on the presentation )

Nette Risikokontrolle..... Unterm Strich dürfte das aber trotzdem für eine große Erleichterung sorgen ( Der Umstand das eine massive Kaitalspritze von üver 5,5 Mrd € zu Ausverkaufspreisen als gute Nachricht angesehen wird sagt eigentlch schon alles aus...). Speziell in den letzten beiden Tagen hat das Gerücht um eine riesige Abschreibung den ganzen Sektor zerlegt. Das die Abschreibung jetzt größtenteils nur auf einen "Betrug" und damit hoffentlich nur isoliert zu betrachten ist sollte beruhigen. Relativ gesehen natürlich....Kein Wunder das die Banken sich gegenseitig nicht über den Weg trauen..... Ein interessanterter Aspekt ist das auch SocGen damit angefangen ist wertlose Versicherung der Monolines abzuschreiben ( von den 550 Mio stammen lediglich 50 Mio von ACA / Details auf Seite 10 der Präsentation) . Passend zum Thema hier ein Ranking vom Spiegel über die größten Fehlspekulanten Börsenschwindler, Seiltänzer, Hochstapler

You cannot make this up. FT Alphaville is reporting that Societe General has won the award for the " Best Equity Derivatives House" .....

Das ist wirklich kaum zu toppen. FT Alphaville berichtet das ausgerechnet Societe General den Preis fpr das "Beste Derivatehaus für Aktien" gewonnen hat.

“We managed the existing book very well because we decided some time before the crisis to be long volatility and be less sensitive to correlation, so the losses were minimal. We suffered on our statistical arbitrage trading activity, but that was just for one month, and minimal compared to some hedge funds or other banks. Overall, our trading activities will be approximately flat compared to last year, which is a good performance,”

Qutote: Christophe Mianne, SG CIB’s head of market activities, covering equity, derivatives, fixed income, currency and commodities in Paris

Make sure you read the Societe General Presentation for some more interesting details !

Empfehle die Societe General Präsentation für die mehr als interessanten Details zu lesen !

Live blogging the SocGen conference call via FT Alphaville

Marketwatch
French bank Societe Generale loss after an "exceptional fraud" committed by someone who usually trades plain-vanilla and European stock index futures.

It also said it was taking a 2.05 billion euro write-down, with 1.1 billion euros coming from U.S. residential property, 550 million euros coming from the U.S. bond insurers and 400 million euros in additional subprime-related risks. It will earn between 600 million and 800 million euros for the year.

The board rejected the resignation of CEO Daniel Bouton. It's going to issue 5.5 billion euros in preferred securities to J.P. Morgan and Morgan Stanley to boost its capital

The story is reminding of Nick Leeson & Barings

Erinnert mich irgendwie stark an Nick Leeson & Barings

Here is a good take from Barry Ritholtz Fed's Folly: Fooled by Flawed Futures? suggesting ( i think correctly ) that this poor trader has lead to the emergency cut

Hier eine wie ich finde zutrefende Einschätzung von Barry Ritholtz Fed's Folly: Fooled by Flawed Futures? der unterstellt das dieser durchgeknallte Trader es geschafft hat Bernanke zum größten Notzinsschritt seit Jahrzehnten zu bewegengrößten Notzinsschritt

Brace yourselves: S&P adjusts risk models

This is big big news! It was about time..... Big hat tip to FT Alphaville for bringing this up!

Wurde auch höchste Zeit..... Großen Dank mal wieder an FT Alphaville für das hervorkramen dieser wirklich weitreichenden News!


Brace yourselves: S&P adjusts risk models
Late last night, rating agency Standard & Poor’s did some quiet housekeeping.

In a late press release, S&P announced it was adjusting its cumulative loss measure on 2006 subprime collateral to 19 per cent - up from 14 per cent:

We revised our expected losses for the 2006 vintage subprime collateral to 19% from 14%, as delinquencies continue to rise, and we will recalculate lifetime loss expectations for all vintages of U.S. RMBS. Additional losses are projected to result directly for the additional delinquencies and defaults.

The press release is somewhat anodyne, but the implications of that tweak are disturbing:

It will mean huge new downgrades on CDO tranches from the 2005 vintage through to 2007 - the majority of the market, in other words.

We suspect this will push hundreds more CDOs through “events of default” and a significant number into liquidation - a likely repeat of the disastrous events in November and December, when CDOs went into meltdown and banks were forced to admit further humiliating writedowns.

S&P are also altering their metrics; RMBS rating models will now apply the adjusted cumulative loss measure over the lifetime of the structures they rate - not just (as has hitherto been the case) over a 36-month period. That will likely make senior CDO investors more keen to liquidate deals: super senior swap holders, or AAA note holders in many CDOs have thus far been keen to accelerate but not liquidate the transactions on the basis that things will inevitably improve. The new model suggests they wont: controlling note holders now have every incentive to exit fast.

The crisis won’t just be restricted to CDOs. Any structure containing RMBS will suffer; SIVs, ABCP conduits, even plain old securitisations.

And it might be the final nail in the coffin for the monolines - MBIA and Ambac. Both have maintained their crucial AAA issuer ratings by the skin of their teeth, having raised $2bn each in emergency capital to act as collateral. S&P’s metric readjustment means that the monoline stress-test they performed is now outmoded and over-optimistic.

What remains to be seen now is when those calculations will feed through into a cataract of rating actions.

> Speaking of AMBAC.......

Ambac Will Cut Dividend, Raise $1 Billion to Preserve Rating

Jan. 16 (Bloomberg) -- Ambac Financial Group Inc., the second-largest bond insurer, will slash its dividend 67 percent and raise more than $1 billion in new capital to preserve its AAA credit rating.

Chief Executive Officer Robert Genader will leave the company, New York-based Ambac said today in a statement distributed by Business Wire. Ambac will reduce the value of securities it guarantees by as much as $3.5 billion. The quarterly dividend will be cut to 7 cents a share from 21 cents.

Citigroup Still With $ 37.3 Subprime Exposure.....

I think it is interesting to read the Citigroup Results in detail. Make sure you see this Excellent Presentation. Lots of data. I have put the focus on subprime exposure and credit costs. Lets hope their internal models for valuing these securities has improved during the past 2 quarters ( UPDATE & hat tip via Calculated Risk"Citi is basing their CDO loss forecasts on house price decline of about 7% each for each of the next two years")...... But i think with the new CEO in charge there is hope that they are now more realistic. He normally has no incentive to underestimate. But after all i have seen from this company ...... Here are my earlier takes on Citigroup and here the details to the $14.5 billion of capital infusion. Nice to see that they are still paying a dividend ...... What a farce!

Ich denke es lohnt sich die Citigroup Results im Detail durchzulesen. Kann jedem diese excellente Präsentation ans Herz legen. Haufenweise Infos die ein Bild geben was in den einzelnen Märkten so vor sich geht. Ich habe hier setllvertretend mal die Zahlen zu Subprime und den explosierenden Kreditkosten herausgepickt. Bleibt zu hoffen das die internen Modelle auf denen die Wertermittlungen basieren in den letzten 6 Monaten besser geworden sind ( Update & Dank an Calculated Risk "Citi is basing their CDO loss forecasts on house price decline of about 7% each for each of the next two years )...... Mit dem neuen CEO an Bord bestehet aber zumindest die Hoffnung das man jetzt näher an der Realität ist. Üblicherweise neigt der neue CEO dazu bei der ersetn Ergebnisveröffentlichung unter eigener Verantwortung klar Tisch zu machen. Aber nach allem was ich bisher von diesem Unternehmen gesehen habe....... Hier meine früheren "Gedanken" in Sachen Citigroup. Zusätzlich hier die Details zur $ 14.5 Mrd Kapitalspritze. Lächerlich das im gleichen Atemzug noch immer eine Dividende gezahlt wird.....

Sildes taken from the Excellent Presentation

Credit costs increased $5.41 billion, primarily driven by an increase in net credit losses of $1.56 billion and a net charge of $3.85 billion to increase loan loss reserves.

-- U.S. consumer credit costs increased $4.1 billion, comprised of $689 million in higher net credit losses and a net charge of $3.31 billion to increase loan loss reserves. The $3.31 billion net charge compares to a net reserve release of $127 million in the prior-year period.

The increase in credit costs primarily reflected a weakening of leading credit indicators, including increased delinquencies on 1st and 2nd mortgages, unsecured personal loans, credit cards, and auto loans. Credit costs increased also due to trends in the U.S. macroeconomic environment, including the housing market downturn, and portfolio growth.

UPDATE: Here are some more links with very good insights / Hier einige andere gute Link mit meiner Meinung nach guten Meinungen

Citi Dividend, Future Prospects and Credit Cards Calculated Risk

Live-Blogging the Citigroup Earnings Call WSJ

Cost of Capital "Ratchets Up" at Citigroup and Merrill Mish

Citi confirms $18bn Q4 writedown; signs of consumer stress FT Alphaville

More Greenspan Bashing

Compare this with the exclusive view from Greenspan Alan Greenspan explains the roots of the mortgage crisis If you can stand more from Greenspan click here or watch the following video

Vergleicht das mit den doch bedenklichen Aussagen von Greenspan......Alan Greenspan explains the roots of the mortgage crisis Wenn Ihr noch mehr von Greenspan vertragen könnt klickt bitte hier oder seht einfach das folgende Video



Fed Shrugged as Subprime Crisis Spread NYT

bigger / größer

I Want My Buyback Back "Washington Mutual Edition"

Today this news is making headlines

Heute kommt diese Schlagzeile über die Ticker

WaMu to Raise $2.5 Billion in Additional Capital, Reduce Dividend, Resize Home Loans Business and Cut Expenses to Fortify Capital Base

Flashback January 2007

On Jan. 3, 2007, the company entered into an accelerated share repurchase agreement with a dealer, buying back $2.7 billion of its common stock ( Stock close to $ 40 now $ 19)

Wary of Risk, Bankers Sold Shaky Mortgage Debt

The real reason for the mess was that the so called sophisticated investors (institutional investors like pension funds, banks and hedge funds ) have done no research and obviously would be ready to win the casting for the sequel of "dumb & dumber"... Nobody was forced to buy this toxic waste and everybody with common sense ( that´s the problem) could see this coming from a very long distance. And they often call themselves "smart money"......

Niemand von diesen sogenannten institutionellen Investoren wie z.B. Pensionskassen, Banken, Hedge Fonds, Versicherungen, staatlichen Investmentfonds usw. ist gezwungen worden diesen Schrott zu kaufen. Jeder mit gesundem Menschenverstand ( da liegt wohl auch das Problem) konnte schon von weitem erkennen das diese Sache übelst ausgehen muß. Wenn man aber anscheined null Research macht und das Hirn ausschaltet braucht man sich nicht zu wundern wenn die Zeche zu zahlen ist..... Schmunzelt beim nächsten mal also wenn die Medien mal wieder vom "Smart Money" sprechen......


NYT As the subprime loan crisis deepens, Wall Street firms are increasingly coming under scrutiny for their role in selling risky mortgage-related securities to investors.

Many of the home loans tied to these investments quickly defaulted, resulting in billions of dollars of losses for investors. At the same time, many of the companies that sold these securities, concerned about a looming meltdown in the housing market, protected themselves from losses.

One big bank that saw the trouble coming, Goldman Sachs, began reducing its inventory of mortgages and mortgage securities late last year. Even so, Goldman went on to package and sell more than $6 billion of new securities backed by subprime mortgages during the first nine months of this year.

Of the loans backing the Goldman deals for which data is available, nearly 15 percent are already delinquent by more than 60 days, are in foreclosure or have resulted in the repossession of a home, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The average default rate for subprime loans packaged in 2007 is 11 percent.

“There is a maxim that comes to mind: ‘If you work in the kitchen, you don’t eat the food,’” said Josh Rosner, a managing director of Graham Fisher, an independent consulting firm in New York.

The New York attorney general, Andrew M. Cuomo, has subpoenaed major Wall Street banks, including Deutsche Bank, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley, seeking information about the packaging and selling of subprime mortgages. And the Securities and Exchange Commission is examining how Wall Street companies valued their own holdings of these complex investments.

The Wall Street banks that foresaw problems say they hedged their mortgage positions as part of their fiduciary duty to shareholders. Indeed, some other companies, particularly Citigroup, Merrill Lynch and UBS, apparently did not foresee the housing market collapse and lost billions of dollars, leading to forced resignations of their chief executives.

In any case, the bankers argue, buyers of such securities — institutional investors like pension funds, banks and hedge funds — are sophisticated and understand the risks.

Wall Street officials maintain that the system worked as it was supposed to. Underwriters, they say, did not pressure colleagues on trading desks or in research departments to promote securities blindly.

Nevertheless, the loans that many banks packaged are proving to be increasingly toxic. Almost a quarter of the subprime loans that were transformed into securities by Deutsche Bank, Barclays and Morgan Stanley last year are already in default, according to Bloomberg. About a fifth of the loans backing securities underwritten by Merrill Lynch are in trouble.

As early as January 2006, Greg Lippmann, Deutsche Bank’s global head of trading for asset-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations, and his team began advising hedge funds and other institutional investors to protect themselves from a coming decline in the housing market.

“He was really pounding the pavement,” said one hedge fund trader, who asked not to be identified because it could jeopardize his relationship with Wall Street banks.

Mr. Lippmann’s trade ideas — documented in a January 2006 presentation obtained by The New York Times — were not always popular inside Deutsche Bank, where the origination desk was busy selling mortgage securities. In the fall of 2006, Mr. Lippmann pitched bearish trades to the bank’s sales force at the same time the origination desk was bringing them mortgage deals to sell to clients.

Last year, Deutsche Bank underwrote $28.6 billion of subprime mortgage securities, according to Inside Mortgage Finance, an industry publication. In the first nine months of this year, the bank underwrote $12 billion.

Goldman Sachs also moved early to insulate itself from potential losses. Almost a year ago, on Dec. 14, 2006, David A. Viniar, Goldman’s chief financial officer, called a “mortgage risk” meeting. The investment bank’s mortgage desk was losing money, and Mr. Viniar, with various officials, reviewed every position in the bank’s portfolio.

The bank decided to reduce its stockpile of mortgages and mortgage-related securities and to buy expensive insurance as protection against further losses, said a person briefed on the meeting who was not authorized to speak about the situation publicly.

Goldman, however, did not stop selling subprime mortgage securities. The bank, like other firms, retains a piece of the securities it sells. A Goldman spokesman said the firm was not betting against the mortgage securities it underwrote in 2007.

Like Goldman, Lehman Brothers also started to hedge its huge inventory of home loans in the second quarter of this year, concerned about poor underwriting standards. But Lehman also continued to sell mortgage securities packed with shaky loans, underwriting $16.5 billion of new securities in the first nine months of 2007. About 15 percent of the loans backing these securities have defaulted.

At the center of the boom in mortgages for borrowers with weak credit was Wall Street’s once-lucrative partnership with subprime lenders. This relationship was a driving force behind the soaring home prices and the spread of exotic loans that are now defaulting in growing numbers. By buying and packaging mortgages, Wall Street enabled the lenders to extend credit even as the dangers grew in the housing market.

Not all banks continued to expand their subprime business. Credit Suisse, which had been a major player in 2005, pulled back aggressively, with its underwriting down 22 percent in 2006, compared with 2004.

But other Wall Street banks, pushing to catch these market leaders, reached out to subprime lenders. Morgan Stanley, which expanded its subprime underwriting business by 25 percent from 2004 to 2006, cultivated a relationship with New Century Financial, one of the largest subprime lenders. The firm agreed to pay above-market prices for loans in return for a steady supply of mortgages, according to a former New Century executive.

“Morgan would be aggressive and say, ‘We want to lock you in for $2 billion a month,’” said the executive, who asked not to be identified because he still works with Wall Street banks.

Loans made by New Century, which filed for bankruptcy protection in March, have some of the highest default rates in the industry — almost twice those of competitors like Wells Fargo and Ameriquest, according to data from Moody’s Investors Service.

Fremont General and ResMae, which also had high default rates, were big suppliers of loans to Deutsche Bank. Merrill Lynch had a close relationship with Ownit Mortgage Solutions, which filed for bankruptcy in December. Merrill also acquired another lender, First Franklin, for $1.7 billion in late 2006.

“The easiest way to grab market share was by paying more than your competitors,” said Jeffrey Kirsch, president of American Residential Equities, which buys home loans.

What is clear is that home loans were highly lucrative to Wall Street and its bankers. The average total compensation for managing directors in the mortgage divisions of investment banks was $2.52 million in 2006, compared with $1.75 million for managing directors in other areas, according to Johnson Associates, a compensation consulting firm. This year, mortgage officials will probably earn $1.01 million, while other managing directors are expected to earn $1.75 million.

> Can´t believe that after Ben Stein vs Jan Hatzius this is the second time i´m defending somewhat the banks. :-)

> Kann selber kaum fassen das ich nach Ben Stein vs Jan Hatzius bereits zum zweiten Mal binnen weniger Tage einige Banken verteidige. :-)

Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy / WSJ

I suggest to read the entire story including some more interesting graphs Subprime Debacle TrapsEven Very Credit-Worthy

Ich denke es ist lohnenswert sich die gesamte Geschichte mit weitern Grafiken durchzulesen. Subprime Debacle TrapsEven Very Credit-Worthy

Here the interactive version of the chart with more details

Blue Pill Accounting At ACA Hits The Wall......

I suggest to read this post from July first ACA Capitals "Preferred Measurements Of Income" or "Blue Pill Accounting" & this from just a few days ago ACA "Hypothetical Speaking....." . In hindsight lots of comments from management, rating agencies & analysts are looking like they really live in the Matrix....... Amazing! Maxedoutmama has also a very good summary on ACA Hell's Bells Ringing On Wall Street

Ich empfehle im Vorwege dieses Post vom Juli ACA Capitals "Preferred Measurements Of Income" or "Blue Pill Accounting" und dieses von vor einigen Tagen ACA "Hypothetical Speaking....." zu lesen um deutlich zu machen wie planlos sowohl das Management, die Ratingagenturen und selbstredend auch die Analysten durch die Welt laufen...... Maxedoutmama hat eine weitere erstklassige Umschreibung zu diesem Thema Hell's Bells Ringing On Wall Street

ACA hits trouble - squared FT
More bad news from the world of structured finance. Lancer Funding II - a $1bn CDO squared - has entered an “event of default”, making it the first CDO squared to hit the wall.

CDO squared are, like the name suggests, CDOs of CDOs. A CDO squared defaulting then, is perhaps significant, since it acts as a litmus test for the broader CDO universe.

And Lancer is also part of a bigger grim picture at ACA Capital, its management company. They reported their Q3s on Monday and joined the banking big-league with a $1.7bn writedown. ACA are a big manager of CDOs and also a leading provider of CDO default insurance policies - which strikes us a pretty shortsighted combination.

Considering that ACA’s prime line of business is in structured finance, a $1.6bn writedown is hardly surprising, but it’s still worthy of note for several reasons:

Firstly, relative to ACA’s size, it’s a very big hit.

Secondly, the writedown ACA has taken may yet be a lot worse. The main cause for concern here is the fact that ACA’s Q3 results only cover the period up to September 30. And the very worst month for CDOs was October. Testament to that the fact that Lancer has now entered an event of default.


And thirdly, as a monoline insurer, ACA’s problems are not just ACA’s problems. The security of their insurance - on billions of dollars of CDO paper - is dependent on the safety of ACA’s own rating. And in the light of such a big writedown and the prospect of more trouble ahead, S&P has put the group on review.

ACA has been used as a “dumping ground” by subprime securitizers says Barrons, and that might now come back to haunt them. Wall Street does indeed seem keen to prop ACA up. According to filings with the SEC, a consortium of banks has provided liquidity facilities to the company. In spite of disastrous performance, banks have also continued to take out ACA insurance, unwilling perhaps, to pull the rug from under ACA’s feet.

Barrons

ACA has long been a convenient dumping ground in which major subprime securitizers like Bear Stearns (BSC), Citigroup (C), Merrill Lynch (MER) and some 25 other prominent dealers could pitch billions of dollars of risky obligations for modest premiums.

That let them gussy up their balance sheets and shift any potential mark-to-market hits to ACA.If ACA Capital were to founder, more than $69 billion worth of CDOs, including the $25 billion in subprime paper, would come rumbling back to the Wall Street banks, and likely with heavy attendant losses.That's why Wall Street has continued to do a brisk business with the beleaguered firm.

In the third quarter, ACA insured some $7 billion of subprime collateralized-debt obligations. Even if the company survives for only another couple of quarters, that would stave off the recognition of billions of dollars of losses.

All of this, of course, is immaterial, because October has happened and its presumably now just a question of time before ACA ‘fesses up to the damage already done. Little wonder that the company’s share price has just gone down and down and down. It stopped just short of collapsing through the dollar mark on Tuesday at $1.09.

Swiss Re Writes Down $1.07 Billion on Credit Swaps

What a difference a few days made.....The headline from the earnings release on Nov. 6th was "upbeat"..... How they can be surprised from this downgrade is beyond me. Lets hope their "models" to forecast Hurricanes etc is more up to date......

Schon lustig wenn die Pressemitteilung zu den Ergebnissen am 06. November noch nahezu euphorisch klingt .... Wie man bei all den Meldungen der letzten Monate von den Herunterstufungen die