Ich denke das nich einmal die größten Bilanzierungstricks verschleiern können das sich sowohl der Gewinnausblick als auch die Bilanzstruktur erheblich und wohl auch auf längere Sicht verschlechtert hat. Soviel zum niedrigen KGV das seit jeher als Kaufargument herangezogen worden ist. Nun wird bereits auf den niedrigen Buchwert hingewiesen (siehe Kommentar weiter unten), demnächst.......
STOCKMARKET investors come in all shapes and sizes, but in the current turmoil they agree on one thing: if in doubt about a financial firm, shoot first and ask questions later.
Through the conduits’ convoluted structures, banks were able to “lend” huge amounts off-balance sheet and collect fees on no-capital-required lines of credit. No one - and I mean no one - ever expected these conduits to move from off-balance sheet back on-balance sheet and I don’t think the market yet understands the earnings, capital and liquidity impact of this migration.
If you figure you need anywhere from 6-8% capital per dollar of loans, then a move of $1.0 trln from off-balance sheet to on requires $60-80 bln in additional equity capital. I don’t know about you, but I don’t see this kind of free capital sitting around.
But it is the investment banks that continue to take most of the bullets. They helped drag stockmarkets down on August 28th after Merrill Lynch downgraded a number of its peers, citing exposure to toxic credit, a day after Goldman Sachs had done the same. An unseemly squabble over jurisdiction in a bankruptcy case against two defunct Bear Stearns hedge funds ´probably didn't help to calm nerves. It hurts all the more to fall from a great height. Until a couple of months ago the investment banks were flying. Profit records were smashed quarter after quarter. Bonus pools looked more like lakes. Valuations climbed to three times book value, implying sustainable returns on equity of over 30%, when even 25% is rare in the industry.
As long as the money rolled in, no one seemed to mind that much of the business was cloaked in mystery.
Investment banks are now paying for that opacity, even though their management of risk has improved since the last credit crisis in 1998. They are suffering from their decision to do less moving and more storing of assets: they hold a lot more illiquid, hard-to-value paper these days, and have more capital tied up in lumpy private-equity deals. Worse, some of Wall Street's most lucrative recent creations, such as conduits and CDOs, are suddenly out of favour. This is part of what one analyst, Deutsche Bank's Mike Mayo, calls “dis-disintermediation”: the return of more traditional forms of finance, to the benefit of universal banks like Citigroup.....
Thanks to iTulip
All except Bear are still trading well above book value, the level at which they are generally considered cheap.
The key now will be to reassure markets that the exotic assets on bank balance sheets are worth something. Investors are waiting with bated breath for Wall Street firms' third-quarter results, beginning in the second week of September. They may try to get as much bad news out as they can while sentiment is at rock bottom.
Mr Hintz sees it as an encouraging sign that none of the investment banks issuing bonds in the second half of August pointed to new “material” risks, as required when a company raises debt. This suggests that, while things are undoubtedly bad, the banks see no further nasty surprises in the short term.
At least investment banks are in better shape than they were going into past crises. Their capital structures are more stable: they increased long-term funding by $200 billion in the past year alone, making them less vulnerable when capital markets dry up. They are also more diversified. They have piled into commodities trading and wealth management, which remain attractive. Their proprietary trading desks, once predominantly credit-focused, now trade lots of equities too. All except Bear Stearns now earn roughly half of their non-retail revenues outside America. ....
Bear and Lehman Brothers are likely to suffer more than the rest, partly because they are smaller and partly because they are more exposed to asset-backed nasties (see chart). If conditions worsen, they may even have to buy back securities peddled to clients, as they are obliged to make markets in some of them.
The tables may yet turn. Merrill, Goldman and Morgan Stanley are more exposed than Bear or Lehman to the $300 billion overhang of unsold debt from leveraged buy-outs. This week the bankers fought back, forcing Home Depot to cut the price on the sale of its supply division and the trio of private-equity buyers to swallow higher interest rates on the debt. A bigger test of nerves will come in the next couple of weeks, when buyers are sought for more than $20 billion of loans to finance the takeover of First Data, a transaction-processing group. Were that or another big upcoming deal to collapse, the investment banks could expect a hail of bullets.
Eleven junk-rated borrowers have sold bonds since the beginning of July, compared with an average of 41 a month in the first half of the year, Bloomberg data show. Three found buyers in August.