Which “inning” of the mortgage crisis are we in? / Hussman

Once again nice "Anti Spin" from Hussman. And don´t forget that after the mortgage crises we will see the commercial real estate crises, the credit card crises, the auto loan crises.......

Einmal mehr wohltuend sachliches von Hussman der einmal mehr die in den Raum geworfenen Behauptungen in ein rechtes Licht zu rücken versucht. Ist zwar bei dem ganzen Müll ein fast aussichtsloses Unterfangen aber bewahrt vielleicht den ein oder anderen den "Rattenfängern" oder Permabullen auf den Leim zu gehen. Und man sollte im Hinterkopf verankert haben das nach der Hypothekenkrise, die Krise der gewerblichen Immobilien, die der Kreditkarten, der Autofinanzierungen usw. kommt.

Which "Inning" of the Mortgage Crisis Are We In?

One of the fascinating aspects of Wall Street is the ability of analysts to provide opinions without the faintest backing from evidence. Among the latest topics of opinion is how far the mortgage crisis has to go. Evidently, the idea is that the recession that these analysts didn't forecast is already over, so it is time to “look across the valley” on the belief that most of the writedowns are behind us.

A good way to estimate where we are in the process of writedowns and foreclosures is to revisit the schedule of resets for adjustable rate mortgages.

The chart doesn't extend out to 2010 ( see extra chart Credit Suisse), where another spike in resets will occur in the third quarter of that year, but it is enough to recognize that resets are only now entering the heavy period.

To understand the implications of this schedule, it is important to recognize the foreclosure timeline. Once a reset occurs, it takes up to 30 days for the first payment to be missed. After 90 days of attempts to catch up on missed payments, the homeowner is served with a “Notice of Default.” It then takes another 90 days with the homeowner in default for a “Notice of Trustee Sale” to be delivered, shortly after which the property is sold in a foreclosure. In short, there is generally a span of about 6 months from reset to foreclosure, which means that we have to lag the data to get the profile of anticipated loan losses.

Fortunately, only a portion of the mortgages that reset will actually go into default, but we estimate which “inning” we are currently in by calculating the cumulative amount of mortgages that will have reset at each point in time (i.e. integrating the curve), and lagging it by 6 months (roughly the span between reset and foreclosure). That produces the following profile for the cumulative losses that can be expected. Again, these are not dollar amounts, since only a portion of even sub-prime mortgages will default. While we will also undoubtedly observe losses from credit cards, commerical real estate, and home equity loans, the point here is only about the general shape of the cumulative loss curve:


Clearly, as we enter April 2008, we appear to be quite early in the mortgage crisis, with only about a quarter of the cumulative resets having occurred. That places us near the start of the third inning, where we can expect each of the nine “innings” to be about three months in duration. Unfortunately, the next three innings (quarters) are when the heavy hitters on the opposing team will come up to the plate, as the cumulative amount of resets will surge. With that surge, loan losses and foreclosures will also predictably spike higher.

Moreover, because of the bundling, securitization*, and slicing and dicing of mortgage obligations, financial companies have little ability to take the required writedowns in advance, because they don't know yet which ones will go into default. To opine that we are in some late “inning” of the mortgage problem, without reference to the reset data, is just naïve. If anything, the probable rate of foreclosure on later resets will be higher, not lower, than the earlier resets, because those later resets represent the mortgages initiated at the peak of home prices and the trough of lending standards.

60 Minutes Legitimizes Walking Away

I have borrowed the headline 60 Minutes Legitimizes Walking Away from Mish. He has also some more thoughts on this topic ( read also The Business of Walking Away ) . Also a hat tip to my friends from Housing Doom for digging the Youtube version. I hope this clip shows especially the European visitors how bleak the reality looks like and why we are still in the beginning of this painful process of the "correction". Lots of Germans ( including Landesbanker like West LB , Sachsen LB, IKB etc.) can´t understand that it is possible to just "walk away" from the house without facing consequences for the rest of their lifetime like here in Germany.

Dank geht an Mish für die "geborgte" Überschrift die eine ganz neue Dynamik in den "Anpassungsprozeß" der US Immobilienkrise bringen wird . Hier weitere Gedanken von Mish The Business of Walking Away . Zudem dank an Housing Doom für das aufstöbern der Youtube Version.

Nur zur Erläuterung muß erklärt werden das anders als in Deutschland die Haftungen in großen Teilen der USA und insbesondere in den Hochburgen wie Kalifornien bei einer Zwangsvollstreckung komplett anders als zum Beispiel in Deutschland gestaltet sind. Dort wird nur mit der Immobilie gehaftet. Das ist gleichbedeutend damit das selbst wenn die Immobile unter den Hammer kommt und die Bank wie momentan üblich gigantische Verluste macht der Schuldner nicht für diesen Verlust einzustehen hat.

Praktisch, oder?

Würde mal tippen, das auch dieses Neuland für die Manager der Landesbanken ist ( siehe Sachsen LB, West LB , IKB usw ) Sinnvollerweise haben die Verantwortlichen oftmals gleich die ganze Bank aufs Spiel gesetzt um auch ja genug US Hypothekenpapiere zu erwerben.....

So kommt es vor das zum Beispiel wenn ein Haus auf der gegenüberliegenden Straßenseite für 300.000 $ zum Verkauf steht und man für sein eigenes Objekt mit 400.000 $ in der Kreide steht ( Eigenkapital war ja zum Glück dank der wahnwitzigen Finanzierungen in den letzten Jahren aus der Mode gekommen ) es nur logisch ist das neue Objekt zu erwerben und das andere in die Zwangsvollstreckung gehen zu lassen. Der damit ruinierte Creditscore sollte bei dieser Ersparniss nicht weiter ins Gewicht fallen. Noch besser wird es wenn man es sogar geschafft hat während Zeiten steigender Immopreise die Refinanzierungskeule zu schwingen und siene Immobilien mit immer neuen Hypotheken zu belasten. Welch gigantische Ausmaße das ganze in der Verganheit angenommen hat zeigt eindrucksvoll dieser Chart.

Schweizer Ansichten von meinen geschätzen Bloggerkollegen gibt es auf Zeitenwende

Point/Counterpoint:The Fed Rate Cut Will Help Save Our Home :-) / Minyanville

LOL! It is very hard for me to stand one day without Minyanville´s "Five Things You Need To Know". The humor is just priceless. Like in this case. For a more serious view on this topic i recommend to read What the Fed's rate cut does -- and doesn't -- mean for mortgages from Mike Larson

LOL! Ich freue mich jeden Tag auf Minyanville´s"Five Things You Need To Know". Deren Humor ist einfach köstlich und trifft den Nagel auf den Kopf. Wie auch in diesem Fall. Für eine ernstere Betrachtungsweise kann ich jedem empfehlen What the Fed's rate cut does -- and doesn't -- mean for mortgages von Mike Larson zu lesen.


The Fed Rate Cut Will Help Save Our Home / Richard Jones
Thank you Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, thank you! With yesterday's 50 basis point cuts in both the Federal Funds and Discount rates, we finally are able to see some welcome respite on the horizon. Why, banks even followed suit almost immediately by lowering their prime rates 50 basis points as well. Yes, relief is finally here!

I don't mind telling you, the little missus and I were worried. In 2002 we took out a $500,000 Option ARMS mortgage, an adjustable rate mortgage with the option of making interest only payments for the first five years with a five-year incremental step-up in payments.

Everything was looking fine for the first five years. Our initial monthly payment on the Option ARMs mortgage was around $1,600. Over the past five years it has slowly crept up to $2100. That extra $500 is beginning to hurt. In August, however, our mortgage lender sent us a note telling us what the 2008 payment is going to be. Prepare to grab the seat of your pants: $4,100!!!! That's right, $4,100!!! Who can afford a payment like that?!?!

Even worse, thanks to what they call "negative amortization," whatever that means, they say our original loan balance of $500,000 is now $535,000!!! How did that happen?!?! Obviously we were worried. That kind of mortgage payment would ruin us. We'd have to sell... assuming we could find a buyer. And I don't even know that we could sell for a price that covers the $535,000 mortgage!

Well, thanks to Big Ben we're back in business, baby. Our refinancing papers are already in! We're going to take down a fixed-rate mortgage this time at a payment we can handle. See, thanks to the Federal Reserve, things usually work out just fine. My wife and I can sleep at night. Thank you Fed Chairman Bernanke! Now, I'm going to buy Alan Greenspan's new book, he's the one who started this whole thing.

Thanks to The Onion

Counterpoint By Darren Salisbury, Loan Officer
Mr. Jones, I'm Afraid There's a Little Problem With Your Refinancing Application

Is this Robert Jones? I meant Richard, sorry. Richard Jones at 233511 Magnolia Stone Haven Wintergardengreen Court Acres Estates? Ok, good. Wow, uh... Mr. Jones, I, uh, I hate to be the bearer of bad news here, but there seems to be a slight problem, with, ah, with your refinancing application. No, no we got the $500 processing fee check, no problem there. That's not refundable, by the way, just want to be clear on that. Right. Yeah, it, uh, just kind of looks like we're not going to be able to approve this refinancing package.

Yes, I'm sure. Whoa, absolutely, I agree $4,100 a month is way, way too high for a house in, ah, where are you? Right, Magnolia Stone Haven Wintergardengreen Court Acres Estates. Hey, did the developer ever finish the community pool and recreation facilities there? Wow, I'm surprised at that. They were the same developers as Crystal Glen Squire Thirstwood Cove Hammock Lake and they finished the community pool and rec center on that development six or eight months before they abandoned it. Well, on the bright side, with the Fed rate cut and all, maybe they'll come back and finish it. Would certainly help the resale value.

Yes, I checked on that and unfortunately you're outside the GSE guidelines and, look, if it ain't GSE it ain't gettin' done these days. Have you tried taking in some boarders, maybe raising some cash by renting out the east wing? Sure, but you have, what 5,600 square feet there, right? Ok, just a thought. Well, good luck with everything. If it gets down to the wire for you, give me a ring back. My brother-in-law handles distressed property sales.

Unmasking Greenspan Vol. XXIII....

SCHADENFREUDE! I can´t wait to see his new book (already at a 34% discount) to become a major flop. This guy is the most overrated person in the financial history. But this will change very soon. The timing couldn't have been much worse. For more "Greenspan Watch" i recommend Tim´s blog The Mess That Greenspan Made .

Tut mir leid, aber ich kann meine Schadenfreude nicht wirklich unterdrücken. Ich kann es nicht erwarten zu sehen wie das neues Buch ( bereits jetzt mit einem Abschlag von 34% zu erhalten) von "Easy Al" in den Regalen verstaubt oder aber zumindest in alle Einzelteile zerlegt wird. Das Timing hätte schlechter nicht sein können. Der wohl am meisten überschätze Notenbänker aller Zeiten (wird sich sicher in Rekordgeschwindigkeit ändern). Mehr über die Entzauberung von Greenspan findet Ihr regelmäßig auf The Mess That Greenspan Made

Taken from Bush, Bernanke and a bad bailout / Fleckenstein
Of course, as the mortgage-for-anyone-with-a-pulse party was in full bloom, Greenspan was busy cheerleading. In a speech April 8, 2005, Greenspan extolled the virtues of sublending:

"With these advances in technology, lenders have taken advantage of credit-scoring models and other techniques for efficiently extending credit to a broader spectrum of consumers. . . . As we reflect in the evolution of consumer credit in the United States, we must conclude that innovation and structural change in the financial-services industry have been critical in providing expanded access to credit for the vast majority of consumers, including those of limited means. . . . This fact underscores the importance of our roles as policymakers, researchers, bankers and consumer advocates in fostering constructive innovation that is both responsive to market demand and beneficial to consumers."

Naturally, it was not until after the debacle unfolded that Greenspan warned banks about imprudent lending standards.

> Another example of how the times have changed is the fact that the book from Hyman Minsky is only available within within 4 to 6 weeks. If you want to buy it now you have to buy a used one and pay at least $167,85 / 34% premium....... ;-)

> Ein praktisches Beispiel das zeigt wie sehr sich die Zeiten geändert haben ist die Tatsache das für das Buch von Hyman Minsky zur Zeit Lieferfristen von 4-6 Wochen in Kauf genommen werden müssen. Wenn man es sofort kaufen möchte muß man auf ein gebrauchtes Exemplar zurückgreifen und mindestens $167,85 / 34% Aufschlag zahlen..... ;-)

> The NYT is reporting in "Greenspan Blogs? Not for Long!" that Greenspan has shut down his blog to promote his new book after only one post....

> Passend dazu berichtet die NYT in "Greenspan Blogs? Not for Long! " das Greenspan seinen Blog zur Promotion seines Buches nach nur einem Post eingestampft hat ......

1 Year ARM Surpasses 30 Fixed Year For The First Time

I´m pretty sure that the majority of mortgage borrowers never heard of LIBOR as the most important rate when it comes to their mortgage.....

Ich bin mir ziemlich sicher das die Mehrzahl der Hypothekenschuldner noch nie in Ihrem Leben vom LIBOR gehört haben. Ärgerlich wird es wenn dieser Zinssatz dann die Anpassung des laufenden Kredites maßgeblich bestimmt......

LIBOR is an abbreviation for "London Interbank Offered Rate," and is the interest rate offered by a specific group of London banks for U.S. dollar deposits of a stated maturity. LIBOR is used as a base index for setting rates of some adjustable rate financial instruments, including Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs) and other loans.

The average rate on a one-year adjustable mortgage surged to 6.51 percent, the highest since January 2001, from 5.84 percent the prior week. The rate also surpassed the cost of a 30-year fixed loan for the first time.

Increasing Rate of Foreclosures Upsets Atlanta / NYT

If Atlanta is really a microcosm for broader national trends maybe things are not so "contained".......

Wenn Atlanta angeblich eine gute Vergleichsplattform abgibt ist die Lage evtl. doch nicht so "contained" wie Tag ein Tag aus gepredigt......

ATLANTA — Despite a vibrant local economy, Atlanta homeowners are falling behind on mortgage payments and losing their homes at one of the highest rates in the nation, offering a troubling glimpse of what experts fear may be in store for other parts of the country.

The real estate slump here and elsewhere is likely to worsen, given that most of the adjustable rate mortgages written in the last three years will be reset with higher interest rates...



A big reason the fallout is occurring faster here is a Georgia law that permits lenders to foreclose on properties more quickly than in other states. The problems include not just people losing their homes, but also sharp declines in property values, particularly in lower-income and working-class neighborhoods.

For example, a three-bedroom house near Turner Field, where the Atlanta Braves baseball team plays, fetched a high bid late last month of $134,000 at an auction by the bank that took possession of it. Almost three years ago, the new home was bought for $330,000.

While the surge in foreclosures in other big cities like Cleveland, New Orleans and Detroit can be attributed to local economic challenges, Atlanta more closely reflects the nation. Its unemployment rate, 4.9 percent in May, is low and close to the national average of 4.5 percent. And businesses here are adding jobs, albeit at a slower pace than they were last year.

Like others across the country, homeowners here took out aggressive mortgages in the last few years when interest rates were low and housing prices were soaring. Now many are falling behind — some have lost jobs or experienced other financial difficulties, but many others are not able to refinance because their homes are worth less than they paid for them and their credit is now too weak for them to qualify for another loan. ..

Atlanta also serves as a microcosm for some broader national trends: wages have been stagnant for much of this decade, homeowners have taken on record amounts of debt, and mortgage fraud has been on the rise.

An estimated 2.7 percent of all housing units in the region were in foreclosure at the end of last year, up from 1.1 percent in 2000, according to an analysis by the commission. Nationally, less than 1 percent of all housing units were in foreclosure, according to data from the Mortgage Bankers Association and the Census Bureau.

Though Atlanta has added jobs in recent years, they pay less than the jobs the region lost after the technology boom of the late 1990s ended. The median household income was only 7.6 percent higher in 2005 than in 2000, according to the Census Bureau. That is about half the rate of inflation during that period, and it mirrors what has occurred nationally.

While wages have languished, average Atlanta families are shouldering more debt. As of March, residents had bigger credit card balances, mortgages and car loans relative to their income than average Americans, according to data compiled by Moody’s Economy.com. And the equity that Atlanta residents have in their homes — the value of their house minus what they owe — has dropped 14 percent since peaking in late 2005.

By comparison, in California — the state where mortgage lending was most aggressive, real estate prices climbed fastest and homeowners have the highest debt burdens — home equity values have dropped about 10 percent from their peak in 2005.

Georgia’s foreclosure laws have also accelerated a process that can drag on for months in legal proceedings in other states. Lenders can declare a borrower in default and reclaim a house in as little as 60 days.

That still would not explain why so many people fall behind on house payments in the first place.

At the end of March, 6 percent of all mortgages in Georgia were more than 30 days past due, the fourth-highest rate in the nation, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association. Mississippi, Louisiana and Michigan had more loans past due.

Rajeev Dhawan, an economics professor at Georgia State University, has started studying the characteristics of loans on homes that are in foreclosure. His preliminary analysis of data from April shows that nearly half were for adjustable rate mortgages and many were issued in the last two years.

Auctions for a dozen homes conducted one day in late June across the Atlanta area — from gritty inner-city neighborhoods to the affluent suburb of Marietta — provide a window into how the real estate slump is playing out here.

The most prized property on offer that day was a stately four-bedroom brick home in Marietta that sits on a tree-covered lot measuring three-quarters of an acre. It fetched a high bid of $646,000, about $60,000 more than the last mortgage on the property. More than 200 people turned up at the auction, and the winning bidders were a young couple, Cameron and Jamie Clayton, who are expecting a second child this year.

“I wouldn’t say it is a steal,” said Mr. Clayton, who is an executive at The Weather Channel. “We paid the same price we would have paid on the market, maybe more.”

But about 25 miles south, an auction for the three-bedroom home near Turner Field produced a starkly different result. Corey Neureuther, a 29-year-old accountant, was the winning bidder. He said it was his first real estate investment and he was surprised that others did not bid the price up at the auction, which drew about 30 people. Having recently moved to Atlanta from New York, he said he became interested in buying property after learning about foreclosures in the area.

“I thought for sure it would sell for $200,000 plus,” he said. Mr. Neureuther said he thought that he could make money by renting out the house.

Stephanie Calhoun, the former owner of the home, could not be reached for comment. Property records show she took out two loans to finance 100 percent of the purchase price. She borrowed the money from Ownit Mortgage Solutions, a California company that sought bankruptcy protection in December after many of its customers defaulted on their loans. Investors who bought bonds backed by Ownit loans will bear the loss on her home.

Economists say auctions are generally the most efficient way to determine prices. But only about 1 percent of residential real estate sold in the country last year by dollar value was auctioned.

Most sellers still list homes and wait until they get an offer close to their asking price. At the end of March, 2.8 percent of all owner-occupied homes nationally were vacant and for sale, up from 1.8 percent at the start of 2005. That is the highest vacancy rate in the 51 years the Census Bureau has been tracking it.

Mark Rollins bought a house southwest of downtown Atlanta for $78,000 at one of the Williams & Williams auctions. The property sold for $255,000 in summer 2004. Mr. Rollins, who is a Realtor, said he planned to live in the house for a couple of years, fix it up and resell it for $150,000 when the market recovered.

Why did the house sell for so much more in 2004? Mr. Rollins has a simple theory: “The market was hot, the interest rates were low, and they were giving all kinds of deals to people.”

Mortgage Rate Rise Pushes U.S. Housing, Economy to `Blood Bath'

nothing really new but a nice summray. from "home sweet home" to "blood bath" in 24 month....always good to remember that this cover is just 2 years old and marked the peak....

nichts richtig neues aber eine erstklassige Zusammenfassung der aktuell trüben Lage. Das inzwsischen brühmte Cover im Sommer 2005 hat ziemlich genau das Top im Markt getroffen...

The worst is yet to come for the U.S. housing market.

The jump in 30-year mortgage rates by more than a half a percentage point to 6.74 percent in the past five weeks is putting a crimp on borrowers with the best credit just as a crackdown in subprime lending standards limits the pool of qualified buyers. The national median home price is poised for its first annual decline since the Great Depression, and the supply of unsold homes is at a record 4.2 million, according to the National Association of Realtors. ...

Confidence among U.S. homebuilders fell in June to the lowest since February 1991, according to the National Association of Home Builders/Wells Fargo index released this week.

Housing starts declined in May for the first time in four months, the Commerce Department reported yesterday. New-home sales will decline 33 percent from 2005's peak to the end of this year, according to the Realtors' group, exceeding the 25 percent three-year drop in 1991 that helped spark a recession. `Economic Recession'
``It's not just a housing recession anymore, it looks more and more like an economic recession,'' said Nouriel Roubini, a Clinton administration Treasury Department director and economic adviser who now runs Roubini Global Economics in New York.

Goldman Sachs Group Inc., the world's biggest securities firm, and Bear Stearns Cos., the largest underwriter of mortgage-backed securities in 2006, said last week that rising foreclosures reduced their earnings. Bear Stearns said profit fell 10 percent, and Goldman reported a 1 percent gain, the smallest in three quarters. Both firms are based in New York.

The investment banks, insurance companies, pension funds and asset-management firms that hold some of the U.S.'s $6 trillion of mortgage-backed securities have yet to suffer the full effect of subprime loans gone bad, said David Viniar, Goldman's chief financial officer. Subprime mortgages, given to people with bad or limited credit histories, account for about $800 billion of the market.
Homebuilder Stocks
Homebuilding stocks are down 20 percent this year after falling 20 percent in 2006, according to the Standard & Poor's Supercomposite Homebuilding Index of 16 companies. Before last year, the index had gained sixfold in five years.

``There isn't a recovery about to happen,'' said Ara Hovnanian, chief executive officer of Hovnanian Enterprises Inc., the Red Bank, New Jersey-based homebuilder. The company's stock tumbled 42 percent this year through yesterday.

The share of people taking out all types of adjustable-rate home loans averaged 29 percent during the past three years, compared with the 17 percent average of the prior three years, according to data compiled by Mclean, Virginia-based Freddie Mac.

Higher fixed mortgage rates and stricter lending standards mean some of those borrowers won't be able to refinance into fixed-rate loans. Many of them have seen their home's value drop even as their interest rates adjust higher.

`Millions of People'
``When all these people see their mortgage payment and it's up 40 or 50 percent, they're going to say, `We can't stay in this house,''' Pimco's Kiesel said. ``And there are millions of people in this situation.''

The average U.S. rate for a 30-year fixed mortgage was 6.74 percent last week, up from 6.15 percent at the beginning of May, according to Freddie Mac, the second-largest source of money for home loans. That adds $116 a month to the payment for a $300,000 loan and about $42,000 over the life of the mortgage.

The recent increase in mortgage rates is the biggest spike since 2004. The change means buyers can afford 8 percent less house than they could five weeks ago, Kiesel said.

``Prices are going lower,'' he said.
The housing sector will push the U.S. economy into recession unless the Federal Reserve cuts its benchmark rate at the first surge in unemployment, said Kiesel, who expects the Fed to reduce rates.

Home Equity Loans
In addition to their primary mortgages, homeowners had $913.7 billion of debt in home equity loans in 2005, more than double the $445.1 billion in 2001, according to a paper by former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy on equity extraction issued by the Fed three months ago.

About a third of that money, extracted as home values surged 53 percent from 2000 to 2005, was used to buy cars and other consumer goods, according to the paper. The interest rate on those loans doubled to 8.25 percent in 2006 from 4 percent in 2003.
If the Federal Reserve lowers the rate it charges for overnight lending to banks, that would cut the prime rate that moves in tandem with it and reduce the interest on many types of adjustable home loans, including home equity mortgages.


Boom and Bust
Homebuyers who got an adjustable-rate mortgage, a so-called ARM, in 2004 have seen their rate climb by about 40 percent. That's enough to add $288 to the monthly payment for a $300,000 mortgage. The average adjustable rate last week was 5.75 percent, an 11-month high, according to Freddie Mac.

Roubini predicts the decline in U.S. home sales will last at least another 12 months, reducing the median house price by 5 percent this year and next. That would take home prices back to 2004, when the national median was $195,200.

The primary cause of the 1990 to 1991 recession was a real estate boom and bust similar to the past seven years, Roubini said. A real estate ``bubble'' in the mid-1980s led to speculative buying and lower credit standards that resulted in widespread foreclosures, he said. The defaults triggered a credit crunch that turned into an economic recession in the spring of 1990, said Roubini, who is an economics professor at New York University's Stern School of Business.

He put the chance of a recession this year at ``50-50,'' above former Fed chief Greenspan's 33 percent estimate. A recession is a decline in gross domestic product for two consecutive quarters.

A Fed survey of senior loan officers issued in April said that 45 percent of lenders had restricted ``nontraditional'' lending, such as interest-only mortgages, and 15 percent had tightened standards for the most creditworthy, or prime, borrowers. More than half had raised standards for subprime borrowers, according to the survey.


The median U.S. price for a previously owned home fell 1.4 percent in the first quarter from a year earlier, the third consecutive decline, according to the National Association of Realtors. Before the third quarter of 2006 prices hadn't dropped since 1993. The quarterly median may dip another 2.4 percent in the current period, the Chicago-based industry trade group said in its June forecast.

Increase in Foreclosures
The share of mortgages entering foreclosure rose to 0.58 percent in the first quarter, the highest on record, from 0.54 percent in the final three months of 2006, the Mortgage Bankers Association said in a report last week. Subprime loans going into default rose to a five-year high of 2.43 percent, up from 2 percent, and late payments from borrowers with poor credit histories rose to almost 13.8 percent, the highest since 2002.
thanks to http://www.recharts.com/rt/RT_1.html

Prime loans entering foreclosure increased to 0.25 percent, the highest in a survey that goes back to 1972. That's a sign that even the most creditworthy borrowers are being squeezed, Roubini said.

``We have a lot of people, even prime borrowers, who are at the edge because they either bought with no equity, they have an ARM that's seen a rate spike, or they used their house like an ATM and turned their equity into cash,'' Roubini said. ``Many of those people are under water today, and if they have to sell, it's going to drag down values in their neighborhood.''


Adjustable Rates
Some owners are selling their homes at ``fire sale'' prices to avoid foreclosure after seeing their adjustable mortgage rates spike, said Lawrence White, an economics professor at the Stern School of Business.

``Prices will continue to soften for as long as we have distressed sellers,'' White said. Some regions of the U.S. could see price declines of 10 percent in the next six to 12 months, he said. The slump probably won't cause a recession, he said.

``It's not going to be the 1929 stock-market disaster, with people jumping out of buildings, but there is going to be widely dispersed pain for the next few quarters,'' he said.

The biggest problem is volatile home prices, said Gary Shilling, head of A. Gary Shilling & Co., an economic forecasting company in Springfield, New Jersey. Shilling put the chance of a recession this year at 75 percent.

``A lot of people went out on a limb to pay the record high prices for homes, and they're in trouble now,'' he said.

`Exploding ARMs'
Borrowers who got loans with so-called teaser rates are in the biggest bind, according to Shilling. Prices surged a record 12 percent in 2005, spurring buyers to ``stretch'' to qualify for bigger loans by using interest-only ARMs or so-called option ARMs with low introductory payments.

Some have payments based on interest rates as low as 1 percent. At the end of an introductory period, the rate can more than quadruple, leading them to be called ``exploding ARMs,'' he said. Some loans allow borrowers to choose how much they want to pay, with the balance added to the loan's principle, making it possible to owe more than the home's purchase price.

``Homeowners with adjustable-rate mortgages are getting squeezed on all sides,'' said Diane Swonk, chief economist at Mesirow Financial Inc. in Chicago. Real estate taxes have surged along with home prices, and many U.S. homeowners saw their property insurance double after Hurricane Katrina ravaged Louisiana and Mississippi, she said.

disclosure: short several hombuilder, lender

Delinquencies Subprime, Prime, Total

click on the headline to read the entire story

klickt bitte auf die Überschrift um die vollständige Geschichte zu lesen

The delinquency rate on prime loans rose in the first quarter to 2.58% from 2.25% a year earlier. For subprime loans, the rate increased to 13.77% from 11.5%.

Delinquency rates on prime adjustable-rate mortgages rose to 3.69% from 2.3% a year earlier. On subprime ARMs, the rate climbed to 15.75% from 12.02%

> and when looking at this graph it should be clear which trend the delinquency rate will take......

> und bei Betrachtung dieser Grafik sollte klar sein welche Richtung die probplematischen Kredite einschlagen werden.....

Still Renting / PIMCO / Hall of Fame

once more excellent stuff from pimco. mark kiesel was right in the past and it his current outlook seems aslo be spot on.

einmal mehr eine tolly analyse von pimco. mark kiesel war einer der wenigen die in der vergangenheit richtig lagen und ich denke auch seine aktuelle beschreibung trifft ziemlich genau zu.


One question my friends and colleagues have asked me repeatedly over the past six months is: Are you still renting? Yes! I sold my house over a year ago and continue to rent.

Back in late 2005, I became anxious about my investment in the “American Dream,” after spending a considerable amount of time and effort researching several factors that I felt would influence housing prices. At the time, I was nervous about housing and ended up selling my house in early 2006 after owning for eight years, and then, upon closing, published For Sale, our U.S. Credit Perspectives, June 2006 publication. A year ago, I suspected housing prices were set to take a sharp turn for the worse and more “For Sale” signs were coming.

Based on the current outlook for housing, I will likely be renting for one to two more years. While many factors that influence housing prices have turned negative, I suspect we have not yet hit bottom. In fact, housing prices should head lower throughout the rest of this year and next year as well. Why? Housing inventories remain high, delinquencies and foreclosures are set to rise as homes purchased over the past few years by speculators and individuals with teaser-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages come back on to the market, affordability is low, and sentiment and risk appetite has shifted negatively. Most importantly, the availability of credit is set to take a turn for the worse as lenders tighten credit standards.

This is all great news for renters and buyers who are patient. Over time, housing prices and interest rates should decline, resulting in improved affordability. This adjustment, however, will take time and occur over a period of years, not months. Housing is illiquid and prices are sticky. As a result, potential buyers should exercise patience and not jump back into the housing market too early. A year ago, I described the state of the U.S. housing market as “the next NASDAQ bubble.” The NASDAQ took over 2 ½ years to go from peak to trough. I suspect that housing prices could display a similar pattern, and we are still over a year away from the bottom. Given these risks, I prefer renting versus owning, and an investment strategy which favors defense versus offense.

Unwinding the Housing Bubble
Housing was an asset bubble influenced by bullish sentiment, robust risk appetite and speculation, lack of fundamental analysis, cheap money, inflated appraisals and easy lending standards. These factors helped to drive housing prices up to new levels and the unwinding of these conditions is expected to drive housing prices down. Never before have we witnessed so many people lever-up real estate with so little money down or “skin in the game.” This growth in mortgage debt and risk appetite helped fuel consumer spending and corporate profits. As such, the unwinding of this bubble will have broad consequences for the overall economy.

As the housing bubble unwinds, what are the implications for the overall economy and credit spreads? The U.S. economy will likely experience sub-par economic growth for the next year as declining housing prices lead to weaker consumer spending, slower corporate profit growth, a decline in business investment and less job creation. This environment favors reducing credit risk, especially to cyclical industries and lower-quality sectors of the market. As lending standards tighten and risk appetite turns more conservative, housing prices are likely to face a further leg down.

What’s the big picture? Declining housing prices will lead to a pullback in job creation and a sharp slowdown in corporate profit growth, causing the Fed to lower short-term interest rates by the end of this year. Despite lower short-term rates, mortgage rates may not follow downward, because more cautious lenders will charge higher spreads relative to Treasuries. In addition, credit spreads should widen as consumers rein in their risk appetite for housing and investors turn more cautious on the outlook for the U.S. economy. We will now turn to an analysis of the supply and demand factors influencing housing. These factors should help to illuminate the future path of housing prices over the next year.

Inventory
On the supply side, the inventory of new and existing homes available for sale remains near all-time highs (Chart 1). The homebuilder industry helped contribute to today’s record inventories through its bullish sentiment and aggressive land purchases over the past several years. Unfortunately, homebuilders have little incentive to stop building once they have purchased land for development. In hindsight, homebuilders bought too many lots over the past few years, expecting that the run-up in land prices would continue for several more years. Given that undeveloped land is less valuable than developed land, homebuilders went through the process of getting zoning approvals on their land and started the build-out process in order to monetize their investments.

Even when prices appeared to have peaked over a year ago, homebuilders continued to commit to new developments and communities. Meanwhile, even in the face of large discounts and concessions, housing order rates have fallen more precipitously than most expected, resulting in inventories remaining stubbornly high. Undeveloped land cannot be monetized without a completed home. The cost of carry, including completion guarantees, provides strong incentives for builders to keep building. Unfortunately, housing is like a supertanker, which takes time to slow down. In addition, homebuilders have little incentive to stop building when a home is incomplete, even if economic conditions soften. All of these factors help to ensure that once projects are started, they are completed, and also help to explain why homebuilders’ inventories have remained elevated despite aggressive incentives such as –10% to –15% price discounts.

The housing market faces potential new supply from other sources as well. First, a large portion of incremental housing demand over the past several years has come from speculators and investors. With housing prices now falling in most of the markets where speculative activity was strongest, yesterday’s marginal buyer is becoming today’s marginal seller. Not surprisingly, the inventories in highly speculative regions such as Florida, California, Phoenix and Las Vegas, have risen sharply. In some of these over-heated markets, supply represents several years of demand. Not surprisingly, homeowner vacancies are soaring (Chart 2). This trend may even accelerate as recent speculators with low initial equity, and negative future equity, choose to walk away from paying monthly mortgage payments on a losing investment, especially factoring in the cost of 4-5% real estate commissions.

Another source of new supply will likely come from rising delinquencies which will eventually turn into more foreclosures. A growing segment of recent homebuyers have bought homes using teaser-rate, adjustable-rate, and no-money-down or low-money-down mortgages. As adjustable-rate mortgages reset upward, the housing market will likely see increased foreclosures involving individuals who can’t afford the new reset rate on their mortgage. The total inventory of homes in foreclosure has risen to 437,041 homes, a +39% increase over the past year.1 The problem is not only in the subprime category, as delinquencies for both prime and subprime loans are rising (Chart 3).

In fact, the market’s primary focus on subprime ignores a major issue, which is that Alt-A and prime borrowers will also face “sticker shock” when adjustable-rate mortgages reset upward. Lehman Brothers estimates $421 billion of ARMs will reset in 2007 ($308 billion subprime and $113 billion prime) and $542 billion of ARMs will reset in 2008 ($349 billion subprime and $193 billion prime).2 Clearly, this is not just a subprime issue, but rather an ARM reset issue as both subprime and prime borrowers potentially are forced to put homes back on the market with almost $1 trillion of ARMs resetting over the next two years. What impact will this have on housing? According to a study published last month by First American CoreLogic, a total of 1.1 million foreclosures with losses of about $112 billion will occur over a period of six years or more with roughly 500,000 homes going into foreclosure over the next two years.3

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Rising foreclosures will result in homes coming back on the market not only at a time when current inventories are near record levels, but also when pent-up demand for housing is low. Easy lending standards and innovations in the mortgage market over the past several years brought forward future housing demand. People who would have qualified for a mortgage in the future were given a mortgage today. Why? Lenders, hungry for yield, relaxed their underwriting standards and provided cheap money. Naturally, consumers took the bait, and levered-up with record low down payments. In fact, 46% of homes purchased in the U.S. last year had less than a 5% down payment.4 Over time, homeowners with little capital at risk and negative home equity will likely walk away from homes under water. For all these reasons, housing inventories are likely to remain high over the next few years.

Affordability and Risk Appetite
On the demand side, housing affordability remains near 20-year lows due to a sharp run-up in housing prices (Chart 4). While mortgage rates have come down slightly over the past few quarters, housing remains unaffordable for a large group of new potential buyers. This buyers’ strike will continue until prices fall and/or mortgage rates decline. Given that homebuilders can’t control the absolute level of mortgage rates, we should expect buying incentives to remain elevated over the next several quarters. Given the strong incentives for buying a new home, owners of existing homes who are forced to sell will likely be forced to lower their asking prices.

We know from the NASDAQ bubble that once risk appetite changes, prices can shift violently in the other direction. Housing is different from equities because it is much less liquid; therefore price adjustments take more time. In a down housing market, the gap between buyers and sellers widens, and volumes fall. Buyers pull back and sellers take time to realize their listing prices are too high. Eventually, housing prices in entire neighborhoods will get reset downward by the weakest hand. Just as prices went up and everyone in the neighborhood applauded the newest neighbor who bought at the top, prices will likely start to fall as financially-stretched home owners and speculators sell, and are forced out of the market. As this process unfolds, risk appetite for housing should take a sharp turn for the worse. This year’s weak start to the traditionally strong spring selling season suggests we have indeed entered the “buyer’s strike” phase of the cycle.

Credit Availability, Lending Standards and Appraisals
A major headwind for housing in the near future will be more restrictive credit availability. Lenders are already increasingly asking for income verification and higher down payments. Countrywide changed their no down-payment lending policy last month, and is now requiring homeowners to have at least a 5% stake in their homes.5 Other lenders are following Countrywide’s lead, which will result in a smaller pool of potential homebuyers. The threat of increased government regulation and restrictive legislation is likely to cause lenders to reduce offerings of no-documentation loans, and to ensure that adjustable-rate borrowers can qualify at the higher reset rate. This trend will tighten credit availability for potential homebuyers.

As delinquencies and foreclosures rise, lenders will also suffer losses. This should reduce their willingness to take risk and cause credit spreads to widen, particularly for riskier borrowers. As lending standards tighten, less credit will be granted. And, credit that is granted will likely be offered at higher interest rates. In the long run, this will be a positive for the housing market, as only buyers who can afford to buy a house will buy one. However, in the short run, tighter lending standards will cause a reduction in demand for housing, and could cause the home ownership rate to fall. Given the significant increase in projected foreclosures mentioned above, an extended period of credit tightening could materialize.

As we discussed in Credit Innovation and Opportunity, our December 2006 U.S. Credit Perspectives, the mortgage industry’s ability to develop new products that kept initial monthly payments low enabled consumers to buy homes they could not otherwise afford, and was a major factor in driving the home ownership rate up 5% in the last 10 years to today’s level of 69%. With rising delinquencies and foreclosures, the downside of credit innovation will surface and may be met face-to-face with increased regulation. Innovation in the mortgage market, which has provided a huge lift to consumers and housing prices through growth in non-traditional products (Chart 5), is clearly at risk. Consumers will likely shift away from exotic mortgages, resulting in less overall stimulus for the housing market, particularly given the lack of pent-up demand for housing.

Lenders are not the only players in the real estate market who are turning more cautious. Real estate appraisers will also become more conservative in their evaluations of property. Some appraisers, who in hindsight probably inflated appraisals over the past several years, helped contribute to the housing bubble on the way up by helping to get marginal buyers and mortgages approved in order to “make the deal work.” Given heightened regulatory oversight, appraisers will turn more realistic. As lending standards tighten (Chart 6) and appraisals become more conservative, the pool of potential homebuyers will shrink. Why? A major problem in today’s housing market is not only sales to new home owners. The “move up” market, or existing owners who want to sell their current house to buy another house, is basically frozen. Outside of speculators exiting the market, this is a major reason why cancellation rates have risen. It isn’t only the speculators and investors backing away. Potential new homebuyers can’t sell their existing home to another buyer. As a result, they cannot move up. Changing buyer sentiment, more restrictive credit and less aggressive appraisals are all helping to restrict marginal buyers.

Where’s The ATM ?
Over the past several years, consumers leveraged rising housing prices and easy credit availability using their home as an ATM. Mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW) soared, allowing consumer spending to grow faster than income growth over the past several years. This process was facilitated by rising home prices and loose lending standards. As long as housing prices were rising, lenders were willing to lend, and consumers were willing to spend, as rising housing prices gave them the confidence to draw down on savings. Today, mortgage equity withdrawal appears tapped. Consumers have been accessing their homes as bank accounts, but housing prices are now falling in many areas, and credit is becoming more difficult to obtain. The slowdown in MEW has been remarkably swift. Over the past year, consumers tapped over $400 billion less equity out of their homes than the previous year. And, in looking at the four-quarter moving average of MEW divided by nominal GDP, the change in MEW as a percent of nominal GDP is now –1.8% (Chart 7). Slower housing price appreciation is causing mortgage equity withdrawal to fall sharply, and is set to detract from U.S. economic growth.

To understand why corporate profits may be at risk as a result of the slowdown in MEW, let’s turn our attention to consumer spending. Companies make money when consumers spend. And, consumers have been spending in part due to rising housing prices, which have allowed consumers to grow debt faster than nominal GDP. Why are corporate profits as a percent of nominal GDP at new highs? Some would argue the reasons are: (a) healthy productivity gains, (b) cost cutting, (c) strong global growth, and (d) low long-term interest rates due to robust global savings. Instead, I suggest turning the focus back to the consumer and housing. Thanks to rising housing prices, consumers have been able to grow spending significantly faster than income growth, through unprecedented increases in mortgage equity withdrawal. In fact, the growth in mortgage debt parallels the growth in corporate profits (Chart 8). As a result, corporate profits, and thus economic growth, are highly dependent on housing prices. As housing prices turn negative, corporate profit growth will eventually follow.

Housing Is Today’s Leading Indictor
Housing is today’s leading economic indicator. To quote our forecast from one year ago in For Sale, “with a softening housing market, we should expect tighter lending standards, a moderation in the willingness to take risk, a slowdown in the pace of asset price appreciation, less liquid markets, and rising volatility in financial markets.” On the economic front, I believe declining housing prices and tighter credit are set to unleash a sharp downturn in housing turnover and job creation. As housing prices fall, corporate profits are expected to be at risk as consumers pull back their spending.

Housing is a momentum market. Turnover rises when real housing prices, as defined as housing price appreciation (HPA) minus mortgage rates, are rising. Turnover slows when real housing prices are falling (Chart 9). Today, the growth in real housing prices is falling. We believe real housing prices will turn further negative in 2007, causing new and existing home sales to decline towards 5 million units per year, down from a peak of over 7.5 million units per year in 2005.

Housing starts and permits tend to be a good leading indicator of job growth. Through February 2007, housing starts are down –28% year-over-year. This type of decline in housing starts typically leads to a sharp slowdown in job growth, within roughly one year (Chart 10). As a result, I believe that job creation is set to slow, possibly materially. The U.S. economy created approximately 200,000 new construction jobs last year. It would not surprise me if we lost 400,000 construction jobs this year, as homebuilders complete their existing projects and then lay off workers. As corporate profit growth deteriorates with a slowdown in housing, business investment and consumer spending, layoff announcements across all sectors of the labor market will likely pick-up

here the link to the economic impact on the illegal immigrants

"Housing Slump Takes a Toll on Illegal Immigrants" http://tinyurl.com/22bv9l

The Fed should lower the Fed Funds rate as soon as we have confirmation that the employment situation is deteriorating. By that time, credit spreads will have already anticipated the fact that risk appetite is set to turn for the worse.......

For renters and potential homebuyers, my advice is to still rent. The housing market has turned for the worse but the unwinding of this bubble will take more time. Unfortunately, this is not good news for the U.S. economy, job creation or corporate profits. Nevertheless, investors who are patient and adopt a conservative investment strategy should prosper over the next few years.