Wednesday, August 15, 2007

Rams Home Loans Fails to Refinance A$6 Billion Debt

I have to repeat what i wrote in "Honey, I shrunk the company"

"And this happened despite no exposure to the US subprime market and a 100% mortgage insurance for their loans..... "
Ich muß wiederholen was ich bereits in "Honey, I shrunk the company" geschrieben habe

"Bemerkenswert ist das dieser Verfall stattgefunden hat obwohl kein Bezug zu Subprime besteht und die Hypotheken zusätzlich abgesichert sind.

RAMS Website

If you are buying your first home, refinancing, self-employed; you
have no deposit, want to purchase an investment property or if you simply want to cut years off your loan and manage your money better - there's a RAMS home loan to suit you.

I can see lots of No DOC , 100 percent financing and zero downs at "All our Products"

Aug. 16 (Bloomberg) -- Australia's Rams Home Loans Group Ltd. failed to refinance A$6.17 billion ($5 billion) of short-term debt as buyers shun credit markets on concern that subprime losses will deepen.

The Sydney-based lender slumped as much as 59 percent on the Australian Stock Exchange. The shares fell to 80 cents at 12:27 p.m. in Sydney, compared with A$2.50 paid by investors before the stock listed on July 27. Rams has lost two-thirds of its market value this week.

Countrywide Financial Corp., the biggest U.S. mortgage issuer, dropped the most since the 1987 stock-market crash after Merrill Lynch & Co. raised the possibility of bankruptcy while Canada's Coventree Inc. sought emergency funding after investors declined to buy its debt.

``Lenders globally who rely on commercial paper for funding will be hurt as the liquidity taps are turned off,'' said Craig Saalamann, credit strategist at JPMorgan Chase & Co. in Sydney.

The longer it takes Rams to refinance, the more it will cost the company. The yield on its short-term debt has jumped to 25 basis points more than the London interbank offered rate, or libor, it said. The debt yielded less than libor about two weeks ago.
Rams got temporary funding of A$1 billion from two of its providers, it said in the statement.

Countrywide Financial would be in ``effective insolvency'' if creditors force it to sell assets at depressed prices or investors lose confidence in its ability to raise cash, Kenneth Bruce, a Merrill analyst in San Francisco, said in a research note yesterday.
> Oh boy..... This was his comment just a week ago....

> Mal wieder spaßiges von der Analystenfront..... Hier sein Kommentar von vor einer Woche....

Less than a week ago, Bruce had reiterated his buy rating on Countrywide
> Maybe he should read Paper-Money or every other Blog (Blogroll) to upgrade his analyzing skills and get a view outside his Wall Street office....

> Er sollte evtl. mal Paper-Money oder einen anderen Blog (Blogroll) besuchen um seinen Blick etwas zu schärfen und mal den Blick für das wahre Leben ausserhalb seines Wall Street Büro´s zu bekommen.....
Thanks to Bespoke

Emergency Financing
Coventree found buyers for C$600 million ($558 million) of asset-backed commercial paper after earlier failing to sell about C$950 million of the securities. This forced as many as 17 commercial paper funds in Canada to seek emergency financing from banks.

American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. and New Century Financial Corp. have already filed for bankruptcy.

Rams included a debt-market crisis among a list of potential risks in a June 27 document for prospective investors ahead of its A$695 million share sale.

UBS AG managed and underwrote the offering, when Rams forecast a 35 percent gain in 2008 net income to A$58.6 million.


> Good that eveybody tells us the markets are cheap based on future earnings projections..... :-)

> Nur gut das man jeden Tag zu hören bekommt das die Märkte günstig bewertet sind wenn man die zukünftigen Gewinne als Maßstab nimmt.... :-)

Disclosure : Short KBW Mortgage Finance Index (including Countrywide)
AddThis Feed Button

Labels: , , , , , ,

Tuesday, July 17, 2007

ACA Capitals "Preferred Measurements Of Income" or "Blue Pill Accounting"

Oh Boy! Read the comments from the company which use their own measure of accounting and the analysts and you know how rotten the market has become. I think it is no coincidence that Bear Stearns is again involved. Needles to say that all 4 analysts have buy ratings on the stock! It gives you a good feeling when companies like ACA are providing insurance for billion of paper, doesnt´t it.....This number is taken from the 2006 annual report (large pdf ) titled "Understanding The Value" making allusions to the "enigma". This pdf could be real fun to revisit when the company runs into further trouble .......

ACA Capital’s Structured Credit business provides credit protection, using credit default swaps, on tranches of credit portfolios. We are primarily a seller of credit protection on tranches where the risk of loss is greater than that of the “AAA” rated level. We will sell credit protection below the “AAA” rated level but only when we see unusually strong value. The credits that underlie the portfolios on which we sell credit protection include corporate bonds and loans and mortgage and asset-backed securities

At the end of 2006, we had $39.4 billion of notional exposure in our Structured Credit business, with over 99% attaching at greater than “AAA” rated levels. ( End of Q1 already over $ 50.2 billion...)

Here is more from Mish on this topic

Das ist wirklich kaum zu fassen. Lest Euch bitte die Kommentare des Unternehmens durch die mal eben eine eigene Art der Buchführung benutzen. Dazu kommen einmal mehr vollkommen nutzlose Analysten die entweder wirklich nicht begreifen was Sie den ganzen Tag analysieren oder ..... Das verkneife ich mir lieber :-) Es ist sicher auch kein Zusfall das Bear Sterns erneut involviert ist. Überflüssig zu erwähnen das alle 4 Analysten Kaufempfehlungen haben. Zudem gibt einem das ganze doch gleich ein gutes Gefühle wenn Firmen wie ACA Mrd. von Papiern "versichern". Der o.g. Jahresbericht könnte in der Rückbetrachtung wenn ACA komplett implodiert ist recht lustig werden. Titel ist "Understanding The Value" und macht Anspielungen auf die Enigma....

By its own measures, everything looks good at ACA Capital Holdings, a financial management and insurance company. But other numbers do not look so good, and the stock price is falling rapidly. The company will not comment on what is going on.

In New York Stock Exchange trading yesterday, ACA shares fell 22 percent, dropping $1.87, to $6.59, on the heaviest volume in the company’s brief history. The shares have lost a third of their value since Thursday, and are trading at less than half of their value a month ago.

ACA has written billions of dollars worth of insurance on the value of financial assets, and it manages collateralized debt obligations, or C.D.O.’s — investment vehicles that invest in bonds backed by risky mortgages and other debt — on billions more. Some of the C.D.O.’s it manages for others were mentioned by bond rating agencies last week as candidates for downgrading.
But it is not clear how much pain ACA could suffer from the subprime market. In detailing its exposure to subprime mortgage loans on its Web site last week, the company said that nearly all of its direct exposure to subprime mortgage debt came through securities rated AAA by at least one bond rating agency. Such securities have generally held their value even as others have plunged in market value amid turmoil in the subprime market.
> "generally hold their value" ..... this comment is almost criminal

> der Kommentar das die AAA Papiere ihren Wert gehalten haben ist schon fast kriminell

Late yesterday, Standard & Poor’s, the rating agency, said it was considering lowering ratings on various securities issued by 19 C.D.O.’s, including 4 managed, though not owned, by ACA. The agency said the moves “reflect the increased probability of default” of underlying mortgages.

Until last month, ACA’s assurances had satisfied investors, although the stock suffered briefly on May 10, when it reported first-quarter earnings. Under normal accounting rules, those results showed that profits were down sharply, and that book value had plunged because of declines in market value of some assets.

But the stock quickly recovered to above $14 a share after the company pointed to its own adjusted measures of earnings, which showed rapid increases in both profits and book value.

In June, the shares began to slide again after the company said that insiders, primarily private equity firms that owned the company before it went public last November, wanted to sell 3.9 million shares, more than a tenth of the shares outstanding.

The proposed offering by insiders was quickly withdrawn after the stock came under pressure, but the selling intensified last week.

The company’s largest shareholder, with a 27.6 percent stake, is a fund managed by Bear Stearns Merchant Banking, an affiliate of the Bear Stearns Companies, whose own shares fell $2.58 yesterday, to $140.31. Last month, Bear Stearns was forced to bail out a hedge fund it managed that had suffered losses in subprime mortgage securities.

After ACA disclosed the extent of its subprime exposure last week, Craig Siegenthaler, an analyst at Credit Suisse, said the disclosure increased the risk profile for ACA, and reduced his price target on the stock to $12, from $17.

In a report yesterday morning, Geoffrey Dunn, an analyst at Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, reduced his earnings forecast, saying that ACA’s price had fallen because it “has no real comparable peers in the publicly traded markets, is very complex and seems to operate in areas that are at the heart of the market’s current concerns.”

But, Mr. Dunn said in an interview, “in our worst-case scenario, we think the stock has a double-digit valuation.” He said the price decline was not caused by “fundamentally legitimate concerns.” > What is this guy smoking? Worst case scenario and still double digit?

Under generally accepted accounting principles, ACA was required to take a loss for the fall in value of some derivative securities it owned, and to reduce its book value for the decline in other securities. A result was that profits were down 17 percent from a year earlier, although the company still reported profits of $11.4 million, or 31 cents a share. Its book value fell to $11.62 a share, from $13.96 at the end of 2006.

But ACA told investors that those numbers were misleading, and its chief executive, Alan S. Roseman, said the results “underscore our ability to produce significant growth throughout changing market conditions.”

Thanks to Randy Glasbergen

Mr. Roseman said that ACA’s preferred measurements of income, called net economic income and base economic income, were each up 41 percent from a year earlier. That was largely because those measurements ignored losses in derivative securities owned by the company. Assuming, as the company does, that those derivatives return to original value, there will be no long-term losses, the company explained.

In computing its adjusted book value, the company not only excludes those derivative losses but also adds in the value of future fees it will collect for managing C.D.O. portfolios. By that measure, adjusted book value rose to $24.91 a share, from $22.93.

ACA’s competitors in insuring C.D.O. values generally have AAA ratings from the rating agencies. But ACA has only an A rating
, indicating a financial position that is less solid, although still good. In affirming that rating in June, Standard & Poor’s said ACA had insured $10.3 billion in C.D.O.’s that invested heavily in subprime mortgage bonds. While that made up nearly a quarter of all bonds insured by the company, S.& P. said that the bonds ACA insured were themselves rated AAA.

>Thank God for the always up to date rating agencies and the prudent due dilligence from buyers of this safe securities.....

> Gott sei Dank haben wir ja die stets aufmerksamen Wächter der Bonität und eine genaue Prüfung der Käufer der mit AAA besucherten Papiere..........

More from Bloomberg
ACA's statement showed that for $6.1 billion of ACA's contracts, the company would start taking losses even before all of the low-rated subprime-mortgage bonds from 2006 and 2007 defaulted

For another $2.8 billion of contracts linked to higher- rated debt, the company may lose money before all the derivatives on CDO securities within them defaulted. Analysts such as ones at Wachovia Corp. say among ``high grade'' CDOs, those made up of many CDOs may face the most losses. ACA also had $444 million in exposure to a CDO containing only CDO bonds, compared with $911 million of adjusted book value, Credit Suisse analysts said.

>If someone knows more about this company and has some insights about the insurance business please leave a comment. I still having problems how it is possible to insure tens on billion with equity under 500 mio and still get an AAA rating. I was a long time shareholder from Depfa (German stock) that is also involved in the financial guaranteed business. But they only provide the guarantee on state backed underlyings / public sector finance. Quite a difference to what ACA is doing.... I hope that i´m missing a point here...Otherwise this is even worse than i could have imagined it.....

>Wenn einer von Euch mehr Hintergrundinformationen hat wie es möglich sein kann das eine kleine Klitsche mit unter 500 mio an Kaiptal bei etlichen Mrd an Papieren als AAA Versicherer auftauchen kann laßt es mich wissen. Kenne hier als langjähriger Depfa Aktionär die gleiche Konstruktion mit dem Unterschied das die ausschließlich staatliche Underlyings garatnteirt haben. Ein nicht ganz zu unterschätzender Unterschied.......

got Gold?


AddThis Feed Button

Labels: , , , , , , ,

Tuesday, March 13, 2007

Rapid Rise, Faster Fall / the new century saga / WSJ

i have also listen to the call from november and it was a desaster. the stock was around $40 even after the call.......

i habe mir ebenfalls den call vom november angetan. ein einziges desaster! bin fast irre geworden als die aktien nach dem call immer noch bei 40$ notierte....


take this as an example from the call
The company repurchased 992,500 shares of its common stock during the third quarter of 2006 at an average price of $41.66 per share for an aggregate amount of $41.4 million. Since the inception of the stock repurchase program in November 2005, the company has purchased an aggregate of 2.4 million shares of its common stock in the open market, at an average price of $39.60 per share (today 38$, round about 25% of the shares that new bought back were sold at the same time from insiders)

During the third quarter of 2006, the company issued 2.3 million shares of its 9.75 percent Series B Cumulative Redeemable Preferred Stock at $25 per share and also completed a $50 million private placement of trust preferred securities (thats the new mantra, borrow to buy back stock...../die neue realität. verschulden um aktienzurückzukaufen.....)

the company sold $410.0 million of non-prime mortgage loans during the third quarter of 2006 at an average discount of 12.9 percent of their outstanding principal balances compared with $415.1 million for the second quarter of 2006 at an average discount of 5.0 percent. (this looks like a crash!)

i suggest to read the post from november (including a very good link from russ winter who was on top of the desaster ) when you want to shake your head. http://tinyurl.com/yreyb2


now i know what the shorts from pets.com went through before the bust.

nun weiß ich wie sich die shorts von pets.com vor der implosion gefühlt haben müssen....

the only way to hide the mess would have been an attempt to report in mandarin etc.....wall street and all the analysts have really no excuse

die einzige option wie new century hätte das veschleiern können wäre gewesen wenn die in mandarin berichtet hätten.... wall street und fast alle analysten haben nüchtern betrachtet keine entschuldigung und auf der ganzen linie versagt.



....In November 2006, the Center for Financial Research and Analysis, an accounting research firm in Rockville, Md., flagged concerns about New Century's third-quarter earnings release.

CFRA analyst Zach Gast noted that the company for the first time had lumped together two categories of reserves, one for losses on defaulted loans and a second for losses on real estate that had been acquired through foreclosure. Combining those two categories allowed the company to show a small increase in reserves from a quarter earlier, he wrote. But that masked a decline of 8.7% in the reserve for losses on soured loans, to $191.6 million, he calculated.
Mr. Gast found it curious that New Century was lowering reserves at a time when defaults on subprime loans generally were surging. Had New Century maintained reserves at levels comparable with the second quarter, he estimated, earnings per share would have been at least 50% lower than the $1.12 reported.

[buyingselling]

At an investor conference on Nov. 28, New Century's co-founder and chief executive, Mr. Morrice, said that despite the subprime area's problems, New Century was "well-positioned to compete and continue to profitably grow market share."

Patti Dodge, an executive vice president, added that the company would continue to enjoy adequate liquidity thanks to "strong relationships with...Wall Street lenders."

dot.com reloaded!


here is a piece from rodger rafter who listened to a new confernce call in 2005.
hier ein wirklich brilliantes teil von rodger rafter der bereits im jahr 2005 nur den kopf geschüttel hat.

"Finanacial Fantasy Land" http://tinyurl.com/2vyr8j ( brilliant)

Labels: ,