The global gusher / economist

Worldwide, an abundance of liquidity has lured investors into riskier assets (like this story about junk bonds) in search of higher returns. Though there is no agreement on how to measure liquidity, using the global supply of dollars as a proxy, The Economist estimates that in the past four years it has risen by an annual average of 18%, probably the fastest pace ever (see chart).( that is the answer! to almost all excess in almost all asset classes / die antwort auf alle excesse in den anlageklassen )

This clumsy flip-flop has severely undermined the credibility of Thailand's economic policymakers. Yet the drastic measures highlight the seriousness of a dilemma faced elsewhere in Asia: how to curb domestic liquidity when foreign capital is flooding in. Thailand could have allowed the baht to rise further, but it had already gained against all other Asian currencies last year, raising concerns about exporters' competitiveness.
Some economists ( i´m sure they were directly from wall street!..... / bin mir sicher das diese direkt von der wall street kamen...)argue that Thailand should simply have cut interest rates to stem capital inflows, making bonds less attractive to foreign investors. But this is to misunderstand the nature of the problem. David Carbon, an economist at DBS, a Singapore bank, argues that the baht's strength is not the real issue, because Thailand's exports have continued to grow strongly. Instead, the Bank of Thailand is more worried about excessive domestic liquidity. Lower interest rates would simply add to the problem, generating higher credit growth, inflation and asset prices. Similarly, central-bank intervention to hold the baht down by buying dollars would also boost the money supply.
Moreover, as Brad Setser of Roubini Global Economics points out, Asian central banks are having to buy dollars not just because of their current-account surpluses, but also because foreign investors are moving money into the region. If the dollar subsequently falls, the central bank may make a loss on its reserves (i´n not sure that this argument is the reason behind some interventions / bin mir nicht sicher ob dieses argument zugkräftig ist), but the country's exporters gain. However, though Asian countries may be happy to subsidise their exporters they are not so keen to offer the same subsidy to foreign banks, pension funds or hedge funds.
Capital controls are a way around what economists call the “impossible trinity”: an economy cannot simultaneously control domestic liquidity, manage its exchange rate and have an open capital account. Only two of the three are possible. .....
Other Asian countries are also looking for ways to discourage foreign capital inflows. In December South Korea raised reserve requirements on foreign-currency debt to make it harder for banks to borrow from abroad. China has kept its restrictions on portfolio capital inflows, helping it to hold down its exchange rate. This, however, is squeezing the competitiveness of other Asian economies. Many economists reckon that a rise in the yuan would do little to reduce America's trade deficit, but it would certainly help to take pressure off other Asian exporters—and assist in curbing the gush of global liquidity.
The deluge of spare cash has two main sources.
The spread on emerging-market bond yields over American Treasury bonds fell to another record low last week. Share prices in emerging economies have risen by 243% on average from their trough in 2003. That still leaves the average price/earnings ratio below its historical average and less than that in developed countries, so for most markets it is premature to talk about bubbles. But if asset prices continue to climb at their recent pace, central bankers will become increasingly nervous.
Labels: capital controls, carry trade, liquidity, peg, petrodollar


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