Sustainable?
This graph from the FT Germany is showing the difference from the cashflow minus capital spending, dividends & net equity emissions from non financials vs the national income....
On top of this they are pointing out that the S&P 500 is currently trading at 20.4 time 2008 estimated GAAP earnings.....So much for the "cheap market" spin that is still en vogue....
And we all know that the estimates from Wall Street Finest are still way too high.
Examples like The Great Private Equity Cash Robbery of 2007 from & Big Buybacks Begin to Haunt Firms from Jeff Matthews may explain why the balance is looking so streched......

GAAP tut ganz schön weh FTD Kapital
Tut man es frecherweise doch, schaut man bei der Recherche zunächst mal ziemlich verdutzt aus der Wäsche. Laut S&P notiert der S&P 500 nämlich sage und schreibe mit dem 20,4-Fachen des geschätzten US-GAAP-Gewinns - von 2008. Selbstredend kann man diese Zahlen nicht ernst nehmen, da die Gewinnschätzungen ja durch die - ganz bestimmt nur vorübergehenden - Kalamitäten im Finanzsektor entstellt sind.
> Hier ein Beispiel von Wall Street Finest das zudem zeigt wie abseits aller Realität selbst die Schätzungen für 08 sind.
> Zudem empfehle ich jedem The Great Private Equity Cash Robbery of 2007 & Big Buybacks Begin to Haunt Firms von Jeff Matthews zumindest eine Teilerklärung dafür zu finden warum die Bilanz des Charts so übel aussieht.
Probieren wir es also mit einem anderen herkömmlichen Bewertungsansatz: der Dividendenrendite.
Doch gemessen an Zahlungen über die vergangenen vier Quartale beträgt auch die weiterhin gerade mal zwei Prozent, wobei ironischerweise der Finanzsektor mit einer Rendite von 3,3 Prozent hervorsticht und insofern nur noch vom Telekomsektor überboten wird. Legt man die Dividendenerwartungen für 2008 zugrunde, ergibt sich für den S&P 500 eine Rendite von 2,2 Prozent. Schön, aber wenn in Europa 3,8 Prozent winken, dürfte man von Amerika doch wohl zumindest drei Prozent erwarten. Nur müsste der S&P 500 schon dafür um gut ein Fünftel fallen.
Nicht doch, werden viele nun einwenden. Immerhin kaufen die US-Firmen Aktien zurück wie wild. Doch wie etwa die Citigroup zeigt, kann man sich darauf ebenso wenig verlassen wie auf die verheißenen Dividenden. Und wie lange werden die nichtfinanziellen US-Kapitalgesellschaften in der Kreditkrise wohl noch eine Finanzierungslücke nach Investitionen, Dividenden und Netto-Aktienrückkäufen von acht Prozent des Nationaleinkommens durchstehen? Ein paar Wochen vielleicht.
> Ich muß gestehen das mir dieser Indikator bisher noch nicht untergekommen ist. Was ihn aber besonders aussagekräftig macht ist die Tatsache das er über mehrere Jahrzehnte aufzeigt das besonders in letzter Zeit etwas nicht "gesund" ist. Behaltet das im Hinterkopf wenn mal wieder die Arien auf die so starken Bilanzen und die hohen Cashbestände von "Expertenseite" hingewiesen wird......Das sind oftmals dieselben die vor 12 Monaten identisches zu den Bankenbilanzen zu sagen hatten..... Bleibt zu hoffen das bei Meldungen wie Capital access: US drops from global top 10 die Experten nicht allzuweit daneben liegen.... ;-)
Labels: cash flow, credit cards, debt, pe ratio, peak earnings, private equity, profit margins, profits vs gdp, stock buybacks, tightening credit, us recession, valuations, wall street finest

'Arbitrary action'

> Here comes the definition from "Cash Advance " & "Pawn" via Cash America
Das WSJ hat ne recht gute
Strong economic optimism (... is a contrary indicator)
Another useful contrary indicator is the mutual fund cash/assets ratio, which just hit a fresh low of 3.5%. Since cash levels tend to fluctuate with Treasury bill yields, Norm Fosback of the Institute for Econometric Research noted that the relationship to subsequent market returns is significantly improved by factoring out the effect of interest rates, which I've done in the chart below. Adjusted for interest rates, mutual fund cash levels are the lowest level, relative to assets, on record. This is another sign of extreme bullishness about the prospects for the stock market and the economy. Unfortunately, such extreme bullishness has historically been well correlated with subsequent weakness.
Still, I continue to believe that it's too early to form any strong expectation of an oncoming recession. The evidence is certainly increasing, given that credit spreads have now blown wider, and the growth rate of employment is edging closer to the levels that typically indicate imminent recession risk (1% year-over-year or 0.5% over a 6-month period). The ISM Purchasing Managers Index also shifted lower, though still above the 50 level. While readings below 50 on the PMI are not sufficient indicators of recession risk in themselves, their usefulness is substantially magnified when they occur in the context of slow employment growth, a flat yield curve, rising credit spreads and flat or declining stock prices.
YPSILANTI, Mich. — On a recent evening, Christine Moellering, 40, sorted through the plastic laundry basket where she keeps the family bills, statements and coupons.
“The Sears one is 32.24 percent,” Ms. Moellering said, reading a credit card statement with a balance of $5,955, including $155 in monthly finance charges. The high interest rate took her by surprise. “That’s nice,” she said sarcastically.
Their credit card debt came to $22,228, including $380 in monthly finance charges. Interest varied from 12.1 percent to 32.24 percent. The Moellerings also have a mortgage of $93,000 and a home equity loan balance of $68,574, at 8 percent interest. ......
Credit card debt, less than $8 billion in 1968 (in current dollars), now exceeds $880 billion, more than tripling since 1988, adjusting for inflation, according to the Federal Reserve Bank. Penalty fees alone cost consumers $17.1 billion in 2006 — up from $12.8 billion in 2003, adjusted for inflation, according to R. K. Hammer, a bank card advisory firm. In part because of the debt burden, the consumer savings rate fell below zero percent in 2005 and has stayed there.
thanks to
When the couple met through
He paid for some of the expenses through a home equity loan, and paid contractors with promotional checks that came with low interest for the first year. When money gets low, the Moellerings skip paying credit card companies rather than miss a mortgage payment.
SAN DIEGO (MarketWatch) -- You may have seen that LendingTree commercial with a happy-go-lucky guy named Stanley Johnson, who brags about his big house, his new car and how, "I even belong to the local golf club. How do I do it?" he continues with a big, dumb smile, "I'm in debt up to my eyeballs." Lowering his voice, but still smiling, he adds, "I can barely pay my finance charges." The smile doesn't leave his face as he drives a riding lawn mower, saying, "Somebody help me."

He adds that it wasn't the expansion of mortgage balances that was so alarming. "It was all the new, expensive cars being purchased and added on to their auto insurance," he says. "Often people were calling to replace a Honda Accord with a new BMW or Mercedes. We were also receiving a lot of phone calls from our customers asking coverage questions: for instance, 'Is my new Rolex watch covered if I lose it on vacation in Hawaii?' "
"We see it as it happens," he says. "From industry to industry over the years, they come in groups when various industries go through turmoil. Now it's real estate's turn. I can't tell you how many mortgage brokers, builders, developers and others associated with the building industry have come in for a divorce in the past six months and it's increasing." Those not associated with real estate, but hurt by the false sense of financial security because of it, are no doubt next. Calling Stanley Johnson.
But there may also be structural reasons why investors are favouring bonds over shares. The first is that savers have changed. Pension funds and insurance companies in the developed world have become more cautious (thanks to regulation and the bear market of 2000-02) and are increasingly buying bonds in an attempt to match their liabilities. Furthermore, savers are no longer risk-happy Americans but Asian central banks, which have traditionally put bonds at the core of their portfolios.
All this has coincided with an exceptionally favourable period for corporate-debt markets. Companies have been extremely profitable, generating more than enough cash to service their debts; as a result, the default rate has been very low. Traditionally, low default rates have been associated with low spreads.
