Wednesday, September 26, 2007

Earnings Quality Part XXIII........

Another example why you should read the earnings news especially from financial with great scepticism......Add this to the list of "creative accounting" like Negative Amortisation, Level 3 " Mark-To-Make-Believe Gains", Level 2 "Mark-To-Model", "Preferred Measurements Of Income", loan loss "politics" Part 1 & Part 2 etc.......
Einmal mehr Beleg dafür das man besonders die Ergebnisse der Finanzinstitute mit einer gewissen Portion "Skepsis" betrachten sollte......Hier ein paar weitere Beispiele die belegen das nicht wirklich "konservativ" bilanziert wird Negative Amortisation, Level 3 " Mark-To-Make-Believe Gains", Level 2 "Mark-To-Model", "Preferred Measurements Of Income", Risikovorsorge Teil 1 & Teil 2 etc.......
Brokers' Head-Scratcher / WSJ
Still, some investors remained concerned about earnings quality, in part, because the firms all benefited from a tumble in the value of their own debt. Accounting rules require firms to take a gain on such declines if they are applying market values to some forms of debt or financial instruments.

At Bear Stearns, the already dismal quarter would have been even worse without about $225 million in such gains. Morgan Stanley, which also had a rocky quarter, said it booked $390 million in such debt-related gains, while Goldman said it benefited from nearly $300 million in this way. Lehman didn't specify its gains, but said they helped lower to $700 million the hit the firm took from markdowns on loans and securities.
Hat tip to Barry Ritholtz
Keep this in mind when Wall Street is pointing to low pe´s......They also often forget to mention that financials are the biggest sector of almost every major US index....
Behaltet all das im Hinterkopf wenn der nächste Analyst mal wieder auf die niedrigen KGV´s verweist....... Zudem wird nur zu gerne unterschlagen das Finanzwerte der mit Abstand wichtigste Sektor aller US Indizes sind....
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Monday, September 17, 2007

Surprising Trends in Federal Reserve Data / Minyanville

Minyanville Peter does an excellent job of digging trough the details of financials. And with the financials accounting for over 30% of S&P earnings and also the largest component of almost every broader index this sector key for the further direction of the market. And until recently nobody from Wall Street finest saw this coming. And they are still far behind the curve ( see comments)..... I also highly recommend The problem with financials / Hussman with lots of additional details, charts and tables.

Hier sorgt Minyanville Peter mal wieder für Durchblick im Datenwust der Finanzkonzerne. Und da die Finanztitel der mit Abstand wichtigste Bestandteil des S&P 500 sind und bisher für knapp 30% der Gewinne verantwortlich sind sollte man diesen Sektor immer ganz genau beobachten. Die Finanztitel dominieren ebenfalls fast alle anderen gängigen Indizes in den USA. Und bis vor kurzem war für die "vorausschauenden" Analysten die Welt noch in Ordnung. Und auch jetzt noch sind Sie immer noch meilenweit hinter der Realität zurück (siehe Kommentare)... Ich empfehle zu diesem Themenkomplex noch The problem with financials / Hussman mit weiteren Details, Charts, Links und Tabellen.

Thanks to Bespoke

Minyan Peter, who has become quite popular around the 'Ville with readers and professors alike, here continues his informative series on banks. Previous entries were Bank Earnings 101, Bank Earnings 102, and Bank Earnings 103.

In Bank Earnings 103: Reading Bank Balance Sheets, I emphasized the importance of bank balance sheets as a predictor of future bank earnings. ....

Over the weekend I spent some time reviewing Friday’s H-8 to see what trends I could uncover. To make it simple for myself I looked at annualized growth trends from February to July – “the best of times” - and compared them to the annualized growth rates for the most recent four weeks reported - August 8 to September 5.

So what did I find?
The contrast in asset growth trends between small and large banks is startling. Large bank balance sheets have ballooned since early August – rising at an annual rate of almost 73% versus a 5.5% annual rate from February to July. I have written previously that credit growth in this cycle was built on an “originate for sale” business model. You really see that in these balance sheet growth statistics. With secondary markets very tight, large banks are clearly being forced to hold assets they would have previously sold.

Since early August, while large bank balance sheets are bursting, small bank balance sheets, having been flat for most of the year, are now shrinking – and at an almost 18% annual rate. The biggest declines appear to be coming from real estate related lending activity, particularly revolving home equity lines.

Large bank net assets (a Fed proxy for total capital) appear to have peaked in May and are down almost 7% since then. Small bank net asset capital, however, continues to be growing – although I would caveat that many small banks do not finalize loan loss reserves until the very end of the quarter and this may push net asset values down. As a result of balance sheet growth and lower net capital, large bank capital ratios have dropped from 12.7% of assets in May to 11.3% - still very strong, but a material decline.

The growth in large bank balance sheet assets has been largely funded through non-core deposits. Since early August large time deposits ($100,000+) have been growing at annualized rate of more than 75% (versus flat from February-July) while non-deposit borrowings are growing at a near 100% annual rate. It also appears that large banks are pulling off-shore liquidity on-shore. Net due to off-shore affiliates has grown dramatically.

Large bank balance sheet growth has not been constrained to loan portfolios. Investment portfolio growth, particularly mortgage-related securities, has been enormous since early August (+68% annualized growth rate versus less than 6% for February-July).

It appears that systemic credit extensions have also grown significantly since early August. Having declined from Feb to July, broker dealer loans and interbank loans are now growing at 100% annualized rates.

While, admittedly, four weeks is a relatively short time frame, the changes in large bank balance sheet composition since early August are significant and warrant continued focus, particularly if reported capital continues to decline.

Further, the fact that smaller bank balance sheets are shrinking raises questions to me. I will be watching small bank earnings releases to determine whether their balance declines are a symptom of weaker loan demand, more strict lending standards, or fallout from tightened available liquidity. While none is positive, weaker loan demand would represent a more fundamental economic change.

Disclosure: Short KBW Mortgage Finance Index
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Monday, September 03, 2007

The problem with financials / Hussman

It is not hard to understand why common sense from Hussman is obviously not good for the business of Wall Street. I wanted to add another point that doesn´t makes thing better. I think if the financials would be forced to account conservatively the lots of the earnings would fall apart. If you want an example of how "creative" this process has become make sure you read Wells Fargo Gorges on Mark-to-Make-Believe Gains

Es ist aus nicht weiter verwunderlich das der gesunde Menschenverstand der jede Woche von Hussman unters Volk gebracht wird nicht gut für das Geschäft von Wall Street ist. Ich habe noch einen Zusatz zum Report zu machen. Ich bin mir ziemlich sicher das die Gewinne schon jetzt deutlich geringer ausfallen würden wenn die Finanzkonzerne konservativer bilanzieren würden. Als anschauliches Beispiel wie weit die "kreative" Auslegung der Bilanzvorschriften inzwischen gediehen ist bietet sich dieser Link an Wells Fargo Gorges on Mark-to-Make-Believe Gains

The problem with financials
We continue to carry a very low weight in financial stocks. Though the recent weakness in these stocks has prompted a great deal of interest in “bottom fishing,” my impression is that such efforts are based on the same untempered assumptions of high and growing earnings in this sector that existed months ago. P/E ratios ought to be well below historical norms when those P/Es are based on record earnings and record profit margins. In my view, existing valuations are based on untenable assumptions of permanently high profit margins in this sector, with optimistic growth assumptions as well.

In 2000, this was the essential problem with the technology sector. It was some time before Wall Street's expectations caught up with the reality that profit margins are cyclical and that early declines off of overvalued peaks do not constitute bargains.

I expect that in the next year or two, we will observe at least one quarter, and more likely a full year, in which the entire profit of the U.S. banking sector is consumed by loan losses.

Consider, for example, the latest FDIC Banking Profile, which was published based on June 30, 2007 data (before the recent liquidity crisis emerged). In that report, the FDIC noted that the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans remains at a 32 year low. As for the portion of those loans that are in trouble, the FDIC notes “for the fifth quarter in a row, reserves failed to keep pace with the increase in non-current loans.” The industry's “coverage ratio” of reserves to non-current loans fell to the lowest level since the third quarter of 2002, while non-current loans posted the largest quarterly increase since the fourth quarter of 1990. Recall that 1990 and 2002 were periods when recessions were already well underway. If we're already seeing these signs of credit stress at the peak of an economic expansion, the figures we observe in a recession are likely to be a lot worse.

> Make sure you read Is WaMu the Next Countrywide? to see how ugly the situation and the quality of earnings already is.

> Ich kann jedem empfehlen Is WaMu the Next Countrywide? zu lesen um zu verstehen wie übel die Lage selbst bei einigen großen Instituten inzwischen aussieht.

> The impact on total S&P 500 earnings is if you take this table from Bespoke already over 30 percent. I have seen charts that include the impact of the financial arms from companies like GE, GM, F, Harley etc and the number is closer to 30 perecnt and 40% of the profits. Either way you look at it this number is going to decline significantly.

> Der Gewinnanteil an den gesamten S&P 500 Gewinnen liegt wenn man nach der Übersicht von Bespoke geht bei über 30%. Ich habe auch schon Aufstellungen die zusätzlcih die Finanarme von GE, GM, F, Harley usw miteinrechnen. Dann verschieben sich die Zahlen Richtung 30 und 40 Prozent. Wie man es auch dreht und wendet diese Anteile werden sich in den nächsten Jahren massiv gen Spüden bewegen.

> Here Bear Stearns as an example. I´ll bet that the real number for 07 and 08 will be much lower. How can any Analyst come up with another conclusion is a mystery to me. They should know that Bear is viewed as the most vulnerable as it generated 44 per cent of its revenue from its fixed-income business, according to Bernstein Research. It also has least exposure to less troubled markets outside the US. Here is another good story why a slump in earrnings is very likely American Investment Banks "Shots In The Dark" Economist

> Nehmt Bear Stearns als Beispiel. Ich gehe jede Wette ein das die tatsächlichen Gewinne in 07 und 08 deutlich niedriger sein werden. Wie ein Analyst hier zu einer anderen Meinung kommen kann ist mir schleierhaft. Ich gehe davon aus das denen der Fakt bekannt ist das Bear 44% seiner Umsätze im Anleihebereich macht und fast ausschließlich auf die USA beschränkt ist. Hier ein guter Link der zeigt warum dei Gewinne aller Investmentbanken wohl demnächst deutlich niedriger ausfallen dürften. American Investment Banks "Shots In The Dark" Economist

EPS TrendsCurrent Qtr
Aug-07
Next Qtr
Nov-07
Current Year
Nov-07
Next Year
Nov-08
Current Estimate 2.323.1912.7313.62
7 Days Ago 2.783.4813.4314.47
30 Days Ago 3.364.0514.6915.76
60 Days Ago 3.394.0414.7215.78
90 Days Ago 3.504.2115.2815.95

> And when you look at this table of pending LBO deals via the NYT it should be clear that the investmentbanks are also facing "loan" trouble.....

> Und wenn man sich diese Übersicht der noch zu finanzierenden LBO Deals von der NYT ansieht kann man sich leicht ausrechnen das die Investmentbanken ebenso wie die gewöhnlichen Banken einige "Kreditprobleme" zu lösen haben.... The Banks Behind the Biggest Buyouts

James Grant put it this way – “Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd, in the 1940 edition of their seminal volume ‘Security Analysis,' held that the acid test of a bond or a mortgage issuer is its ability to discharge its financial obligations ‘under conditions of depression rather than prosperity.' Today's mortgage market can't seem to weather prosperity.”

As of June 30, 2007, the net income of all FDIC insured banking institutions totaled $36.8 billion. At an annual rate, that represents about 2% of all loans outstanding. Meanwhile, net charge-offs for bad loans were already running at an annual rate of about 0.50% in June. That's in a strong economy, before the recent problems, and loan loss reserves didn't even budge from a 32-year low. Net charge offs could easily quadruple in a mild recession.

Importantly, the problems go far beyond sub-prime. In its June 30 report, the FDIC noted “all of the major loan categories posted both increased net charge offs and higher net charge off rates.” Overall, net charge-offs jumped by over 50% from year-ago levels, with a jump of over 60% for consumer loans and over 70% for industrial loans. These percentage jumps are so high because they are off of such a low base, which underscores the extent to which observed profits in the financial sector have been unhindered by loan losses in recent years. Charge-off rates have not soared as much for credit cards, but this is because the existing level of charge-offs is already high (representing over 3% of the total amount volume of credit card balances, year-to-date). In short, the problems are in all categories, and given the thin coverage of the banking system for such losses, rising charge-offs and loan loss reserves are likely to bite deeply into earnings.

For some financials, relatively high dividend yields are being touted as a measure of safety and quality for investors. The difficulty is that if earnings come under pressure, a greater share of earnings will be required to cover those dividends.

> Let us hope that the Analysts are not so far behind the curve as they were with the homebuilders Number Of The Day ....Earnings Estimates for Homebuilders..... But as i said before....Common sence isn´t good for business......

> Bleibt zu hoffen das die Analysten in diesem Fall nicht ganz so daneben liegen wie bei den Buildern Number Of The Day ....Earnings Estimates for Homebuilders..... Wie ich aber schon vorher angemerkt habe ist der gesunde Menschenverstand nicht förderlich um Geschäfte an Wall Street zu machen.....

Now the bust is taking a brutal toll. In January, industry analysts predicted that the 10 biggest builders would have average earnings per share of $3.69 for 2007; the latest forecast is for a loss of $1.18.

Of course, the long-term return is equal to the dividend yield plus the long-term growth rate of dividends. Though I don't expect forced dividend reductions for major U.S. bank stocks, I do believe that the growth rates assumed by Wall Street here are overstated. And while a well-covered dividend can produce a lower “duration” and therefore a smaller sensitivity to broad market fluctuations, it does not in itself produce an undervalued stock. ....

In any event, my impression is that the problems for financials are just beginning, and that the risk premiums demanded by investors are likely to rise. As investors have seen throughout market history, stocks having rich valuations, weakening fundamentals, and rising risk premiums typically don't constitute great bargains.

> Now compare this to the "call" from Wall Street finest.... They obviously didn´t use any realistic earnings estimate. The only way they can justify this target is probably the "Fed Model". But as Hussman also has pointed out in "Fed Model"Knowing What Ain't True every body that has to use this argument is at best clueless (try to stay polite)........

> Nun vergleicht diese Aussagen mal mit den unvermeindlichen Zielen und Prognosen für den S&P 500. Anhand von realitischen Gewinnschätzungen sind diese Ziele sicher nicht erstanden. Die einzige Erklätung wäre das das brüchtigte "Fed Model" eine gewichtige Rolle gespielt hat. Wie abermals Hussman in "Fed Model" Knowing What Ain't True geschrieben hat ist jeder der dieses Argument heranzieht im besten Fall ahnungslos ( höflich formuliert).......

Disclosure: Short KBW Mortgage Finance Index

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Sunday, August 19, 2007

Quotes Of The Day / Cramer & Hussman

Looks like Cramer has gotten over his 2 week "depression" and is now back with one of his regular U-turns. How will this guy act if we see more than a 10 percent correction ? Can´t wait for his next meltdown . But the last one should be hard to top. But with Cramer you never know. Needless to say that his severe amnesia part 218 & part 1 is still with him...

Es sieht so aus als wenn Cramer seine kurzfristige "Depression" überwunden hat und mit einer seiner üblichen 180 Grad Wendungen wieder zurückgekehrt ist. Man fragt sich wie der gute Mann bei einem richtigen Korrektur von über 10% reagiert. Ich bin jedenfall mehr als gespannt wann der nächste Rückfall kommen wird. Der letzte Ausraster wird aber sicher kaum noch zu toppen sein. Ich denke das es überflüssig zu erwähnen ist das seine Amnesie part 218 & part 1 ist immer noch nicht "geheilt"....

Jim Cramer, the CNBC television host who led the howls for the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates, got his wish today.

``They obviously heard us, they acted,'' he said on the air.


``This is the beginning of the run to 14,500.''


I´ll take the opposite view and go with the consistent Hussman

Ich denke es ist besser sich am "Anti Cramer" John Hussman zu orientieren

Look at the composition of S&P 500 earnings. Financials currently make up about 25% of the S&P 500 market capitalization, but close to 40% of
the earnings.

Wages and salaries as a fraction of U.S. corporate profits have rarely been lower. Irresponsible lending and suppressed labor costs have been strong contributors to S&P 500 earnings in recent years thanks to a massive leveraging cycle – financial profits exploded, while wage demands stayed low because it was easy to spend out of home equity withdrawals and strong real-estate gains. But these are not permanent factors, and it is dangerous to value stocks as if recent profit margins will endure in perpetuity.

Nice to see that Barrons is also "Shorting Cramer"

Schön zu sehen das Barrons ebenfalls "Cramer shorted"

If you can stand more episodes from Cramer click on the label.

Wenn ihr es aushalten könnt noch mehr Weisheiten von Ihm zu hören klickt bitte auf das Label.

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Thursday, March 08, 2007

It's behind you / economist

good story. and a good song....




Should twitchy markets scare us?
“WHAT'S that coming over the hill? Is it a monster?” The Automatic, an indie-rock band, might almost have written its recent hit with the stockmarket in mind. Most people struggle to muster much sympathy for overpaid Wall Street traders when share prices are falling. What they worry about is a market decline that seems to anticipate—or even cause—an economic downturn. ....





.. There has been a sharp fall in HSBC's activity-surprise index, which reflects whether economic numbers have surpassed or fallen short of expectations. A weaker-than-expected services-sector survey was followed by a surge in American unit labour costs, a fall in pending home sales and a 5.6% drop in factory orders, all seemingly negative indicators.


A look back at the past week or so suggests investors are indeed worried about economic growth. The assets that have sold fastest have been growth-sensitive ones—shares, commodities and emerging markets—whereas Treasury bonds have risen. Within stockmarkets, defensive shares, such as food producers, have done better than cyclical ones, such as miners.

Market turmoil also matters because financial services play such an important part in many developed economies. In America the industry makes up more than 30% of profits. Wall Street's big securities firms were on top of the world only weeks ago, basking in record profits and handing out bonuses to make Croesus blush. Last year was the best ever for the five biggest firms, which made combined profits of more than $30 billion. ......


The credit markets, to which the banks are naturally exposed, have long looked like an accident waiting to happen. In late February the interest-rate margins above Treasury bonds on high-yield corporate and emerging-market debt were very low by historical standards. Some narrowing of these spreads was justified by the fundamentals. Emerging economies are a lot stronger than they were ten years ago, with many enjoying current-account and budget surpluses. Surging profits have kept the default rate on corporate debt down to very low levels.

But investors probably became too complacent. According to Martin Fridson, a credit strategist, spreads in late February no longer reflected the return needed to compensate investors for the historic default rate on bonds. That is especially odd given that the credit quality of bond issuers has steadily deteriorated in recent years, as fewer and fewer companies have achieved the prestigious AAA rating. (thats quity an understatement.../ne leichte untertreibung. thanks to http://calculatedrisk.blogspot.com/ )

Credit spreads have widened again during the sell-off. The cost of insuring against default in the European high-yield debt market rose by almost 50% in a week (see chart). Higher costs for borrowers could prove to be a drag on economic activity.


Another element of the financial system that has caused concern is the “carry trade”, where investors borrow low-yielding assets to invest in higher-yielding instruments. Japan's low interest rates have made the yen the chief target for the trade in recent years.

When the storm broke, investors reversed their bets. .... (run to the exit forrest......)


It is tempting to believe the yen's movements have been fuelling recent events. But that may be simplistic. Stephen Jen, a currency strategist at Morgan Stanley, believes the equity and credit markets were the main arenas for a rethink on risk. Once these markets stirred, hedge funds were compelled to exit their riskier trades wherever they could. The liquid currency markets were an obvious place to start.

In any case, hedge funds were not the only ones who had been nudging the yen lower. A big part had been played by Japanese savers searching for higher returns overseas. They might limit the yen's rise. David Woo at Barclays Capital reckons that, each time the yen strengthens towards 115 to the dollar, Japanese funds will find it hard to resist the temptation to buy “cheaper” overseas assets—and start bidding down the yen again. (chart was befor the latest small rebound in the yen / der chart zeigt noch nicht den letzten kleinen rebound)


Sinking subprime mortgages, risky credit markets, reversing carry trades—any one might be the harbinger of bad economic news. Many monsters turn out to be a figment of the imagination, but this one seems more solid than most.

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