Remnant Of A Bygone Era.......

Nice due dilligence...... If an investors pumps money to "Pirate Equity" under such "favourable" terms they deserve to get ripped off...... The same is true for most of the hedge funds out there ( UPDATE via Naked Capitalsim : Hedge Funds Continuing to Take It on the Chin & Ospraie to Close Flagship Hedge Fund After 38% Loss ) ..... Lets´hope that not too much pension fund money is involved...... The mother of all pump & dumps is probably the Fortess IPO Plundered Fortress / Pump & Dump At Its Best . Enjoy!

Da kann man wohl getrost von ganz genauer Due Dilligence sprechen... Wer Pirate Equity unter solchen Bedingungen Geld in den Rachen wirft hat es verdient so abgezockt zu werden...... Gleiches kann fast ausnahmslos für die Gebührenstrukturen der Hedge Fonds behauptet werden ( Passendes Update viw Naked Capitalism Hedge Funds Continuing to Take It on the Chin &Ospraie to Close Flagship Hedge Fund After 38% Loss ). Bleibt zu hoffen das nicht zu viele Pensionskassen involviert sind.....Die Mutter aller Deals in Sachen Pirate Equity is vermutlich der Börsengang von Fortress gewesen ( siehe Plundered Fortress / Pump & Dump At Its Best ). Glückwunsch den Altaktionären!


You Must Remember This? KKR Hopes Not WSJ
Pitching its initial public offering of stock, KKR portrays itself as a kind of new, enlightened capitalist. Fourteen times throughout its SEC filing, KKR mentions plans to align its interests with potential shareholders. It gleefully contrasts itself to rival Blackstone Group, stressing how its partners won't be cashing out in the ostentatious style of Blackstone's founders . There's even a pledge to serve the environment and other "stakeholders" tied to the KKR ecosystem.

Then there's the KKR that the firm would prefer you forget: That it already has two publicly traded investment vehicles. They've both performed miserably and have needed restructuring. KKR has proposed rescuing one of them, KKR Private Equity Investors, by folding it into its parent. The shareholders of the other, KKR Financial Holdings LLC, known as KFN, are being left to fend for themselves.

KFN was forged in the credit-slinging days of 2004 and 2005, as a vehicle to invest in the mortgage-securities market. It was supposed to show that KKR could do more than just plain leveraged buyouts, an important step for building its resume as a public firm.

KFN didn't do much to buff that resume. Outside investors have put $2.4 billion into KFN since 2004. Its market cap is now just over half that. Admirably, its two founders and other partners personally injected $57 million when the company ran into credit-market trouble a year ago. Yet last April the company had to issue still more shares, priced below their own book value, to forestall credit problems.

Despite switching away from mortgages and into the healthier market for top-rated corporate debt, KFN still trades at $9.38 per share, a deep discount to its book value of $12.71 per share.
Perhaps one reason for that discount is investors' continued worries about KFN's fee structure, which looks like a remnant of a bygone era.

For example, KFN investors pay a 1.75% management fee based on the size of KFN's equity. This takes away an incentive for KKR to buy back stock, even though this seems an obvious path for a company trading at such a discount to book.

..... of the other, KKR Financial Holdings LLC, known as KFN, has no high-water-mark feature, a typical hedge-fund provision which keeps the funds from earning incentive fees until they completely make up any investor losses. Those incentive fees, which can award up to 25% of profits above a 2% quarterly hurdle rate, are paid quarterly, so managers just need to post a good three month's performance to cash in. Most hedge-fund managers need to hold things together for a year to get paid. During 2007, when KFN lost $100 million, its managers made incentive fees of $17.5 million

That's not all, because these executives are paid again for, well, doing their jobs. On top of the management fee, KFN compensates its own executives for legal, accounting, due diligence and other services "that outside professionals or outside consultants would otherwise perform."